Chapter 1

Theorem I: The Mind Coexists with the Brain

What is the mind? Specifically, what is it physically and ontologically? This question is one of the most important in our lives. Still, we cannot definitively answer it. Various other questions about the mind also exist and remain unanswered. One of them that is not only fascinating but also fundamental is whether the mind is an entity that can exist and function separately from the brain. For many people and in many religions, the answer is affirmative. This belief has led to popular stories about the mind as an entity that can exist, wander, and carry out various activities outside the brain. Obviously, pictures, novels, and movies portraying the mind in this way abound. However, in the scientific world, the answer is still inconclusive. Because this question is fundamental and underlies other mysteries of the mind, this theory attempts to solve it first in this chapter. The problem of what the mind is physically and ontologically, which is more difficult to determine, is addressed in the next chapter.

Even though the mind has been studied for a very long time, probably first by pre-historic thinkers and later by religious practitioners (priests, monks, shamans, etc.), philosophers, and, lately, neuroscientists and scientists in related fields, the above puzzles remain unsolved. One possible reason for this lack of resolution is that certain properties of the mind, specifically physical properties, have not been comprehensively examined. In the past, the exploration of these conundrums was hindered by a dearth of tangible, empirical evidence, causing investigators to focus primarily on studying the functional attributes of the mind through personal observations. As a result of this approach, they discovered a range of distinct characteristics associated with the mind, including its private nature, subjectivity, indescribable qualities, representational capacity, and intentional disposition, as well as its possession of propositional content and qualitative properties [1–10]. However, these properties are related to the mind’s functions rather than the outside physical world and thus do not yield essential clues about the mind’s physical nature. Thankfully, since the past few decades, empirical, physical evidence has become available, and some mental phenomena such as qualia and consciousness have been investigated increasingly in terms of their physical properties. For instance, some of the physical properties of qualia have been found to be related to information processing, neural processing (especially in the resonant state), and neural activity patterns [11–16]. Regarding consciousness, some of its proposed physical properties are as follows: being integrated and constructed by the brain [17], involving the thalamocortical core and re-entrant signaling, having widespread brain effects, having informative content [8,18], and being related to integrated information [19–21]. Although investigations of these physical properties have led researchers to formulate theories about the physical nature of qualia and consciousness, resulting in many theories on various aspects of these two entities [8,11–15,17–23], they neither covered other important physical properties nor systemically investigated them for the mind as a whole. They did not definitively answer whether the mind is a physically separate entity from the brain and what the mind physically and ontologically is, either. Therefore, to resolve these problems, it is necessary to comprehensively examine the mind’s physical properties, which are directly related to the physical world, particularly those that have not yet been thoroughly examined.

This chapter scrutinizes physical properties of the mind to answer the question of whether it exists and functions separately from the brain as follows:

1.1 Physical Properties of the Mind and Mental Processes

If the mind and mental processes are defined as stated in Sections D1 and D3, the previous chapter, we find that they are related to the outer physical world through several properties. Ten of these, which this theory finds essential in revealing the physical nature of the mind and mental processes, are as follows:

Physical properties of the mind and mental process (PM)

PM1. Defining physical properties

     PM1.1 Their nature is non-material.

     PM1.2 Their activities are signal processing.

PM2. Additional physical properties

     PM2.1 Their existence is concurrent with their neural processes’.

     PM2.2 Their locations are the same as their neural processes’.

     PM2.3 Their information is the same as their neural processes’. 

     PM2.4 Their abilities are the same as their neural processes’. 

     PM2.5 Their capacities are the same as their neural processes’.

     PM2.6 Their chronological aspects are the same as their neural processes’. 

     PM2.7 Their changes are the same as their neural processes’. 

     PM2.8 Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

PM1. Defining physical properties

Defining physical properties are physical properties that we believe the mind and mental processes should have and that are used to define them (Sections D1 and D3, the previous chapter). They are as follows:

PM1.1 Their nature is non-material.

By definition, the mind and its mental processes are non-material entities. When we evaluate this property, we find that it is valid to our intention because we never find any material entity that is called or should be called mind or a mental process.

PM1.2 Their activities are signal processing.

As the definition requires that the mind and its mental processes can execute “the three activities,” which are sensing, operating, and sending signals from both the outside and inside of the mind (resulting in various mental activities, such as perceiving visual images, thinking of several things, and controlling motor movements—see Section D1.3, the previous chapter), the activities of the mind and mental processes must be signal-processing. When we evaluate this property, we find that it is also valid to our intention because we never find any entity not sensing, operating, and sending signals that is called or should be called mind or a mental process.

PM2. Additional physical properties

Additional physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes possess in addition to their defining physical properties. They are as follows:

PM2.1 Their existence is concurrent with their neural processes’.

It is universally observable that, in animals with a nervous system, the existence of a mental process is concurrent with the existence of a certain neural process, which this theory calls the mental process’s neural process (or, in short, its neural process). For example, the existence of the visual-perception, emotion-generation, and thought-formation mental processes are found to be concurrent with the existence of the visual-perception, emotion-generation, and thought-formation neural processes, respectively—these mental processes have never been found to exist without the concurrent existence of their respective neural processes. 

