Chapter 2

Theorem II: The Mind is the Composite of All Neural Information-processing Processes

In the previous chapter, it has been shown that a mental process and the mind coexist with, or exist and function in accordance with and inseparably from, a certain neural process and the brain, respectively. However, by what mechanisms do mental processes and the mind do so, and, most importantly, what are they physically and ontologically? This chapter investigates these problems and provides scientific answers to them.

2.1 The Nature of the Mind and Mental Processes

For the mind, there are two mutually exclusive possibilities regarding what it physically is. One possibility is that the mind is a non-material entity that exists and functions separately from the brain, like the soul or spirit (in many beliefs), which is envisioned as a separate entity from the physical body. However, it somehow possesses the body by some mechanism so that it appears to coexist with the brain, which is a must, according to Theorem I. Apparently, this possibility seems improbable because there is a noticeable contradiction: The mind must exist and function separately from the brain but somehow appear to exist and function in accordance with and inseparably from the brain. Nevertheless, let us insist that this possibility is valid and study it to learn comprehensively about the essence of the mind-brain problem and the mind’s nature. The other possibility is that the mind is a non-material entity that exists and functions inherently in the brain, with no functionally separate entity occurring, similar to information that exists and functions inherently in electrical currents in a functioning integrated circuit (IC). In the case of a mental process and a neural process, these possibilities are the same. As the mind is composed of mental processes and the brain is composed of neural circuits, of which neural processes are the signal-processing processes, to simplify the investigation, we will investigate this problem in detail by examining the possibility of how a mental process, instead of the much more complex mind, exists and functions with a certain neural process, called its neural process, instead of the much more complex brain. 

The two mutually exclusive possibilities for how a mental process exists and functions with its neural process are as follows:

     Possibility 1. A mental process is a functionally separate entity from its and all other neural processes—existing and functioning separately from them. Thus, its functions and effects are separate from those of all neural processes. However, it somehow appears to exist and function in accordance with and inseparably from its neural process.

     Possibility 2. A mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process—existing and functioning intrinsically in its neural process. Thus, its functions and effects are inherent in those of its neural process. Naturally, it exists and functions in accordance with and inseparably from its neural process.

The means of identifying which possibility is correct is to examine the physical properties of the entity that a mental process is asserted to be. This means is based on the principle that the entity that a mental process is must have all the physical properties of a mental process. These properties are the physical properties of the mind and mental processes discussed in the previous chapter. They are listed here again for ease of reference:

Physical properties of a mental process (PM)

PM1. Defining physical properties

     PM1.1 Its nature is non-material.

     PM1.2 Its activities are signal processing

PM2. Additional physical properties

   PM2.1 Its existence is concurrent with its neural process’s.

     PM2.2 Its location is the same as its neural process’s. 

     PM2.3 Its information is the same as its neural process’s. 

     PM2.4 Its abilities are the same as its neural process’s. 

     PM2.5 Its capacities are the same as its neural process’s. 

     PM2.6 Its chronological aspects are the same as its neural process’s.

     PM2.7 Its changes are the same as its neural process’s.

     PM2.8 Its activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Next, let us examine the physical properties of the entity in each of the two possibilities as follows:

2.1.1 Possibility 1: A mental process is a functionally separate entity from all neural processes.

Suppose a mental process is an entity M (Figure 2.1) that exists and functions separately from all neural processes and the brain but appears to exist and function in accordance with and inseparably from its neural process, similar to the soul or spirit (in many beliefs), which is envisioned as an entity that is separate from the physical body and brain but seems to possess them.

The mind and the brain

Figure 2.1 M exists and functions separately from all neural processes and the brain

PM1.1 M’s nature is non-material.

This is certainly possible. However, what is the nature of this non-material entity M—what is it made of? At present, there is no answer to this question, and a hypothesis is needed for it..

PM1.2 M’s activities are signal processing.

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from all neural processes, which process electrical/electrochemical (E/EC) signals, then the signals that M processes cannot be neural E/EC signals (because we find only one type of E/EC signal in the brain—that of neural processes). The question is what is the nature of the signals used by M in processing? 

