The Mind
The mind is one thing that has always fascinated and puzzled us. It is the only thing that we can be certain of existing, yet, apparently, we do not know exactly what it is, how it occurs, and why it occurs. This is in contrast to things outside the mind, such as houses, cars, and even other people, which we cannot be certain that they really exist—they may be just illusions—yet, apparently, we know what they are, how they occur, and why they occur. What is more, the phenomena of qualia and consciousness, such as the red color as it appears phenomenally red in our mind and our phenomenal conscious awareness and experience of that red color, have always been baffling—what is their nature, how and why do they occur, and cannot there be just the mind without them?
Fortunately, with centuries of studying these matters, first by philosophers and later also by neuroscientists, psychologists, and other scientists in related fields, we now have a wealth of scientific evidence and concepts that are complete enough to form a theory that can answer these great puzzles.
“The Basic Theory of the Mind” is a physical theory about the mind and its phenomena, especially qualia and consciousness, derived from this wealth of knowledge. It also involves related matters, including the hard problem of consciousness, the explanatory gap, variable qualia, and p-zombies. As a physical theory, it provides empirically verifiable predictions. Its essence is as follows:
I. What is the mind?
The answer: From the similar physical properties of the mind and those of the brain’s information-processing process, such as being dynamic, continuously changing in the time scale of milliseconds, consisting of non-material content that can represent various things, and being able to communicate the content between their parts, it can be concluded that the mind is the brain’s information-processing process.
“What happens when we see, hear, and smell things around us, think about something, plan actions, experience moods, remember and recall events, and command our hands, lips, and body to move,
if not information, information, and information are being processed.
We are just informational entities, ever processing information and living on the informational side of the universe.”
Because the mind is the brain’s information-processing process, it is an informational entity. Because it is a non-material, informational entity, it is not composed of elementary particles and their interactions, which constitute conventional physical entities (or mechanical entities) like mass, energy, or force. That is why the mind is so different from conventional physical entities.
II. Why do we have minds, qualia, and consciousness as they are—manifesting phenomenally as visions, sounds, smells, tastes, emotions, thoughts, etc. that we can experience richly in our lives? Why are we not like computers or robots, doing everything “in the dark” without those phenomena occurring?
The answer is that such minds, qualia, and consciousness have physical effects that increase the survival chances of ourselves and our species. Therefore, minds, qualia, and consciousness as they are—manifesting phenomenally—exist to help us and our species survive with better chances.
III. How can minds, qualia, and consciousness have physical effects?
The answer is by inducing occurrences and functions of physical processes. Evidently, when minds, qualia, and consciousness occur, we have awareness and experiences of them. We can tell that they have happened and what they are like … what visions are like, what sounds are like, what smells are like, what emotions are like, what thoughts are like, etc. But awareness and experiences cannot occur alone by themselves—some brain processes must function for them to occur. Hence, minds, qualia, and consciousness must induce brain processes to occur and perform these functions. Since brain processes are physical, minds, qualia, and consciousness induce physical processes and thus have physical effects.
IV. But how can something with phenomenal manifestations, such as the vision of a house, the sound of a song, and the smell of a rose … in our minds, occur from brain processes, which are physical and do not have phenomenal manifestations?
The answer is that some brain processes have signals that mean, among working brain processes, something with phenomenal manifestations, such as the vision of a house. When viewed from the third-person point of view—our point of view when we think about or investigate the signals in labs—they do not appear to be something with phenomenal manifestations because they are only thought about or observed, not read. In contrast, when viewed from the first-person point of view—the natural point of view of working brain processes—the signals are read and interpreted. If the signals mean something with phenomenal manifestation, the reading brain processes will interpret them as such. Consequently, something with phenomenality, such as the vision of a house, naturally and inevitably appears in those neural processes and the brain.
