Welcome to mindtheory.net. This site is the principal site for “The Basic Theory of the Mind”, which is a physical theory about the mind and its phenomena, such as consciousness and qualia. It also involves related matters, including the hard problem of consciousness, the explanatory gap, variable qualia, p-zombies, and free will. This theory is a scientifically verifiable theory – it is based on physical evidence and has experimentally testable predictions.

The Mind

The mind is one thing that has always fascinated and puzzled us. It is the only thing that we can be certain of existing, yet, apparently, we do not know exactly what it is, why it occurs, and how it occurs. This is in contrast to things outside the mind, such as houses, cars, and even other people, which we cannot be certain that they really exist – they may be just illusions – yet, apparently, we know what they are, why they occur, and how they occur. What’s more, the phenomena of qualia and consciousness, such as the red color as it appears phenomenally red in our mind and our phenomenal conscious awareness and experience of that red color, have always been mystifying – what is their nature, why and how do they occur, and cannot there be just the mind without them? Fortunately, with centuries of studying these matters, first by philosophers and later also by neurologists, neuroscientists, and other scientists in related fields, we now have a wealth of scientific evidence and concepts that are complete enough to form a theory that can answer these great puzzles.

The Basic Theory of the Mind

Based on this wealth of scientific evidence and concepts, this theory has been formed. Its essence is as follows:

1. From the physical properties of the mind and those of the brain (the alive, processing brain), it can be concluded that the mind always occurs, exists, and functions with the brain and that the brain always occurs, exists, and functions with the mind. Both never occur alone without the other. They are a unity. Each is the intrinsic, equivalent, but different (non-material vs material) aspect of this unity. (Chapter 1)

2. From the physical properties of the mind and those of the brain’s information-processing processes, which are non-material processes, it can be concluded that the mind is the composite of the information-processing processes of the brain. Because the information-processing processes are intrinsic entities in the brain (Figure A), to explain the phenomenon of the mind, a novel entity or a separate entity from the brain (Figure B) is not needed.

The funcionally united mind vs the functionally separated mind

Because the mind is a composite of information-processing processes, it is an informational entity – a non-material entity that is composed of information and information processing, and because the information processing processes that form the mind are innumerable in number and involve information that ranges from simple to very advanced, the mind is an informational entity in a highly advanced form.

Because the mind is a non-material, informational entity, it is not a conventional physical entity (or mechanical entity) like mass, energy, or force; that is why it is so different from the conventional physical entities. But, because information and information-processing processes are physical entities, the mind, which is an informational entity, is also a physical entity; therefore, physicalism is true in this sense – that everything, including the mind, is physical. Yet, an information entity is categorically different from a conventional physical entity (or mechanical entity); thus, there are two basically different classes of entities in this universe, and dualism is true in this sense. (Chapter 2)

3. Qualia or mental phenomena that we can consciously experience in our mind, such as the vision of a house, the sound of a song, and the odor of a rose, which appear phenomenally in our mind, are physical phenomena. They are governed by physical laws and are physically predictable.

Qualia appear phenomenally in the mind.

Specifically, they are neural-process associated physical phenomena. (Chapter 3 & 4)

4. From the physical properties of qualia and those of special kinds of neural-process signaling patterns, which are abstract and non-material, it can be concluded that qualia are special kinds of neural-process signaling patterns. Because neural-process signaling patterns are intrinsic entities in neural processes of the brain, to explain the phenomena of qualia, neither novel entities nor separate entities from the brain are needed. (Chapter 5)

“If we look around and consciously experience the visual qualia occurring right in front of us now, with the facts that our consciousness can experience the visual qualia and that the only things the consciousness neural process is capable of reading are signaling patterns of neural processes, it is inescapable to conclude that we are, in fact, experiencing the signaling patterns of neural processes!”