There is a large amount of clinical and experimental evidence for this relationship. For example, the visual-perception mental process occurs and exists concurrently with its neural process, which is the visual-perception neural process. The visual-perception mental process occurs and continues to exist only when the visual-perception neural process occurs and continues to exist (such as when visual stimuli arrive at and get processed in the visual-perception neural process, when the ischemic visual-perception neural process recovers from ischemia after blood reperfusion occurs [such as in the case of a transient ischemic attack], or when the visual-perception neural process is stimulated to function by migraine aura activity, epileptic activity, or electrical [24–32] or magnetic stimulation [33–46]). Conversely, the visual-perception mental process ceases to exist when its neural process ceases to exist (such as when there is a cessation of its blood supply, there is an injury to it, or its function is interfered with by magnetic stimulation [33,34,37–42,45,46]). The visual-perception mental process has never been found to occur or exist alone or with anything other than its neural process. These associations can be scientifically verified* and are true for all other mental processes. Thus, mental processes’ existence is concurrent with their neural processes’ existence. Because the mind is a composite of mental processes, including the highest-level mental processes, its existence is concurrent with that of a composite of neural processes, including the highest-level neural processes. Therefore, in the maximal case, the mind’s existence is concurrent with the whole nervous system’s existence. However, in the minimal case, its existence is concurrent with the brain’s existence because the minimal organ that can fulfill the requirement of having the highest-level neural processes is the brain.

(* That a neural process starts, continues, or stops functioning can be confirmed by techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [47–55], magnetoencephalography (MEG) [50,56–60], electroencephalography (EEG) [50,51,61–66], electrocorticography (ECoG)[67–82], stereoelectroencephalography [83–84], and single-unit recordings in the cerebral cortex [84–92], and that a corresponding mental process does the same can be confirmed by evaluating the patient or volunteer reports.)

PM2.2 Their locations are the same as their neural processes’.

The mind has a definite spatial location. There has long been an unfounded belief among many people, including some philosophers, that the mind does not have a definite location in space [2]. However, this belief has not been scientifically substantiated. In contrast, at present, there is overwhelming evidence that the mind has a definite location. It always occurs in the brain. It has never been found elsewhere; that is, it has never been found in any body parts other than the brain (such as the heart, abdomen, hand, etc.) or outside the body. This is evident from the fact that these body parts can be injured, removed, or replaced without injuring, removing, or replacing the mind; only some localized effects resulting from injuring, removing, or replacing a body part, such as loss of sensation or motor command of that part, will occur. Similarly, everything outside the body can be damaged, destroyed, or replaced without affecting the mind. In contrast, if the brain is disturbed or destroyed, the mind will be simultaneously disturbed or destroyed. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the mind, one has to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the brain. Hence, the mind has a definite location in space: in the brain. 

Similarly, mental processes have definite spatial locations. They always occur in the nervous system (the brain, spinal cord, and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems). They have never been found elsewhere, neither in body parts without parts of the nervous system (such as blood, hair shaft, and nail plate) nor in something outside the body. This is evident from the fact that such a body part can be affected, removed, or replaced without affecting, removing, or replacing mental processes. Likewise, everything outside the body can be damaged, destroyed, or replaced without affecting mental processes. In contrast, if the nervous system is disturbed or destroyed, mental processes are simultaneously disturbed or destroyed. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy mental processes, one has to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the nervous system. Thus, mental processes have a definite location in space: in the nervous system.

Where do the mind and mental processes exist in the nervous system? They do not exist in the meninges, blood vessels, supporting connective tissue, or any other tissues of the nervous system other than the functioning neural circuits. This is evident from the fact that diseases such as pure meningitis, atherosclerosis of the nervous system blood vessels, and intracerebral calcification, which affect only tissues other than functioning neural circuits, do not affect the mind and mental processes. Also, mechanical effects on or electrical stimulation of these tissues without affecting functioning neural circuits do not affect the mind and mental processes, either. In contrast, electrical or magnetic stimulation, diseases, or pharmacological agents that selectively affect functioning neural circuits but do not affect other tissues affect the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes reside must be functioning neural circuits. This is supported by abundant evidence from studies in clinical neurology and cognitive neuroscience, which have revealed that each specific mental process occurs in its specific neural circuit. For example, various mental processes for the visual identification of a face occur in various face perception areas, such as the occipital face area, fusiform face area, and ventral anterior temporal lobe, in which various facial identification neural circuits have been found [93–96]. Generally, this kind of location specificity is true for all mental processes. Therefore, mental processes are located at the locations of their functioning neural circuits.