It is possible that the signals that M uses in its processing are information because information is non-material, as is M. However, if that is the case, then the problem is how M obtains this information. For example, when M (such as the visual perception mental process) deals with the outside world (such as forming mental images of things in the outside world), it must obtain the corresponding information from the outside world. But if M is functionally separated from all neural processes, how can M obtain that information? How can the outside world send the needed information (for images, sounds, smells, etc.), all of which are carried by physical carriers (electromagnetic waves, sound waves, odorant molecules, etc.), to M, and how can the non-material M receive these physical signals (e.g., with what receptors and with what mechanisms)?

It is obvious that these questions are presently unanswerable, and new hypotheses are needed to explain them.

PM2.1 M’s existence is concurrent with its neural process’s.

However, if M exists and functions separately from its neural process, why is its existence concurrent with its neural process’s existence, and what is the mechanism that ties its existence to the existence of its neural process? 

Also, if M exists separately from all neural processes, one crucial question is: What creates it into existence? If there is something that creates M, further questions will arise. For example, what creates that thing; what is the nature of that thing; and how can that thing create M to exist concurrently with its neural process? Alternatively, if M occurs from nothing by itself, many questions will similarly arise. For instance, how can it achieve that; what is the mechanism that connects its existence to that of its neural process so that their existence is concurrent; and what is the mechanism that ties its existence correctly to its neural process’s, not wrongly to some other neural process’s?

It is obvious that these questions are presently unanswerable, and new hypotheses are needed to explain them.

PM2.2 M’s location is the same as its neural process’s.

However, if M exists and functions separately from its neural process, how can it always be at the same place as its neural process? That is, how can it follow its neural process simultaneously and correctly, regardless of which way or how fast the head moves (especially when the person runs or travels fast by car, train, or plane)—what is the mechanism that keeps it anatomically fixed with its neural process? Again, a new hypothesis is required to explain this.

PM2.3 M’s information is the same as its neural process’s.

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its information need not be the same as its neural process’s. For example, if M is the visual-perception or auditory-perception mental process, the visual or auditory mental information in the mental process does not need to be the same as the information in the visual-perception or auditory-perception neural process, and the mental images and sounds do not need to be those created by the corresponding neural processes. That is, one can see or hear in the mind what one does not see or hear through the visual or auditory perception neural processes (which function for seeing via the eyes or hearing through the ears and for seeing or hearing in abnormal conditions such as illusions and hallucinations). However, such discrepancies do not occur—what one sees or hears in the mind is always the same as what one sees or hears through the corresponding neural perception processes. Thus, M’s information must somehow match its neural process’s so perfectly that its information is always the same as its neural process’s and thus seems to be its neural process’s information, as required. How can M always match its information with its neural process’s?

PM2.4 M’s abilities are the same as its neural process’s.

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its abilities need not be the same as those of its neural process. For example, the human perception mental process may have abilities that the human perception neural process does not have, such as an ability to sense electricity or magnetism in the form of electroreception or magnetoreception (like those in some animals mentioned in PM2.4-A, the previous chapter). However, such dissimilarities are never the case—the abilities of a mental process are always the same as those of its neural process. Thus, M’s abilities must somehow match its neural process’s abilities so that its abilities are always the same as its neural process’s, as required. How can M achieve that, or what mechanism keeps its abilities always the same as its neural process’s?

PM2.5 M’s capacities are the same as its neural process’s

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its capacities need not be the same as those of its neural process. For example, the human visual-perception mental process may have capacities that the human visual-perception neural process does not have, such as the capacity to see things in the infrared or ultraviolet range or behind the neck. However, such differences are never true—the capacities of a mental process are always the same as those of its neural process. Thus, M’s capacities must somehow match its neural process’s capacities so that its capacities are always the same as its neural process’s, as required. How can M achieve that, or what mechanism keeps its capacities always the same as its neural process’s?

PM2.6 M’s chronological aspects are the same as its neural process’s.

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its chronological aspects—its starting time, processing rate, and ending time—need not be the same as its neural process’s. For example, when our foot hits something hard, the mental process for processing dull, aching pain can start functioning immediately, without waiting for the corresponding neural process to start functioning, and we can feel the pain simultaneously with the hit. When given a problem to solve, the mind can finish it faster or later than its neural process. And when we close our eyes after looking at a bright lamp, the visual perception mental process can stop functioning at once, and we will suddenly see nothing, including no afterimage. But these three scenarios are never true. What really happens has been described in PM2.6, the previous chapter. Thus, M’s chronological aspects must somehow match its neural process’s chronological aspects so that its chronological aspects are always the same as its neural process’s. How can M achieve that, or what is the responsible mechanism?

