Chapter 8

The Explanatory Gap

In Chapters 5 and 7, it has been shown that qualia are neural signaling patterns and that consciousness is a neural signaling state. However, how can such physical signals, which basically result from movements of ions and molecules, give rise to qualia (such as an image of a house, a sound of a song, and an odor of a flower in our minds) and consciousness (awareness and experiences of what qualia are like, such as what an image of a house is like, what a sound of a song is like, and what an odor of a flower is like)? In short, how can qualia and consciousness occur from a physical system? This problem seems to resist scientific explanation and is widely known as the explanatory gap [1–19]. This chapter answers this question, which can be achieved using two different approaches: the information-meaning approach and the point-of-view approach.

8.1 The Information-Meaning Approach

8.1.1 The meaning of various signals

Let us consider various signals with different information, as depicted in Figure 8.1.

Figure 8.1 Various signals with different information meanings

First, consider Figure 8.1A. The information of the signal means “a house” to those who understand sign language. When those people read this signal, they will get the information meaning “a house” (the information that means “a house”) from the signal, but only “a house” without anything else, such as what the house looks like. Others, who do not understand sign language or, equivalently speaking, those to whom the signal does not mean “a house,” will not get information meaning “a house” from the signal but will get something else, such as something funny or meaningless.

Likewise, consider Figure 8.1B, which depicts a signaling pattern of a certain subconscious neural process, such as some subconscious visual perception neural process. The information of this signal means “a house” to some receiving neural processes. It may also comprise physical information, such as the size, shape, and color of the house. However, if the whole information does not include information meaning what the house looks like to the receiving neural processes, these neural processes will get the information meaning “a house” and potentially some physical information when they read this signal but no information meaning what the house looks like. Consequently, what the house looks like will not and cannot occur in them. Similarly, awareness and an experience of what the house looks like, which require prior information about what the house looks like, will not and cannot, either. Other receivers that cannot interpret this signal or, equivalently speaking, those to which the signal does not mean “a house” will not get any specific information from it. To them, the signal will be meaningless.

Figure 8.1C

Next, consider Figure 8.1C. The information of the signal means “a house” and “what the house looks like” to those who can interpret this image, such as healthy adults. When they read this signal, they will get the information meaning both “a house” and “what the house looks like” from the signal; they will not get information meaning “a house” alone. Other receivers who cannot understand the image or, equivalently speaking, those to whom the signal does not mean “a house” and “what the house looks like,” such as babies or non-human animals, will not get the information meaning “a house and what the house looks like” from the signal but will get something else, such as something colorful but meaningless to them. 

Figure 8.1D

Similarly, consider Figure 8.1D, which depicts a signaling pattern of a certain conscious neural process, such as some conscious visual perception neural process. The information of the signal means “a house” and “what the house looks like” to some receiving neural processes, such as the consciousness neural process. When these neural processes read the signal, they will get the information meaning both “a house” and “what the house looks like” from the signal, and the signal will be interpreted as such by these neural processes. Consequently, “a house” with “what the house looks like” will naturally and inevitably appear in them—that is, the image quale of the house, which manifests what itself looks like, will and must appear in these receivers. If the receiver is the consciousness neural process, because of the available information (about what the house looks like) and its specialized ability, the signaling state, as depicted in Figure 8.1E, that has the information that means “awareness and an experience of what the house looks like” to the consciousness neural process itself can be generated.

When the consciousness neural process reads this signaling state via reentrant signaling, it will be interpreted as such, and “awareness and an experience of what the house looks like” or consciousness of the house image will naturally and inevitably appear in it.

On the other hand, other receivers that cannot understand the signal in Figure 8.1D or, equivalently speaking, those to which the signal does not mean “a house” and “what the house looks like,” such as unrelated neural processes or computers (if the signal could somehow be fed to them), will not get the information meaning “a house” and “what the house looks like” from the signal. Consequently, the image of the house with the manifestation of what the house looks like or the image quale of the house will not and cannot occur in them. Similarly, awareness and an experience of what the house looks like or consciousness of the house image, which require prior information about “what the house looks like,” will not and cannot, either.