Because neural-process signaling patterns are neural-process information, qualia are special kinds of neural-process information – information in specialized forms that can appear phenomenally in our mind. Like the mind, they are non-material, informational entities, not mechanical entities. And this answers the hard problem of qualia and bridges the explanatory gap of how non-material phenomenal qualia can arise from material neural processes: qualia are basically special kinds of information that naturally exist intrinsically in material neural processes. (Chapter 5)

5. From the physical properties of consciousness and those of a special kind of reentrant signaling state, which is abstract and non-material, of the consciousness neural process, it can be concluded that consciousness is a special kind of reentrant signaling state of the consciousness neural process. Because a reentrant signaling state is an intrinsic entity in the consciousness neural process of the brain, to explain the phenomenon of consciousness, a novel entity or a separate entity from the brain is not needed.

Because a neural-process signaling state is neural-process information, consciousness is a special kind of neural-process information – information in a specialized form that can be phenomenal consciousness, or consciousness that appears phenomenally in our mind. Like the mind and qualia, consciousness is a non-material, informational entity, not a mechanical entity. And this answers the hard problem of consciousness and bridges the explanatory gap of how the non-material phenomenal consciousness can arise from the material consciousness neural process: the phenomenal consciousness is just a special kind of information that naturally exists intrinsically in the consciousness neural process. (Chapter 6)

6. The fact that qualia and conscious awareness and conscious experiences of the qualia occur in only the final-stage sensory perception neural processes and the highest-level cognitive and executive neural processes, which are the latest-evolved neural processes, and never occur in more primitive neural processes, such as those in the brainstem, cerebellum, and basal ganglia, or over the whole nervous system scatteredly, indicates that they are not randomly occurring phenomena but are evolved functions of the nervous system. (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6)

7. Because a neural process that performs a certain function without qualia occurring and a neural process that performs the same function with qualia occurring have different information in the processes, they have different signaling patterns (to convey different information). Therefore, they have different physical effects on other neural processes, at least from the different effects of different signaling patterns. Qualia thus have physical effects. Also, because we do have conscious awareness and conscious experiences of qualia, qualia must certainly induce some neural processes to function to be consciously aware of and to consciously experience the qualia; therefore, because neural processes are physical processes, qualia cause changes in physical processes and thus have physical effects. (Chapter 5)

Similarly, it can be concluded that consciousness (conscious awareness and conscious experiences) has physical effects. (Chapter 6)

Therefore, qualia and consciousness are evolved neural functions that have physical effects.

8. Because a function requires resources in building, maintaining, and operating the function and may have some negative effects, if its overall effects do not help increase the survival chance of the animals that have the function, those animals and the function will likely become extinct in the evolutionary process. This is especially true for a major function in a critical organ as in the case of qualia and consciousness in the brain. The fact that qualia and consciousness still exist today indicates that they have been selected to remain in the evolutionary process. This means that their overall effects must help increase the survival chance of the species that have them. Qualia and consciousness, in the form that they are – phenomenal qualia and phenomenal consciousness, or qualia and consciousness that appear phenomenally in our mind – thus are evolved functions to help increase the survival chance of the species, including humans, that have them. This is the scientific answer to the other part of the hard problem of consciousness: why does consciousness in the form of phenomenal consciousness occur in this universe? This is also the scientific answer to one of the most basic questions of our lives: why do “we” exist? (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6)

In conclusion:

“We” – our mind, qualia, and consciousness – exist

to increase the chance of our own survival

… and our own species.

“You” – your mind, qualia, and consciousness – exist

 to increase the chance of your own survival

… and your own species.

The above summarizes the principal concepts of the theory but is just part of the theory. Other subjects of the theory include subsidiary theories, variable qualia, p-zombies, self, and free will. The complete content of this site consists of Preface, Definitions, Chapter 1 to 12, and Conclusions, which are partitioned into separate chapters on this website.

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> To Preface

The Basic Theory of the Mind: The book.

The Basic Theory of the Mind - The printed book

The Basic Theory of the Mind - Front & Back

The theory has been published in a hardcover form.

Look inside the book

 About the Author


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Mind, consciousness, qualia, the hard problem of consciousness, explanatory gap, the mind-body problem, p-zombies, philosophical zombie, self, free will, dualism, physicalism, neural information

N.B. The hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap are answered in items 5 to 9.