PM2.7 M’s changes are the same as its neural process’s.

However, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its changes do not need to be the same as its neural process’s. For example, if M is the visual-perception mental process, its changes do not need to be the same as those of the visual-perception neural process. Consequently, one may still see the same image in the mind even after one has turned to look at other things, or one may see an image in the mind changing continuously even if one still gazes at the same thing. However, this kind of mismatch is never the case—a mental process’s changes always match its neural process’s. Thus, M’s changes must somehow match its neural process’s so that their changes are the same, as required. How can M achieve that, or what mechanism always keeps its changes the same as its neural process’s?

PM2.8 M’s activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

If M’s position can somehow be fixed at its neural process, then this property can be fulfilled because M will always be spatially associated with its neural process and thus with its neural process’s electromagnetic activities as well. However, as discussed previously in PM2.2, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, how can M always be where its neural process is? Alternatively, if the electromagnetic activities that M’s activities are associated with are not those of its neural process, what generates them? 

In summary, the possibility that a mental process is a functionally separate entity from its and all other neural processes but can appear to exist and function in accordance with and inseparably from its neural process and have all the required physical properties of mental processes carries several critical questions that are presently unanswerable. Several new hypotheses are needed to support it. 

Next, let us examine Possibility 2.

2.1.2 Possibility 2: A mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process.

 If a mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process—existing and functioning intrinsically in its neural process—it must be a non-material process that exists and functions inherently in the neural process. What is this non-material process?

When we examine a neural process carefully to find a non-material process that exists and functions inherently in it, we will find the following: When a neural process, which is the signal-processing process of a neural circuit, is functioning, material E/EC signals will be circulated and processed in the circuit. However, these are not the only things that are circulated and processed in the circuit. Information—a non-material thing that is transferable and consists of content*—is always circulated and processed simultaneously. This is because information is an inherent, non-material counterpart of material E/EC signals.

(* For a more detailed discussion of this point, please see Introduction and Definitions: Section D8 and Extra Chapter I: Information.)

Therefore, in the entirety, two processing processes occur concurrently in a neural process. The first is an obvious material process: the electrical/electrochemical-signal–processing process (EPP). The other is an inconspicuous, non-material process: the information-processing process (IPP). Both processes not only occur simultaneously but also are inseparable—they cannot occur independently of each other. Each is an inherent counterpart of the other: The EPP is the inherent material counterpart of the IPP, and the IPP is the inherent non-material (informational) counterpart of the EPP. Both constitute the neural process in different but complementary aspects: The EPP, the material aspect, and the IPP, the informational aspect.

Because the IPP is a non-material process that exists and functions inherently in its neural process, it qualifies as the entity that a mental process is. If we verify this concept with all mental processes, which are the entities that perform sensation and perception, integrative and control, and response or output functions, we will find that all mental process functions are indeed related to information processing. Therefore, it is probable that every mental process is an IPP (depicted as looping arrows existing in the brain in Figure 2.2 below).

Information processing process in the brain

(Looping circular arrows representing information being sent and processed in the IPP)

Figure 2.2 A functionally inherent IPP (looping arrows)

We must now verify whether this hypothesis is correct. If a mental process is an IPP, then the IPP must have all the physical properties of a mental process; otherwise, the mental process cannot be the IPP. Does an IPP have all the required properties? This can be verified as follows:

PM1.1 An IPP’s nature must be non-material. This property is satisfied because the IPP is non-material, as discussed above. Moreover, because the specific nature of an IPP is already known—it is a non-material, information-processing process—no additional hypotheses are needed to describe its physical or ontological nature.

PM1.2 An IPP’s activities must be signal processing. This property is satisfied because IPPs process information, which is a non-material signal that is the counterpart of material E/EC signals.

PM2.1 An IPP’s existence must be concurrent with its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an informational aspect of its neural process; its existence is naturally concurrent with that of its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, always exists concurrently with its neural process and never exists alone or with anything else.