Thus, it can be seen from the above examples that various signal receivers can interpret the same signals differently, or, equivalently speaking, the same signals can have different meanings to different receivers. In general, the meaning of a signal depends on the signal information, the readers, and the context of the signal reading (which is not discussed in the examples above because it is the same for receivers in each example). Therefore, when the signal and the context of signal reading are the same, the meaning of the information in the signal depends only on the receivers. Hence, in the case of qualia (Figure 8.1D), although the signal’s information does not mean a quale to most receivers, it can have such a meaning to some (such as the consciousness neural process), and a quale (such as an image of a house) will appear in them. 

8.1.2 What is the mechanism for a physical signal to mean a quale?

In the previous subsection, it has been shown that some signals can mean a quale to some receivers. However, what is the mechanism for a physical signal to mean a quale, such as a mental image of a house, to a receiver? The answer is that, for a signal to mean a quale to a receiver, the signal must have physical effects on the receiver such that the quale becomes information in the receiver’s processing system. For example, please see Figure 8.2. If Signal S with information I meaning Quale Q (such as a mental image of a house) to the consciousness neural process C, it must have the effects on C such that physical interactions occur as follows: S (I) interacts with C → a cascade of physical interactions occurs in C → components in C change → Quale Q becomes information in C.

S = a signal with information I that means quale Q to C
S′ = the signal after the information transfer
C = the consciousness neural process before reading S
C + Q = the consciousness neural process after reading S
Q = a quale (such as an image of a house)
Figure 8.2 The mechanism for a signal and information to mean a quale

That Quale Q has become information in C can be evidenced by subsequent C’s activities, which will reflect that C has this information. For example, C can be aware of and experience Quale Q and send Quale Q’s information to other processes, resulting in other processes being able to think about Quale Q, have emotions concerning Quale Q, remember and recall Quale Q, and report Quale Q to the outside world—all of which were not possible for C before reading (interacting with) Signal S.

In detail, this means that, if C + Q (or the consciousness neural process C with quale Q in its system) is composed of elementary particles [a′,b′,c′,d′,e′,f′,g′] with specified characteristics—spatial position, velocity, mass/energy, electrical charge, and spin—for [a′] = a′₁,a′₂,a′₃,a′₄,a′₅, respectively, for [b′] = b′₁,b′₂,b′₃,b′₄,b′₅, respectively, and so on, and if C, or the initial consciousness neural process that does not have Q in its system, is composed of particles [a,b,c,d,e,f,g] with the same specified characteristics for [a] = a₁,a₂,a₃,a₄,a₅, [b] = b₁,b₂,b₃,b₄,b₅, and so on, then, for information I in the signaling pattern S to mean Q to the receiver C, S’s particles [i,j,k] must interact with C’s particles [a,b,c,d,e,f,g] such that a physical interaction cascade occurs in C that ultimately changes C to C + Q, that is, changes [a]:(a₁,a₂,a₃,a₄,a₅) to [a′]:(a′₁,a′₂,a′₃,a′₄,a′₅), [b]:(b₁,b₂,b₃,b₄,b₅) to [b′]:(b′₁,b′₂,b′₃, b′₄,b′₅), and so on.

Although, at present, we do not know the characteristics of a signal S that can have information I with such physical effects, it is certain from real-life evidence that S and I exist, because some neural signals evidently have information that means qualia to the consciousness neural process C and can change C to C + Q. That is, the state C + Q does exist—we can become aware of and experience what Q is like, think about Q, have emotions concerning Q, remember and recall Q, report Q to the outside world, and so on.

The crucial question is how is it possible that a signaling pattern having information meaning a quale (such as the signaling pattern in Figure 8.1D) and a signaling state having information meaning awareness and an experience of what the quale is like (such as the signaling state in Figure 8.1E) to some receivers can be created? The answer is that it must be basically possible for such a signaling pattern and signaling state to be created because qualia and awareness and experiences of what qualia are like do occur in billions of humans everywhere, nowadays and in the past. Also, some neural processes (such as the visual perception neural processes) must basically be able to create such signaling patterns, and some other neural processes (such as the consciousness neural process) must basically be able to create such signaling states. Otherwise, these phenomenal phenomena —qualia and consciousness—would not have been occurring in human brains since the ancient past and up to the present time. It is a brute fact.