Where do the mind and mental processes reside in the functioning neural circuits? A functioning neural circuit comprises signal processing, metabolic, and structural maintenance (of membranes, organelles, cytoskeleton, etc.) parts. Because the mind and mental processes perform signal-processing functions (property PM1.2), it is unlikely that they reside in the metabolic or the structural maintenance parts because these parts cannot receive, operate, and send specific signals (signals that convey specific information, not nonspecific information that may exist in heat from metabolism and minute vibrations from the structural modification processes) between neural circuits. The only part that can process specific signals in which the mind and mental processes most likely reside is the signal-processing part. This is supported by the fact that anything that affects the signal-processing part but does not affect the other parts, such as electrical stimulation, magnetic stimulation, or pharmacological agents that selectively affect the signal-processing part, can affect the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes exist are specifically the signal-processing parts of their functioning neural circuits: the neural processes.

At this point, some may oppose this conclusion by citing phenomena such as near-death and out-of-body experiences [97–108] as evidence that the mind or mental processes can exist outside the body and brain, and thus outside the neural processes. However, it has never been definitively established that the mind and mental processes exist outside the body and brain during these phenomena, even though they have been studied for more than a hundred years [109,110]. Also, similar phenomena have recently been documented to occur not only in epilepsy, migraine, depersonalization-derealization disorder, and several other non-life–threatening events but also during electrical brain stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation of the parietal, temporo-parietal junction, or temporo-occipital cortex [111–121]. Therefore, such extraordinary phenomena can occur because of abnormalities or interference in neural process functions, which always occur in near-death situations. Interestingly, brief surges of electroencephalographic activities at the time of death have been reported [122–125], and a new phenomenon called cardiopulmonary resuscitation–induced consciousness (CPRIC) [126–130] has been recently recognized. Although this matter is still controversial [131], some think that near-death and out-of-body experiences may be part of the spectrum of this phenomenon. In addition, several plausible neural-based explanations of near-death and out-of-body experiences have been proposed [120–124,132–134]. Hence, this theory concludes that there is no definite evidence that the mind can exist outside the brain or that mental processes can exist outside neural processes.

In summary, if one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the mind or mental processes, then one has to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the brain or its neural processes. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the mind’s and mental processes’ locations are those of the brain and their neural processes, respectively.

Definition: The outside world and the external world.

“The outside world” and “the external world” are the terms that are used frequently in this theory. They mean the world that is, from the mind’s point of view, “outside” or “external.” It includes everything except the mind and the place where it resides (the neural processes). Thus, not only all things outside the brain but also all the non-neural process parts of the brain, such as the cerebral blood vessels and meninges, are included in the outside or external world.

PM2.3 Their information is the same as their neural processes’.

A mental process’s information, which manifests itself as the details of the mental process’s product, such as the color, brightness, and location of every point in a mental image; the pitch, timbre, and loudness of a perceived sound; or the details of a recalled past event, is the same information as its neural process’s information. There can be no mental process’s information that is not the same as its neural process’s, because the mental process does not have information sources other than its neural process. If this is not the case, then there must be some mental process’s information not the same as its neural process’s manifesting in the mental process’s product. For example, there must be some extra image occurring in the perceived vision even if the object of that extra image is not seen by the subject and thus has no information in the neural process (e.g., there must be people or other extra objects in front of the house in the perceived vision, even if one looks at a bare house without people or other extra objects in front of it), or there must be some of the mental process’s information left manifesting even after the neural process stops functioning (e.g., there must be some part of the perceived vision left occurring after the eyes have been closed, after there is no blood supply to the occipital lobes, or after the occipital lobes have been destroyed). However, such cases never happen. By contrast, whenever information in the neural process changes or disappears, the information in the mental process changes or disappears accordingly and simultaneously. For example, when people gather in front of the bare house in the previous example, there will be additional information about those people in the visual perception neural process, and the mental image will inevitably consist of an image of those people. On the contrary, when there is a lesion in the ventral, caudomedial occipitotemporal, or ventromedial occipital cortex, which functions to create color information for images in the opposite visual field, the neural process’s perceived images in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [135–138], and the mental images in that visual field will unavoidably be devoid of colors.

Thus, mental processes’ information is the same as their neural processes’.

PM2.4 Their abilities are the same as their neural processes’.

The abilities of the mind and mental processes to sense something in the outside world, perform mental operations, and affect things in the outside world are the same as those of their neural processes. There can be no mind’s and mental processes’ abilities that are not the same as their neural processes’.

     A. To sense things in the external world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever sensing abilities they want; their sensing abilities must only be the same as their neural processes’. For example, in humans, the mind and mental processes have the abilities to sense only visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, proprioceptive, vestibular, and some internal-organ stimuli because human neural processes have sensing abilities only of these modalities. Whatever sensing abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because human neural processes do not have the ability to sense magnetic stimuli, which can create magnetoreception in some animals, such as birds, bats, bees, and sharks [139–141], or to sense electrical stimuli in a way that creates electroreception or electrolocation, as found in certain fish species like electric fish, which use this ability to navigate or locate prey [142–147], the human’s mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to sense these stimuli either, even if they try to.

     In addition, the mind and mental processes do not have the ability to sense things by themselves but require the sensing ability of their neural processes. For example, to mentally see or hear anything in the external world, the mind and visual or auditory mental processes cannot see or hear anything by themselves but require the sensing ability of the visual or auditory neural processes (and the visual or auditory receptors and pathways), respectively. If these neural processes lose this ability and cannot function to see or hear (such as in the case of a stroke, tumor, or trauma), the mind and visual or auditory mental processes cannot see or hear anything, even if they try to. 