[Quick proof ⇒ Qualia have physical effects]
[Quick proof ⇒ Qualia are neural signals]
V. How can physical signals have such meanings? What are the ontological and physical nature of minds, qualia, and consciousness? Do other animals, robots, and other things have them?
The answers to these questions and other related problems can be found scientifically. They are in this theory. The readers are kindly invited to explore them.
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The Three Great Problems of the Mind
1. The Ontological Problem of the Mind and its Phenomena
2. The Hard Problem of Consciousness
3. The Explanatory Gap of Consciousness
These three puzzles are some of the most important in science and philosophy … and our lives. The solutions to them can be found in this theory. Their concise summary is as follows:
1. Present evidence indicates that physical entities (entities obeying physical rules) interact only with physical entities. Because the mind, qualia, and consciousness interact with the brain, a physical entity, enabling us to be aware of and engage in various physical activities related to them (such as discussing, investigating, and documenting them), it is logical to deduce that they are physical entities. Otherwise, new laws for interactions between physical and non-physical entities must be added. Current evidence shows that the former possibility is tenable, and no new laws are needed. Based on their physical properties (such as being non-material, having content about something, and being closely associated with neural processes), it can be concluded that the mind, qualia, and consciousness are neural information—a physical entity—in various forms (as specified in the theory). Because neural information inherently exists in the processing brain, no novel entities are created to be the mind, qualia, or consciousness. This conclusion answers the ontological question of what these three entities are and the hard problem of how these seemingly non-physical entities can occur in the brain.
2. In the third-person point of view, our point of view when we think about or investigate it in the labs, information does not appear as something with phenomenal manifestations, such as qualia and consciousness, because it is not read and interpreted but only thought about or observed. In contrast, in the first-person point of view, the natural point of view of working neural processes, information is read and interpreted. If it means something with phenomenal manifestations, it will be interpreted as such. Consequently, something with phenomenal manifestations, such as qualia and consciousness, will and must appear in the reading neural processes and the brain. This point-of-view account bridges the explanatory gap of how qualia and consciousness can occur in the brain and explains how we can feel and experience ourselves and everything else phenomenally as we do, even though we are merely some forms of information.
3. Since it is a brute fact that the mind, qualia, and consciousness can occur in this universe, at least in some living things, they eventually appeared in organisms that evolved structures complex enough to support them, such as the brain. Their first appearances on this planet were no later than when Homo sapiens, a species possessing them, emerged around 200,000 to 300,000 years ago. Because they exhibit themselves as observable characteristics, they require resources for their generation, expression, and maintenance. Moreover, they may have adverse effects. Therefore, if their overall effects are not beneficial to the species’ survival, both these characteristics and the species possessing them will become extinct due to competition with similar species that do not possess them, such as the original species. This principle is especially true for major characteristics in a critical organ, such as the mind, qualia, and consciousness in the brain, because they expend significant resources. The continued existence of these characteristics over at least hundreds of thousands of years means that they have been preserved through the evolutionary process. With the human race flourishing, not withering, this persistence indicates that their overall effects must aid in humans’ survival. Therefore, the mind, qualia, and consciousness evolved in species, including ours, to help increase the species’ survival chances. This inference answers the hard problem of why they occur in us.
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!!! The Hard Problem Alert !!!
For the readers who are working on the hard problem of consciousness, please note that the mind, qualia, and consciousness appear phenomenal only in the first-person point of view (PoV) … they never appear phenomenal in the third-person PoV. If you are misled to find something that can appear both physical and phenomenal in the third-person PoV, you are doomed to fail because, as just noted, nothing ever appears phenomenal in this view.
Instead, you must find something that appears physical in the third-person PoV but phenomenal in the first-person PoV. The very likely candidate is information because information is interpreted in the first-person PoV but only observed in the third-person PoV. Thus, if some information means qualia or consciousness to some information receivers, those receivers will interpret it as such, and qualia and consciousness will and must appear in their views. Contrarily, in the third-person PoV, information is always only observed from the outside, never read and never interpreted. Thus, even if the information means qualia and consciousness to someone having the first-person PoV, it can never appear phenomenal in the third-person PoV—because it is not read and not interpreted.