If we consider this matter in general, it is not very surprising or improbable that these phenomena happen. Ever since the nervous system appeared in this world hundreds of millions of years ago, there have been innumerable kinds of neural processes with myriad kinds of signaling patterns and signaling states that carry diverse kinds of information for various kinds of neural functions: processing different sensory signals, keeping numerous blood constituents within normal ranges, controlling vascular and cardiopulmonary functions, performing diverse cognitive operations, controlling volitional movements, and so on. All these functions require evolved specific neural processes with specific signaling patterns and specific signaling states that have specific information of their own. The quale neural processes are just evolved neural processes with their own specific functions—creating signaling patterns that have information that means qualia or phenomena manifesting what they are like, such as an image of a house, a sound of a song, and an odor of a flower, to their receiving neural process, the consciousness neural process. And the consciousness neural process is just one evolved neural process with its own specific function—creating signaling states that have information that means, to itself, awareness and experiences of what qualia are like, such as awareness and an experience of what an image of a house, what a sound of a song, and what an odor of a lower are like. To repeat, it is just the fundamental nature of this universe that these neural processes, signaling patterns, and signaling states exist.

8.2 The Point-of-View Approach

8.2.1 How can a signaling pattern be a quale?

First, please look at the signaling between neural circuits A and B in Figure 8.3.

A = neural circuit A, B = neural circuit B, IPP = information-processing process,
O = outside observer, small arrows = the signals that A is sending to B
Figure 8.3 Signals in the view of an outside observer O

From the point of view of an outside observer (O), who observes the brain from the outside, or from the third-person point of view, what appears to occur is that innumerable electrical signals (small arrows) in the form of APs (action potentials) are sent from neurons in one circuit (A) to neurons in the other circuit (B) incessantly and that EPSPs or IPSPs (excitatory or inhibitory postsynaptic potentials) occur almost continuously at the synaptic junctions here and there in B. In this view, those electrical signals and the resulting signaling pattern do not appear to be or be able to be a quale (i.e., an image, sound, emotion, thought, or any other quale, which manifests what itself is like in our minds); they are just phenomenon-less (i.e., phenomenality-less) electrical signals and patterns.

However, for the signals to appear as in this view, the observer must observe them (typically by using some instruments) from the outside of the signaling. From this point of view, the information in the signaling pattern is not read—it is only observed or looked at. We will see that this differs from the following case and that the difference is most critical. 

From the point of view of the information-processing process (IPP) of neural circuit B that is receiving the signals or from the first-person point of view, the signals appear different because the IPP’s point of view and its way of interacting with the signals are different from those of the outside observer (O): 

     1) From its position, the IPP cannot observe the signals from the outside of the signaling because it is part of the signaling—it is the receiver of the signals. Moreover, the world of the IPP is drastically different from that of O:

     The IPP does not know that it is a non-material process in a material circuit composed of millions of neurons with innumerable interconnecting axons and dendrites, connected to several other neural circuits, and with countless APs coursing the circuits and a multitude of EPSPs and IPSPs occurring at the synaptic junctions incessantly, as in Figure 8.3. In short, in the world of the IPP, there are no neurons, axons, dendrites, synapses, electrical/electrochemical (E/EC) activities, or other material things. The IPP is oblivious to these material components because there is nothing that detects and reports these things to it; thus, there is no information about them in it. All that exists for the IPP is non-material things that it receives from something outside, processes, and then sends to something outside or circulates in itself. Because this non-material thing is transferred to the IPP from something, is later transferred from it to something, and consists of content that it can process and transfer, this non-material thing is transferable and consists of content—it is thus information (please see I.1 Information: Definition, in Extra Chapter I: Information). That is, information, information processing, and information transfer are all there is in the world of IPPs. The world of the IPP can be depicted as the illustration in Figure 8.4, not the one in Figure 8.3, which is not the world of an IPP but that of an outside observer O.

Figure 8.4 The world of an information-processing process (IPP)

2) Now, when the signals interact with the IPP (as in Figure 8.3), the information in the signaling pattern will be read and processed by the IPP (as in Figure 8.4). How the signaling pattern appears to the IPP depends solely on the information in the signaling pattern. For example, if the information means a blood sodium level of 135 mEq/L without phenomenality to the IPP, a phenomenon-less blood sodium level will appear in the IPP (represented by L in Figure 8.5). On the other hand, if the information means red with phenomenality (red with a manifestation of what the red is like) to the IPP, a phenomenal red quale will appear in the IPP (depicted as a red disc in Figure 8.5).