PM2.2 An IPP’s location must be the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an informational aspect of its neural process; it is always in its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, is always where its neural process is, regardless of which way or how fast the head moves. 

PM2.3 An IPP’s information must be the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because an IPP is the informational aspect of its neural process; its information naturally is its neural process’s information. This is why a mental process and its neural process always have the same information. 

PM2.4 An IPP’s abilities must be the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because an IPP is an inherent aspect of its neural process; consequently, its abilities must be the same as those of its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, can do only what its neural process can and cannot do what its neural process cannot. 

PM2.5 An IPP’s capacities must be the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because an IPP is an inherent aspect of its neural process; accordingly, its capacities must be the same as those of its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, can perform activities only within the limited capacities of its neural process and cannot perform activities exceeding the capacities of its neural process.

PM2.6 An IPP’s chronological aspects are the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because an IPP is the information-processing process—the counterpart of the E/EC signal processing process of its neural process—its chronological aspects must be the same as its neural process’s. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, has the same starting time, processing rate, and ending time as its neural process.

PM2.7 An IPP’s changes must be the same as its neural process’s. This property is satisfied because an IPP is an inherent aspect of its neural process; its changes are naturally the same as its neural process’s. This is why a mental process, if it is an IPP, must change when its neural process changes, cannot change if its neural process does not, and must change concurrently with and according to its neural process’s changes.

PM2.8 An IPP’s activities must be associated with electromagnetic activities. This property is satisfied because an IPP is always where its neural process is, as discussed in PM2.2, and because a neural process is always associated with electromagnetic activities. This is why a mental process’s activities, if the mental process is an IPP, are always associated with electromagnetic activities and cannot exist without associated electromagnetic activities.

Evidently, an IPP possesses all the listed physical properties of mental processes. Moreover, because an IPP is non-material, it also has other physical properties that we commonly recognize, such as being shapeless, soundless, tasteless, odorless, and intangible. That is why we cannot see, hear, taste, smell, or touch an IPP, even though we have dissected countless brains and scrutinized them using various methods, from our eyes to the most advanced electron microscopes.     

However, having all the required physical properties may not be sufficient for an IPP to be the entity that a mental process is. We must examine whether the IPP has the functional properties of a mental process, that is, whether it can function as a mental process can, which can be assessed as follows: First, what a mental process can do or be depends on its abilities, capacities, and information. Second, the abilities, capacities, and information of a mental process are the same as or do not exceed those of its neural process (see the previous chapter). Third, the abilities, capacities, and information of the IPP are the same as those of its neural process (as discussed above). Therefore, the abilities, capacities, and information of a mental process are the same as or do not exceed those of the IPP. Thus, whatever a mental process can do or be, the IPP can do or be. Hence, regarding the functional properties that some philosophers believe are the properties of the mind and mental processes, such as being private, subjective, intentional, and representational, and having propositional content [1–10], an IPP also has these properties. For example, because an IPP occurs privately in an individual, as its neural process does, and because only that individual is the subject who possesses the neural process and experiences the IPP, an IPP is necessarily private and subjective, like a mental process. Similarly, if a mental process of a certain neural process represents something, then the IPP of that neural process represents that thing as well because the IPP has the same information as the neural process, which is the same as or not less than the information of the mental process. In general, if it can be asserted that a mental process of a certain neural process has some properties, such as being intentional, according to some arguments, then an IPP, which has no fewer abilities and capacities and no less information than the mental process, can also be asserted to have those properties through the same arguments. Therefore, in all aspects, both physical and functional, IPPs have the same properties as mental processes.

2.2 Theorem II

In summary, there are two possibilities: 1) a mental process is a functionally separate entity from all neural processes, and 2) a mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process—specifically, an IPP. The first possibility requires an unknown entity and several additional hypotheses to explain how the entity can have the “must-have” physical properties of a mental process. In contrast, the second possibility does not have to invent a new entity—IPPs are already existing entities in neural processes—and they possess all the required physical properties of mental processes without having to formulate additional hypotheses to explain how they can do so. Therefore, based on parsimony, it is rational to choose the second possibility and conclude that a mental process is an IPP. This theory asserts this conclusion as Theorem II:


Theorem II: A mental process is the information-processing process of its neural process.