     It should be noted that, regarding phenomena of extraordinary sensory perception, such as extrasensory perception (ESP), telepathy, clairvoyance, “psi,” and parapsychological or paranormal phenomena, although there is literature supporting the existence of these phenomena [148–155], the evidence is still inconclusive. This is because the studies were not methodologically rigorous enough (according to current scientific standards) and required improvement [148,152,156,157]. Moreover, many studies and meta-analyses of these phenomena have not confirmed their existence [158–161]. This is despite approximately a century of investigations of these phenomena, sizable prizes offered in various countries worldwide [162,163], and undoubtedly immense fame for those who can prove these phenomena to be true. Because these phenomena seem to contradict the current physical laws, the mainstream scientific community still doubts the authenticity of these phenomena in a supernatural form [164]. Moreover, some investigators have recently shown that these phenomena are explicable by current physical laws [151,165] or psychological processes [166] or have correlates in the physical brain [154,167–169]. Hence, it is possible that these seemingly extraordinary phenomena are simply ordinary physical phenomena occurring in unusual ways. 

     However, it must be noted that, regarding the mental property being discussed in this subsection—the sensing abilities of mental processes are the same as those of their neural processes—this property does not preclude the existence of these extraordinary mental abilities. This property requires only that, if these extraordinary mental abilities exist, they not occur by themselves and be abilities of some neural processes. If they really exist, the scientific community has the duty to find their underlying physical mechanisms, whether they are already known or require new discoveries. In any case, if it is found that these extraordinary mental abilities are real and can occur independently without the functions of some neural processes, this property will be incorrect and must be removed from the list of physical properties of the mind and mental processes.

     B. To operate mental functions, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever operating abilities they want; their operating abilities must only be the same as their neural processes’. Whatever operating abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because normal human neural processes do not have the ability to process signals at an arbitrary or unlimited speed, to turn off or on their whole processing operations at will, or to calculate the square roots of odd digits (3, 5, 7, etc.) by themselves, the human’s mind and mental processes do not have the ability to think at arbitrary or unlimited speeds, to lose or become conscious at will, and to calculate the square roots of odd digits purely mentally, even if they try to.

     In addition, the mind and mental processes do not have the ability to operate mental functions by themselves but require the operating ability of their neural processes. For example, to consciously perceive the image of a house, the visual perception mental process that creates the mental image of the house cannot relay this image to the consciousness mental process directly by itself but requires the operation of the visual perception neural process, the consciousness neural process, and their connections. If there is damage to any point of this neural operation (such as in the case of a stroke, tumor, or demyelinating disease), this mental operation cannot occur, and the conscious perception of the image of the house will not occur.

     C. To affect things in the external world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever affecting abilities they want; their affecting abilities must only be the same as their neural processes’. For example, in many animals, the abilities of the mind and mental processes to affect the outside world are limited to volitional motor movement (such as using hands, legs, and vocalizing organs), non-volitional motor movement (such as smooth muscle contractions and various motor and autonomic reflexes), secretion of hormones or other substances (such as pheromones, digestive enzymes, and poisons), and other means found in some animals** because the animals’ neural processes have only these affecting abilities. Whatever affecting abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because human neural processes cannot command the body to change its color or shape, produce and emit light, produce and discharge electricity, or perform extraordinary feats, such as commanding the body to levitate, teleport, or become transparent, the human’s mind and mental processes cannot execute these deeds either, even if they try to. Even in its own body or itself, the mind can affect only what the neural processes can. Whatever the neural processes cannot affect, the mind cannot either, even if that thing is in its own body or itself. For example, the mind cannot, no matter how hard it tries, heal a body wound instantly, slow down or reverse aging processes in its body, or halt a dementing disease that affects the mind itself because no neural processes can do so. 

(** Such as color changing in octopuses, chameleons, frogs, etc.; shape changing in some caterpillars, pufferfish, frogs, etc.; bioluminescence or production and emission of light in fireflies, comb jellies, deep sea fishes, etc.; and production and discharges of electricity in electric eels, electric catfish, electric rays, etc.)

In addition, the mind and mental processes do not have the ability to affect the outside world by themselves but require the affecting ability of their neural processes. For example, to affect anything in the external world with its hand, the mind cannot, by itself, command the hand to do anything but requires the affecting ability of the volitional motor neural processes to command the muscles of the hand. If the volitional motor neural processes lose this ability (such as in the case of a stroke, tumor, or degenerative disease), the mind cannot command the hand to do anything, even if it is its own hand. 