Figure 8.5 Appearances of different types of information in the IPP

This is how a quale occurs in an IPP: The information that means a quale to an IPP is read and interpreted as such by the IPP (which has the first-person point of view). When that happens, the information naturally and inevitably appears as the quale—a quale thus appears in an IPP … and the physical brain.

If the receiver is the consciousness neural process, we can assess whether the signaling pattern or information appears to it as a quale by checking the reports of how the signaling pattern appears to it that it sends to other neural processes. Some of these neural processes can reveal those reports to the outside world by verbal, written, or other types of language. Because these neural processes function to report to other neural processes factually, if they reveal that the consciousness neural process reports to them that the signaling pattern appears as a quale, the signals must appear as a quale to the consciousness neural process; otherwise, the signals must appear as something that is not a quale to the consciousness neural process.

This kind of qualia appearance from neural signals is verifiable in everyday life. For example, if we look at the brain of a person who is looking at a red color, we will not see anything red occurring in his or her brain. However, we can check how the neural signals of the red color, which are in the form of signaling patterns in the brain, appear to the IPP of his or her consciousness neural process by asking the person. A visually healthy and cooperative person will report (by verbal, written, or other types of language) that he or she sees and experiences what the red color is like in his or her mind. Such a report means that the neural processes that reveal this event (through the means of speaking, writing, or other signaling) have received accounts from the IPP of the consciousness neural process that the signaling pattern of the red-color perception appears as a red color that manifests what the red color itself is like to it. Therefore, signaling patterns, which are phenomenon-less when observed or looked at from the outside or third-person point of view, can indeed appear as phenomenal qualia to the IPP of the consciousness neural circuit that is reading the signaling patterns from the first-person point of view.

An approximate analogy is the working of a cathode-ray tube. Please see Figure 8.6. 

Figure 8.6 A cathode-ray tube analogy

The rays of electrons streaming out of a cathode-ray tube emitter in some signaling pattern representing a beautiful flower bouquet do not seem to be any colorful flower (or any image at all) to an outside observer (O) who is observing the streams from the outside. To O, they are just millions of electrons rushing from the emitter to the screen, and the pattern of signaling does not seem to be anything close to an image of a flower bouquet either. On the other hand, from the point of view of the receiver (R) of the electron rays, if R is the appropriate kind of screen that can correctly interact with the electron rays and thus can correctly interpret (decode) the information in them, the image of the beautiful flowers sent in the electron rays will appear on it. Therefore, image-less electron rays in the third-person point of view can become a colorful image in the first-person point of view. 

At this point, it is essential to emphasize that, for the flower bouquet image sent in the signals to occur at the screen, the screen must be a specific one that can correctly interact with and decode the signals; otherwise, the signals will appear as something else or even nothing on the screen. Semantically speaking, the screen must be a specific one to which the information in the electron rays means an image of a flower bouquet. Not every screen can be such a screen. 

This is the same in the case of neural signaling. Even if we can obtain the signals that neural circuit A sends to neural circuit B in Figure 8.3 and feed them to another neural circuit, a computer, or other signal-analyzing systems, these receivers cannot interact with the signals in the way that the IPP of neural circuit B can and thus cannot decode the information in the signals. Therefore, the effects of the signals on such receivers will differ from those on the IPP, and the signals will appear differently to these receivers than to the IPP. Semantically speaking, the information in the signals does not mean the same thing to these receivers as it does to the IPP. For example, if neural circuit A is the final visual perception circuit and the signals being sent mean the colorful-flowers image to the IPP of the consciousness neural circuit, then the colorful-flowers image will appear in this IPP, although it will not do so in other receivers. 