Thus, all mental processes are the information-processing processes of all neural processes. Because the mind is a composite of all mental processes, it is a composite of all neural information-processing processes. Theorem II regarding the mind can thus be stated as follows:


Theorem II: The mind is the composite of all neural information-processing processes.

The above statement is the general form of Theorem II. However, to differentiate between the mind and the extended mind (a type of mind discussed in Section 1.2), we can be more specific by stating that the mind is the composite of all neural information-processing processes existing with the brain and that the extended mind is the composite of all neural information-processing processes existing with the whole nervous system.

Now, because the mind is a composite of information-processing processes, it is an informational entity—a non-material entity composed of information and information processing—and because the information-processing processes that form the human mind are innumerable and involve information that ranges from simple to advanced, such as complex sensory perception, problem-solving operation, and motor command execution, the human mind is an informational entity in a highly advanced form.

In conclusion, the mind—a non-material entity that exists in us (the reader, the author, other people, and our relatives: other animals with a nervous system) and can evidently execute the three activities (sensing, processing, and sending signals) for each of us—is the composite of all neural information-processing processes. A novel entity is not needed to account for the mind.

Hence, if we could somehow shrink ourselves to the size of viruses and journey through the brain, we would neither be able to spot mental processes nor the mind if we looked only at material components (neural circuits, supporting tissue, circulating blood, etc.). Similarly, walking through Leibniz’s mill [11–14], one would find only mechanical parts pushing and pulling each other but could not find something that could be sensation, perception, or thought if one looked only at mechanical parts. Yet, to account for mental processes and the mind, we do not have to conceive novel, non-material entities. The mind and mental processes are already there—being the inherent neural information-processing processes of the brain and subtly existing in its neural processes. Likewise, in the case of Leibniz’s mill, one does not have to invent novel, non-material entities, such as monads, to be perception, sensation, and thought in the mill. These entities are already there—being the inherent information-processing processes of the mill and invisibly existing in the pushing-pulling processes of the mechanical parts of the mill.

Finally, because mental processes and the mind inherently co-function with material processes—the EPPs, which can physically affect the outside material world—mental processes and the mind can affect the outside material world. However, they do not and cannot do this separately from the EPPs, and the EPPs do not and cannot do this separately from mental processes and the mind. Both types jointly affect the external material world as a single entity. This answers the question of how mental processes and the mind, which are non-material, can affect material entities in the physical world.


2.3 Implications and Predictions

Implications

Because the EPP, or E/EC signal-processing process, of a certain neural process is the material counterpart of the IPP, or mental process, of the same neural process, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be surrogates for those of the mental process (IPP). Therefore, it is possible to study (measure, monitor, compare, etc.) a mental process physically (qualitatively and quantitatively) by studying the physical characteristics of its neural process’s EPP, such as the number of neurons participating in the processing, details of the signaling, and electrical and magnetic parameters of the processing. For example,

     – EPP characteristics, such as the signaling pattern, can be used to identify the exact mental process that is occurring, such as the exact visual image, thought, or emotion that is occurring in a person’s mind at the time of examination. This could be the basis for mind reading.

     – EPP characteristics, such as the number of neurons participating in the processing process or the electrical or magnetic parameters of the processing process, can be used to objectively quantify and compare mental processes, such as to quantify the intensity of the feeling of pain, anger, or alertness that a person is experiencing, and to compare who is stronger experiencing pain or anger or who is more alert. This could be the basis for various types of mental meters.

In addition, because EPPs and IPPs are inseparable counterparts and can neither occur nor function independently of each other, anything that affects the EPPs will simultaneously and similarly affect the IPPs. Therefore, they are always created, changed, and destroyed simultaneously and similarly in all events and experiments. This can be the basis for experiments using EPPs as surrogates to study IPPs and mental processes.