It should be noted that, similar to the extraordinary sensory perception discussed in Section A, mental abilities that can affect the outside world in extraordinary ways, such as telekinesis (or psychokinesis) and spiritual and distant healing, have not yet been proved to be real despite hundreds of years of claims and practices. Studies of spiritual and distant healing are conflicting [170–173]. Those with positive results reported that the benefits were usually limited and short-term [174–176] and that the areas of improvement were mainly psychological, such as improvement in spiritual well-being and quality of life and reduction in pain, depression, anxiety, grief, and hopelessness [174–179]. Thus, spiritual and distant healing are not scientifically proven modes of medical therapy [170,171]. This contrasts with proven effective medical therapies (medication, surgery, radiosurgery, deep brain stimulation, magnetic stimulation, etc.), which have gained widespread acceptance and have become standard treatments in a matter of only years or decades after their introduction.

However, it must be observed that, regarding the mental property being discussed in this subsection—the affecting abilities of mental processes are those of their neural processes—this property does not preclude the existence of these extraordinary mental abilities. This property requires only that, if these extraordinary mental abilities exist, they not occur by themselves and be abilities of some neural processes. If they really exist, the scientific community has the duty to find their underlying physical mechanisms, whether they are already known or require new discoveries. In any case, if it is found that these extraordinary mental abilities are real and can occur independently without the functions of some neural processes, this property will be incorrect and must be removed from the list of physical properties of the mind and mental processes.

PM2.5 Their capacities are the same as their neural processes’.

The capacities of the mind and mental processes in sensing something in the outside world, performing mental operations, and affecting things in the outside world are the same as those of their neural processes. There can be no capacities of the mind and mental processes that are not the same as their neural processes’.

     A. Regarding sensing things in the external world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever sensing capacities they want; their sensing capacities must only be the same as their neural processes’. For example, the mind and mental processes can sense any specific sensation only in limited ranges (such as the limited frequency and amplitude ranges of the visible and audible spectra and the limited spatial range of the visual field) and with limited acuity (such as the limited acuity of vision, hearing, and fine-touch feeling) because the neural processes have the capacity to sense only in these limited ranges and with limited acuity. Whatever sensing capacities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because human neural processes do not have the capacity to sense light in the infrared or ultraviolet spectrum, at very low intensity, or outside of the visual field, the human mind cannot see things in infrared or ultraviolet light, cannot see things when it is too dark, and cannot see what is behind the back of its head, even if it wants to.

     B. As for performing mental operations, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever operating capacities they want; their operating capacities must only be the same as their neural processes’. Whatever operating capacities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because human neural processes do not have the operating capacity to remember all the texts on a newspaper page in one second, to process everything that ten people say to them at the same time, and to solve ten mathematical equations simultaneously by themselves, the human mind does not have these operating capacities either, even if it wants to.

     C. Respecting affecting things in the outside world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever affecting capacities they want; their affecting capacities must only be the same as their neural processes’. Whatever affecting capacities neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because human neural processes do not have the capacities to command one hand to write a story while the other is drawing a complex picture, one foot is tapping every second, and the mouth is singing a song, the human mind does not have these affecting capacities either, even if it wants to.

     Interestingly, extraordinary capacities that the general population does not have can be found in people with Savant syndrome, both autistic and acquired. For example, some savants can rapidly memorize thousands of books with subsequent comprehensive knowledge of geography, history, literature, etc.; some have accurate calendar-calculating abilities; some can recite the number π to 22,514 digits; also, some can solve mathematical problems in the blink of an eye [180–186]. These individuals have abnormalities in some brain areas, especially the left frontotemporal lobe. Acquired Savant syndrome can occur in patients with stroke, head injury, or even some degenerative disease that affects the left frontotemporal lobe. Transcranial magnetic stimulation that inhibits the function of this area can also elicit these kinds of unusual capacities, albeit only transiently. Therefore, it is probable that lesions in the left frontotemporal lobe cause disinhibition of neural processes in other areas and enable them to function with extraordinary capacities [180–186]. Thus, when neural processes can perform functions with extraordinary capacities, the mind and mental processes can equally perform functions with extended capacities.

PM2.6 Their chronological aspects are the same as their neural processes’.

The mind’s and mental processes’ chronological aspects, that is, their starting time, processing rate, and ending time, are the same as their neural processes’. 

When a stimulus enters the body, the mind and the related mental process do not start processing the stimulus’s signal immediately but only when the corresponding neural process starts doing so. For example, when our foot hits something hard, the mental process for processing dull, aching pain does not start processing the pain signal immediately, and we do not begin to feel the resulting dull, aching pain instantly but about some hundred milliseconds to a few seconds later (depending on several factors), when the “slow pain” processing center in the brain receives the pain signal and begins functioning. 

A mental process’s processing rate is also the same as its neural process’s. When given a task to process, such as solving a problem or making a response to some stimulus, a mental process takes the same time as its neural process does to finish the task, not before or after. Also, when the neural process’s processing rate slows down from aging, diseases (such as hypothyroidism, Cushing syndrome, and some dementias), alcohol, or drugs (such as various sedatives), the mental process’s processing rate slows down similarly; it cannot maintain its normal processing rate.

A mental process’s ending time is the same as its neural process’s as well. When the neural process does not end its processing, the mental process cannot end its either. For example, when we look at a bright lamp and then close our eyes to see nothing, we will still keep seeing an afterimage even if we do not want to. The mental process can stop functioning (and the afterimage disappears) only when the neural process stops creating the afterimage. 