We have been on the wrong track to find something that can appear both physical and phenomenal in the third-person PoV all along, so many theories have been developed … and failed understandably. To successfully find the solution to the hard problem of consciousness, you must first find something that appears physical in the third-person PoV and phenomenal in the first-person PoV. If information is not your satisfactory answer, you must find something else that has this property. After finding that entity, the hard problem becomes how and why that entity appears physical in the third-person PoV but phenomenal in the first-person one. Good luck.
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To continue reading the synopsis of the theory, please click: Synopsis
To begin reading the theory in a webpage format, please click: Introduction and Definitions
To freely download the PDF version of the theory, please click: Download the PDF version
For readers interested in some specific subjects, specific links to them are as follows:
- Do computers and robots have consciousness? The answer is in Section H.3 Qualia and Consciousness in Computers and Robots of this chapter: “The Hard Problem”.
- Is my red your blue?
- Can P-zombies or Philosophical Zombies exist?
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In the end, it can be concluded that
We as we are—with minds, qualia, and consciousness—
exist to increase the survival chances of our species
… and ourselves.
You, as you are—with your mind, qualia, and consciousness—
exist to increase the survival chances of your species
… and yourself.
The Basic Theory of the Mind: The book.
The First Hardcover Edition (2018)
The first edition is now out of stock.
The Second Hardcover Edition (2024)
The second edition has been published.
The theory has also been published as Kindle eBooks, and two editions are now available on Amazon Kindle.
The First Kindle Edition (2020)
Buy the first Kindle edition at Amazon Kindle
The Second Kindle Edition (2024)
Buy the second Kindle edition at Amazon Kindle
However, as noted above, a PDF version of the book’s second edition is available for free at: Download the PDF version.
> Go to Introduction and Definitions
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Synopsis
Based on the wealth of scientific evidence and concepts, this theory has been formed, and its essence is as follows:
1. From the physical properties of the mind and those of the brain (the alive, processing brain), it can be concluded that the mind occurs, exists, and functions with the brain (Chapter 1) and that it is the composite of all neural information-processing processes (Chapter 2).
“What happens when we see, hear, and smell things around us, experience moods, think of various things, plan appropriate actions, and command our hands, lips, and body to move, if not information, information, and information are being processed.
We are just informational entities, ever processing information and living on the informational side of the universe.”
Because the mind is a composite of neural information-processing processes, it is an informational entity—a non-material entity that is composed of information and information processing, and because the information-processing processes that form the mind are innumerable and involve information that ranges from simple to very advanced, the mind is an informational entity in a highly advanced form. Because the mind is a non-material, informational entity, it is not composed of elementary particles and their interactions, which constitute conventional physical entities (or mechanical entities) like mass, energy, or force. That is why the mind is so different from conventional physical entities. (Chapter 2)
2. Qualia—mental phenomena that appear phenomenally in our mind and that we can consciously experience, such as the vision of a house, the sound of a song, and the odor of a rose in our mind—are physical phenomena. They are governed by physical laws and are physically predictable. Specifically, they are neural-process–associated physical phenomena. (Chapters 3 & 4)
3. From the physical properties of qualia and those of special kinds of neural-process signaling patterns, which are neural information and non-material, it can be concluded that qualia are special kinds of neural-process signaling patterns, called special signaling patterns. (Chapter 5)
“If we open our eyes and experience visual qualia occurring right in front of us now,
with the fact that we can experience qualia only if the brain can experience the qualia,
it is inescapable to conclude that we are, in fact, experiencing neural signaling patterns
because the only things the brain can experience—read and process—are neural signaling patterns!”
Because neural-process signaling patterns are neural information, qualia are special kinds of neural information—information in specialized forms that, when read by neural processes, are interpreted as phenomenal qualia or qualia that appear phenomenally in our mind.