Predictions

  1. A mental process can be identified, quantified, or monitored by identifying, quantifying, or monitoring, respectively, only its EPP. These EPP investigations are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding mental process investigations to result, while these actions on anything else without involving the EPP will not result in the corresponding mental process investigations.
    Note. An EPP can be identified as the EPP of a mental process by investigations that observe and may also manipulate potential EPPs concurrently with observing the mental process. In various investigations, the EPP that consistently changes concomitantly and correspondingly with the mental process will be that EPP.
  2. A mental process can be created, modified, tested, or destroyed by creating, modifying, testing, or destroying, respectively, only its EPP. These actions on the EPP are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding actions on the mental process to occur, while these actions on anything else without involving the EPP will not result in the corresponding actions on the mental process.
  3. In an event or experiment, all predictions that are valid for an EPP, such as whether the EPP will occur, change, or disappear, will be identically valid for the mental process of that EPP; that is, the changes that occur in the EPP and those in the mental process of that EPP will be identical in all aspects (quality, quantity, temporal pattern, etc.). For example, if it is predicted that the EPP will change its function abruptly from processing visual signals of a static, faint, homogeneous red color to processing visual signals of a dynamic, vivid, complex movie, it will be found that the changes in the mental process of that EPP will be identical in all aspects, such as identical changes from a homogeneous color to a complex movie (quality), from faint to vivid (quantity), and abruptly from static to dynamic (temporal pattern).

All the above predictions can be verified by experiments in conscious, communicative human subjects. A typical experiment is to monitor a mental process’s occurrence, existence, change, etc. by having the subject report what happens to his or her mental process while concomitantly monitoring the EPP by methods such as fMRI [15–23], MEG [18,24–28], ECoG [29–44], stereoelectroencephalography [45,46], and single-unit recordings [47–54] and while the subject’s EPP is being manipulated by methods such as drug administration, electrical stimulation [55–63], or magnetic stimulation [64–77].

2.4 Remarks

Preceding concepts

It should be noted that the idea that mental processes are, are represented by, or are caused by specific brain processes is not novel. For example, Smart (1959) said that “When I say that a sensation is a brain process …, I am using is in the sense of strict identity.” [78]; Bogen (2007) said that “… every sensation, thought, feeling, memory, and expectation is represented in the brain by a neuronal activity pattern (NAP).” [79]; Dehaene (2014) said that “Many stimulation studies … have demonstrated a direct causal mapping between neural states and conscious perception. … that the relation between these neuron’s firing and the corresponding perception is causal … that your mental life arises entirely from the activity of the brain.” [80]; Moutoussis (2016) said that “… a specific brain–activation pattern, leading to the formation of a specific percept. … specific, individual perceptual experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation pattern …” [4]; Roederer (2016) said that “when does a specific distribution of neural firings actually become a mental image? This neural activity distribution does not become anything—it is the image” and that “the dynamic spatio-temporal distribution of neural impulses and the quasi-static spatial distribution of synapses and their efficiencies together are the physical realization of the global state of a functioning brain at any instant of time.” [81]; lastly, Weisberg (2018) said that “First, we find stimuli that reliably trigger reports of phenomenally conscious states from subjects. Then we find what neural processes are reliably correlated with those reported experiences. It can then be argued on the basis of parsimony that the reported conscious state just is the neural state.” [10].

The concept that the mind and mental processes are signal-processing processes, information-processing processes, computational devices, or computing systems is not novel either. For example, Varvatsoulias (2014) discussed in detail various opinions on the concept that the human mind is a computational process device [82]; Velmans (2002,2009) said that “we can say that mind is a psychophysical process that encodes information, developing over time.” [83] and that “mind can be thought of as a form of information processing,” [84]; Rescorla (2020) discussed the Computational Theory of the Mind, which many philosophers supported and which states that the mind is a computing system [85]; lastly, Doyle (The Information Philosopher) said that “The mind is a biological information processing system.” [86] and that “The mind is the immaterial information in the brain.” [87] These ideas are also evident in science fiction. The movie series The Matrix, for example, certainly based their plots on these principles. Also, Doyle (The Information Philosopher) proposed, before this theory, that information, which is neither matter nor energy, might provide the basis for a kind of mental substance and said that “immaterial information is as close as a physical or biological scientist can get to the idea of a soul or spirit.” [88] These concepts are very similar to the concept of this theorem, which is that neural information-processing processes have the right properties—being non-material and having all other required physical properties—to be mental processes and the mind. However, this theory proves these concepts methodically and states them explicitly as a theorem, which, to the author’s knowledge, has never been done before.