(The above correlations between the chronological aspects of a mental and neural process can be demonstrated by various empirical investigations, such as fMRI, MEG, and ECoG.)

PM2.7 Their changes are the same as their neural processes’.

When neural processes change, the corresponding mental processes simultaneously and similarly change with their neural processes (both qualitatively and quantitatively) so that their changes are the same (match). For example, in an acute case, mental processes change instantly with their neural processes when a sudden head injury occurs, and the type (quality) and severity (quantity) of the mental processes’ changes match the type and severity of the neural processes’ injuries. In a subacute case of a brain tumor destroying the frontal lobe, the person’s personality, intellect, and emotions change and worsen gradually, matching the type, severity, and chronology of the neural process destruction. In a chronic case of Alzheimer’s disease, the patient’s personality, intellect, memory, and language capabilities deteriorate gradually but relentlessly, matching the type, severity, and chronology of the inexorable neural-process degeneration.

This kind of matching change is also true in cases of electrical or magnetic stimulation and administration of psychoactive drugs. Whenever neural processes (such as visual, auditory, or somatic perception) are changed by electrical or magnetic stimulation, the corresponding mental processes (such as visual, auditory, or somatic perception) will change accordingly and simultaneously, and whenever psychoactive drugs (such as sedatives, anxiolytics, or psychedelics) affect neural processes, the corresponding mental processes will change accordingly and simultaneously. All these matching changes between neural and mental processes can be verified empirically.

It should be noted that, when their neural processes change, the mind and mental processes must change, even if they try not to. On the other hand, if their neural processes do not change, the mind and mental processes cannot change, even if they try to. For example, the mind cannot fall asleep, get out of a depressive or anxious state, change its behavior, understand difficult things, or attain spectacular sports skills at will because the involved neural processes cannot change to suit the mind’s desire whenever the mind wishes.

Thus, the mind’s and mental processes’ changes match or are the same as their neural processes’.

PM2.8 Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Although the mind and mental processes are non-material entities, their activities are not physically traceless—they are associated with electromagnetic phenomena. Whenever and wherever there are the mind and mental processes, there are electromagnetic activities. Electrical activities can be recorded in various ways, such as electroencephalography (EEG) at the scalp, electrocorticography (ECoG) at the cortex using subdural or intracortical microelectrodes, stereoelectroencephalography in the brain tissue, and single-unit recordings in the cerebral cortex. Magnetic activities can be recorded using magnetoencephalography (MEG) outside the brain. Not only can these electromagnetic activities signify the presence of the mind and mental processes, but they can also provide information about the state of or events in the mind and mental processes at that moment. For example, a continuous isoelectric EEG (i.e., no EEG activity) signifies that there is no mind or mental processes occurring; a generalized slow-wave EEG that is unresponsive to stimulation signifies that the mind and mental processes are being severely deranged [62,63,189]; continuous 3-Hz spike-and-wave discharges signify that the mind is in the state of absence seizure [62,64,189–193]; and various sleep EEG patterns signify that the mind is in certain stages of sleep [61,66,194].

As specific patterns of electromagnetic activities are always present when and where there are the mind and mental processes in specific states and change or vanish when and where the mind and mental processes change or cease to exist, the activities of the mind and mental processes are associated with electromagnetic activities. Moreover, because electromagnetic activities in these cases occur from activities of neural processes, not from anything else, it is definite that the activities of the mind and mental processes are associated with the electromagnetic activities of neural processes.

1.2 Theorem I

From the physical properties of PM2.1 to PM 2.8, it can be concluded that, physically, a mental process does not exist and function alone but exists and functions in accordance with and inseparably from a neural process. This theory will state this conclusion concisely as a mental process coexists with a neural process and assert it as Theorem I for a mental process.

Theorem I: A mental process coexists with a neural process.

Similarly, a composite of mental processes coexists with a composite of neural processes. Because the mind is a composite of mental processes, it coexists with a composite of neural processes. Importantly, because the mind can execute all the three activities, including the highest-level ones of the animal (see Section D1.3), the composite of neural processes with which the mind coexists must be able to do the same (to execute all the three activities, including the highest-level ones of the animal). Because the brain is the neural-circuit composite with neural processes that can execute such activities, the mind coexists with the brain. This theory asserts this conclusion as Theorem I for the mind.

Theorem I: The mind coexists with the brain.

Both theorems mean that when and where there is a mental process or the mind—a non-material entity that exists in us (the reader, the author, and other people) and can evidently execute the three activities for us—there is a neural process or the brain that the mental process or the mind coexists with. We will not find a mental process without a neural process; that is, we will not find a mental process in a purely non-neural process part (such as in the blood, extracellular fluid, hair shaft, or nail plate) or outside the body. Similarly, we will not find the mind without the brain; that is, we will not find the mind in other parts of the body, such as in the heart, lungs, or liver, or outside the body. Also, we will not find a mental process or the mind functioning alone, without the same functioning in a neural process or the brain.