Like the mind, qualia are non-material, informational entities, not mechanical entities. The fact that qualia are neural signaling patterns answers the hard problem of qualia and bridges the explanatory gap of how non-material phenomenal qualia can arise from material neural processes: Non-material phenomenal qualia are neural signaling patterns, which always exist intrinsically in material neural processes—no novel, non-material entities arise or emerge from material neural processes to be qualia. (Chapter 5)
4. From the physical properties of consciousness and those of a special kind of reentrant signaling state, which is the neural information of the consciousness neural process and is non-material, it can be concluded that consciousness is a special kind of reentrant signaling state.
Because a neural-process signaling state is neural information, consciousness is a special kind of neural information—information in a specialized form that, when read by the consciousness neural process itself by the process of reentrant signaling, is interpreted as phenomenal consciousness or consciousness that appears phenomenally in our minds.
Like the mind and qualia, consciousness is a non-material, informational entity, not a mechanical entity. The fact that consciousness is a signaling state answers the hard problem of consciousness and bridges the explanatory gap of how non-material phenomenal consciousness can arise from the material consciousness neural process: Non-material phenomenal consciousness is the consciousness neural process’s signaling state, which always exists intrinsically in the material consciousness neural process—no novel, non-material entity arises or emerges from the material consciousness neural process to be consciousness. (Chapter 6)
5. The fact that qualia and conscious awareness and conscious experiences of the qualia occur in only the final-stage sensory perception neural processes and the highest-level cognitive and executive neural processes, which are the latest-evolved neural processes, and never occur in the more primitive neural processes, such as the brainstem, cerebellum, and basal ganglia, or over the whole brain randomly, indicates that they are not haphazardly occurring phenomena but are evolved phenomena of the nervous system. (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6)
6. Because a neural process that performs a certain function (such as perceiving a vision) without a quale occurring and a neural process that performs that same function (such as perceiving the same vision) with a quale occurring have different information in the processes, they have different signaling patterns (to convey different information). Therefore, they have different physical effects on other neural processes, at least from the different effects of different signaling patterns. Qualia thus have physical effects.
Also, because we do have conscious awareness and conscious experiences of qualia, qualia must certainly induce the consciousness neural process to function to be consciously aware of and to consciously experience the qualia. Therefore, because the consciousness neural process is a physical process, qualia cause changes in a physical process and thus have physical effects. (Chapter 5)
Similarly, it can be concluded that consciousness (conscious awareness and conscious experiences) has physical effects. (Chapter 6)
Therefore, qualia and consciousness are evolved neural functions that have physical effects.
7. Because a function requires resources in building, maintaining, and operating the function and may have some negative effects, if its overall effects do not help increase the survival chances of the animals that have the function, those animals and the function will likely become extinct in the evolutionary process. This is especially true for a major function in a critical organ, such as in the case of qualia and consciousness in the brain. The fact that qualia and consciousness still exist today indicates that they have been selected to remain in the evolutionary process. This means that their overall effects must help increase the survival chances of the species that have them. Qualia and consciousness, in the form that they are—phenomenal qualia and phenomenal consciousness, or qualia and consciousness that appear phenomenally in our mind—are thus evolved functions to help increase the survival chances of the species, including humans, that have them. This is the scientific answer to the other part of the hard problem of consciousness: Why do qualia and consciousness in the form of phenomenal qualia and phenomenal consciousness occur in this universe? This is also the scientific answer to one of the most basic questions of our lives: Why do “we” exist? (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6)
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Keywords:
Mind, consciousness, qualia, quale, the hard problem of consciousness, the explanatory gap, the mind-body problem, theory of qualia, theory of consciousness, consciousness book, p-zombies, philosophical zombie, dualism, physicalism
Dr. Chirapat Ukachoke
Last revision – August 28, 2024