Physicalism and dualism

Since the mind is the composite of all neural information-processing processes, if we consider information-processing processes to be physical entities (because information-processing processes are governed and predictable by physical laws), then the mind is a physical entity. In this sense, this theory accords with physicalism [89–91], which holds that everything is physical—governed and predictable by physical laws. However, because the mind is an information-processing entity, it is an informational entity—a non-material entity that is composed of information and information processing—and not a conventional physical entity, such as mass, energy, or force, which is composed of elementary particles and their interactions and is called mechanical entities** in this theory.

(** This “mechanical” term is similar to that used by Velmans (2009): “The stuff of the world is purely mechanical, following mathematically describable laws.” [84].)

Thus, the mind is basically different from mechanical entities. This is also true for mental processes. Therefore, there are two basically different classes of entities in the universe: the mechanical class and the informational class. The former consists of mechanical entities—all things that are composed of elementary particles and their interactions, such as mass, energy, force, and other complex mechanical entities, such as the brain, neural circuits, and electronic circuits; the latter consists of informational entities—all things that are composed of information and information processing,*** such as the mind, mental processes, and information-processing processes in electronic circuits. However, these two classes of entities are not separate; they are inherently and inseparably connected and function in a unified manner. They are counterparts and are simply two different sides of some single entity. That is, the brain and mind are counterparts of each other and are the mechanical and informational sides, respectively, of the same brain-mind entity. Similarly, the EPP and the IPP are counterparts of each other and are the mechanical and informational sides, respectively, of the same neural process. It is the nature of this universe that there exist not one but two sides to everything. Thus, this theory concurs with dualism [9,10,92–94] in the sense that there are two basically different classes of entities in this universe. However, because they function in a unified manner, this theory does not agree with dualism in the sense that there are two classes of entities that function independently of each other in this universe.

(*** To avoid losing sight of what information in this theory means, please recall that it refers to a non-material thing that is transferable, consists of content, and has effects on the receiver and that, ontologically, it is the pattern of its physical carrier or counterpart. For more details on this matter, please see Extra Chapter I: Information.)

Again, it is to be noted that the concept that the mind and brain are complementary parts or counterparts is not new. Similar concepts have been previously proposed. For example, De Sousa (2013) said that “The Mind is the functional correlate of the brain, while the Brain is the structural correlate of the mind. One is an entity and the other is its operational correlate…” [1]; Singh (2011) said that “The brain-mind dyad must be understood, with brain as the structural correlate of the mind, and mind as the functional correlate of the brain.” [95]; lastly, Panksepp (2011) said that “Hence it may be wiser to have a monistic term, that does not prioritize either mind or brain, but combines the concepts into a unified term (common variants are brain-mind or mind-brain).” [96]. The idea of a dual manifestation of things, similar to the dual manifestation of the neural process as the EPP and IPP, is not novel either. This idea has been presented previously. For example, Solms and Friston (2018) [97] said that “seeing oneself (exteroceptive perspective) and being oneself (interoceptive perspective) realise two aspects of the same thing: the ‘physical’ body (as seen) and ‘mental’ being (as felt) are dual aspects of a single entity. Experience accordingly does not ‘arise from a physical basis’; rather, the physical (what is seen – exteroception) and the mental (what is felt – interoception) are dual manifestations of unitary underlying processes. What is seen does not cause what is felt. Both have hidden causes.” Some important variants of the dual-aspect thinking of the 20th century have been instructively discussed and compared by Atmanspacher (2014) [98]. However, the ontological nature of the complementary part or counterpart of the brain—that is, the mind—has never been identified before. This theory complements the existing concept by determining that the counterpart of the brain is the composite of all neural information-processing processes existing with the brain.


Looking ahead

The puzzles regarding the mind and mental processes have not yet been completely solved. Theorems I and II are valid for the mind and all mental processes. However, when the mind and mental processes function, mental phenomena called qualia and consciousness sometimes occur. What are these additional phenomena? Why and how do they occur? These questions will be addressed in the following chapters.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

What happens when we see, hear, smell, and feel things around us,

experience moods, think of various things, plan actions,

 and command our hands, lips, and body to move,

if not information, information, and information are processed?

We are just informational entities,

composed of information and information processing,

 existing on the informational side of the universe.

.

> Go to Chapter 3

< Go back to Chapter 1

<< Go back to Homepage

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