It should be noted that the whole functioning nervous system, which is more extensive than the brain because it additionally comprises the spinal cord and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems, has neural processes that can execute the three activities, including the highest-level ones of that animal. Thus, it could also be stated that the mind coexists with the whole functioning nervous system instead of the brain. However, as the brain alone can do what the mind is defined to do and as the salient feature of the mind (the ability to process signals at the highest level that that animal can, which can result in consciousness, perception, intelligence, emotion, memory, etc.) exists in the brain even if the rest of the nervous system (the spinal cord and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems) is cut off (such as in patients with high cervical cord injury), the brain alone is sufficient for the mind to coexist with. In contrast, this is not true for the isolated spinal cord and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems. Although we can say that mental processes coexist with the isolated spinal cord and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems, we cannot say that the mind (as defined in Section D1.3) exists in any of them because they lack the salient features of the mind—mental processes in them do not have the ability to process signals at the highest level that the animal can. The mind, with additional mental processes in the spinal cord and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems, is thus simply a larger entity than the mind composed of mental processes in the brain alone. It can be considered an extended version of the mind or the extended mind, and Theorem I for the extended mind can be stated as “the extended mind coexists with the whole nervous system.” The difference between the mind and its extended version is only the number of mental processes that compose them, but they are entities of the same kind—composed of mental processes that coexist with neural processes. Therefore, all conclusions and predictions derived from the principle that mental processes coexist with their neural processes are identical for both the mind and the extended mind.

1.3 Generalizations

All the properties that are used to establish this theorem can be demonstrated in all animals that have a nervous system, including the most basal animals (such as Ctenophora [comb jellies], Cnidaria [such as corals, jellyfish, and hydras], the primitive Bilateria [such as small flatworm-like animals in Acoelomorpha]) and the more advanced animals (such as more advanced Bilateria, e.g., worms, octopuses, insects, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals). Each of these animals has never been found to have the three activities that function for that whole animal without a brain (or brain equivalent). It is to be noted that, although Ctenophora, Cnidaria, and some primitive Bilateria do not have visually recognizable brains but have only nerve nets distributed in their bodies, their whole processing integrated nerve nets are able to perform the three activities at the highest level that these animals can, which can result in complex activities, such as capturing prey, feeding, and fleeing [195–202]. Thus, the whole processing integrated nerve nets can be considered as functioning brains, or brain equivalents, for these animals. Likewise, although many Protostomes (such as flatworms, roundworms, and mollusks) and some Deuterostomes (such as tunicates, lancelets, and starfish) do not have a definitely-formed brain but instead have a nerve ring connected to a ganglion, a system of several connected ganglia, or a primitive neural vesicle as the center of their nervous systems [197,199–204], these structures are able to perform the three activities at the highest level that these animals can, which can result in complex activities, such as capturing prey, feeding, and fleeing. Therefore, when functioning, these structures satisfy the definition of the brain in this theory and can be considered as brains or brain equivalents for these animals.

Thus, this theorem is generalized to include all animals with a nervous system and, with the mind and mental processes as defined in Section D1.3, the brain as defined in Section D2, and neural processes as defined in Section D5, asserts that a mental process coexists with a neural process and that the mind coexists with the brain for all animals with a nervous system.

1.4 Predictions

1. A mental process (such as the visual-perception, emotion-generation, or thought-formation mental process) will be found to coexist with a certain neural process (such as the visual-perception, emotion-generation, or thought-formation neural process, respectively)—it will not be found to exist and function without a certain neural process. Similarly, a mind will be found to coexist with a brain—it will not be found to exist and function without a brain. This means that, when and where there is a mental process, the neural process that the mental process coexists with will be found then and there; similarly, when and where there is a mind, the brain that the mind coexists with will be found then and there.
   In the case of a mental process, it may be difficult to find the neural process that the mental process coexists with because there may be many potential neural processes to consider. However, a neural process can be identified as the neural process of that mental process by investigations that observe and may also manipulate potential neural processes concurrently with observing the mental process. In various investigations, the neural process that consistently changes concomitantly and correspondingly with the mental process will be that neural process. For a certain mental process, this neural process is called the mental process’s neural process or its neural process.
2. For a paired mental process and neural process as so identified, every event in the mental process (such as a change of perception from perceiving a flower to perceiving a house, a change of emotion from being happy to being sad, or a change of determination from resisting to relenting) will be found to be associated with a corresponding, simultaneous event in the neural process (such as an event in a neural process in the occipital cortex, amygdala, or frontal lobe). This association can be investigated by techniques such as fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), MEG, ECoG, and intracortical and single-unit recordings. A mental event will not be found to occur without a corresponding, simultaneous event in the paired neural process. Similarly, for a paired mind and brain as described above, every event in the mind will be found to be associated with a corresponding, simultaneous event in the brain—it will not be found to occur without a corresponding, simultaneous event in the brain.

Up to the present, the predictions of this theorem have been confirmed by everyday clinical events and experimental outcomes. In the previous edition of this theory, it was noted that this theorem could be undermined or even invalidated by the outcome of the AWARE II trial (AWAreness during REsuscitation II trial) [205-207], which followed the AWARE trial [102,106,107], because, according to this theorem, the AWARE II trial would not be able to show that near-death experiences are phenomena that occur in a mind that is anatomically and functionally separated from the brain. Fortunately, shortly before the publication of this book, the AWARE-II study was published [207]. It did not report that cardiac-arrest survival patients had definite episodes of conscious awareness during the periods of no cerebral activity. That is, it did not definitely establish that there were mental processes or the mind functioning in the absence of brain functioning. Therefore, the result of this study does not disprove this theorem. However, as the investigators of the study and its commentators have pointed out, the problems about the phenomenon of Near-Death Experience (NDE) or RED (Recalled Experience of Death) have not been settled by this study, and this phenomenon merits further scientific investigation [207-209], which the author of this theory entirely agrees. Nevertheless, this theorem predicts that no experiments will ever be able to establish that the mind can exist and function separately from the brain.

1.5 Remarks

First, it should be pointed out that many people believe in perfect symmetry between the mind and brain, as does the author. Thus, Theorem I could have been stated to reflect this symmetry as “the mind and the brain coexist with each other.” However, since this theory is scientific and aims to provide verifiable theorems, it cannot assert this statement as a theorem because such a statement is not scientific and not verifiable at present and in the foreseeable future. This is because, given that there is a brain, although we can believe that there is a mind existing with this brain, we cannot scientifically prove that that is the case. At present, other than one’s undeniable subjective experience of one’s mind, there are no scientific ways for anyone to prove that there truly are non-material entities of any kinds, including minds, in others. In contrast, Theorem I is scientific and verifiable. If someone asserts that there exists a mind in an animal with a nervous system (human, dog, cat, bird, insect, etc.)—based on whatever evidence—we will scientifically find that there is a brain there. To avoid losing sight of what this means, let us expand the term “mind” according to its definition in Section D1.3. We will find that the above statement means that, if someone asserts that there is a non-material entity that evidently executes the three activities for the whole animal in a human, dog, cat, or any other animal with a nervous system—for whatever reasons—we will scientifically find that there is an alive, processing brain in that animal; we will not find that animal with a dead brain or without a brain. This issue of a scientific theorem needing to be verifiable is also the case for the theorem of the association between a mental process and a neural process. Thus, Theorems I for both mental processes and the mind can be stated only in the forms that appear in Section 1.2.

Next, it should be noted that the concept that the mind and mental processes are closely associated with the brain and neural processes is not a novel one. This concept has long been present in philosophy [1,2,4,210–218], cognitive neuroscience, clinical neurology, and related fields [1,4,8,17,188,219–224]. Currently, scientific evidence (from studies in clinical neurology, neuropharmacology, neuroimaging, cognitive neuroscience, and other related fields) indicating that mental processes are closely associated with their neural processes and that the mind is closely associated with the brain—that the former entities do not exist or function without the latter entities—is overwhelming to the point that this concept is almost irrefutable. Although this fundamental association between the two kinds of entities has not been explicitly stated as a theorem in cognitive neuroscience, neurology, psychiatry, and related fields, it has been the implicit basis of studies, experiments, and treatments related to the mind and mental processes in these fields for a long time, as one can gather from the way studies, experiments, and therapeutic strategies have been designed. To some scientists and philosophers, this theorem may even seem trivial. However, because this concept is the most basic and crucial to understanding the nature of the mind and mental processes, it is proved methodically and explicitly stated as Theorem I of this theory. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, it underpins several other theorems, and certain controversial matters, such as the existence of p-zombies, can be resolved using this theorem alone. This point can be briefly demonstrated as follows: Humans have qualia and consciousness as well as awareness of them (no matter what qualia and consciousness are, we are definitely aware that they occur in us). Thus, we must have a certain neural process functioning for such awareness to occur because, according to this theorem, awareness of anything cannot occur by itself but must occur with some neural process. By their definition, p-zombies do not have qualia and consciousness, so they do not and cannot have awareness of qualia and consciousness. Consequently, they do not have any neural process functioning for awareness of qualia and consciousness. Hence, humans and p-zombies cannot be physically identical, at least because of the difference in the presence of the neural process for such awareness. However, p-zombies are defined as being physically identical to humans, which is obviously not possible. Therefore, because the definition defines physically impossible entities, p-zombies cannot physically exist. This matter is discussed in more detail in Extra Chapter III.

Finally, it is to be cautioned that, although this theory asserts that mental processes coexist with their neural processes and that the mind coexists with the brain, it does not assert that mental processes are identical with their neural processes and that the mind is identical with the brain. This theory does not support the concept that the mind and the brain are identical. On the contrary, according to this theory, it is basically impossible for mental processes to be identical with neural processes and for the mind to be identical with the brain because, according to this theory’s definition, the mind and mental processes are non-material, whereas the brain and neural processes are material. What the mind and mental processes physically and ontologically are will be discussed and identified in the next chapter.

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