It should be noted that this kind of explanation involving the first- and third-person points of view and different ways of observation has been discussed before by several authors, such as Globus (1973) [20], Velmans (1996,2001,2002,2009) [18,21–25], Feinberg (2012) [26], Feinberg and Mallatt (2016,2020) [10,11], and Solms and Friston (2018) [27]. Feinberg (2012) [26] and Feinberg and Mallatt (2016) [11] called the barriers that prevent the first person from having the third-person point of view “auto-ontological irreducibility” and those that prevent the third person from having the first-person point of view “allo-ontological irreducibility.” Solms and Friston (2018) [27] called the first- and the third-person points of view subjective perspective or interoceptive and objective perspective or exteroceptive, respectively. The dual-aspect theory, for example, suggests that a conscious experience and its correlated brain state are how the mind appears when viewed from first- and third-person perspectives, respectively, and that these aspects of the mind are complementary and mutually irreducible [18]. However, although these authors gave convincing arguments that the different points of view are responsible for different depictions of the same information, they did not give a rationale as to why something with phenomenality—qualia and consciousness—should appear in the first-person point of view. On the other hand, this theory offers a principle of why phenomenality should appear in the first-person point of view: The interpretation of information’s meaning, which can occur only in the first-person point of view, enables information that means something with phenomenality—qualia and consciousness—to the receiver to appear as such in the receiver.

Summarily, when viewed from the third-person point of view, signals appear as a complex composition of physical, phenomenon-less signals because they are observed but not read; consequently, their information is not interpreted and hence does not display itself. In contrast, when read from the first-person point of view, the signals appear to be something that their information means because they are not observed but read, so the information in them is interpreted and displays itself to the receiver. Thus, if a signal, such as a special signaling pattern, has information that means a quale to the receiver, it will naturally and inevitably appear to the receiver as the quale. Furthermore, if the receiver is the consciousness neural process, conscious awareness and experience of the quale will be subsequently created from the quale that has appeared in it. Fundamentally, there is no physical law that a) restricts information from meaning qualia, b) forbids information that means a quale to a receiver from appearing as the quale to the receiver, and c) precludes occurrences of qualia, which are non-material phenomena, in the non-material world of the information-processing process (as depicted in Figures 8.4 and 8.5), and thus in the mind and the brain, in which the information-processing process exists.

Every time you wonder

how material physical signals can be qualia,

remember to move from the third-person point of view

 to the first-person one,

and change from looking at the signals

to reading and processing their information.

The beautiful flowers will appear in your view.

8.2.2 How can a signal state be consciousness?

The way to answer this question is essentially the same as in the case of a signaling pattern in the previous section. Accordingly, the explanation will proceed similarly but with some modifications to suit the case of consciousness, which is a signaling state (specifically, a reentrant signaling state), unlike a quale, which is a signaling pattern.

Please look at the signaling state of the conscious neural process in Figure 8.7.

(looping curved arrows = a reentrant signaling state)
Figure 8.7 The signaling state in the view of an outsider

From the point of view of an outsider who looks at the brain from the outside or the third-person point of view, what appears to occur is that innumerable electrical signals (curved arrows) in the form of APs are being circulated from one neuron to another incessantly and that EPSPs or IPSPs occur almost continuously at synaptic junctions here and there in the reentrant neural circuit. In this view, the electrical signals and the signaling state that occurs do not appear to be or be able to be anything that has phenomenal manifestations; they are just phenomenon-less electrical signals circulating in some pattern, resulting in a certain signaling state. 

 However, for the signals to appear as in this view, the observer must observe the signals (by using some instruments, in general cases) from outside the signaling. And it is essential to note that, in this view, the information that is circulating in the signaling state is not read—it is only observed or looked at. We will see that this differs from the following case and that the difference is most critical. 

Next, let us examine the situation from the point of view of the information-processing process (IPP) in a reentrant neural circuit (such as the consciousness neural circuit, in which the signaling state occurs) or the first-person point of view (Figure 8.8):

Figure 8.8 The world of the information-processing process (IPP) of a signaling state

     1) From its position, the IPP cannot observe the signals from the outside of the signaling because it is part of the signaling—it is both the sender and the receiver of the signals. Moreover, the world of the IPP is drastically different from that of an outside observer. Similar to the case of a signaling pattern, there are no neurons, axons, dendrites, synapses, E/EC activities, or other material things in the world of the IPP; only information, information processing, and information transfer exist in it. The world of the IPP can be depicted as the illustration in Figure 8.8, not those in Figures 8.3 and 8.7.

Additionally, even though all the somas, axons, dendrites, and synaptic junctions of millions of neurons in the neural circuit are separated and thus spatially discontinuous, the IPP does not see the information coming into it or existing in it in a discontinuous pattern. This is because there is nothing that detects and reports these discontinuities to it; consequently, there is no information about them in it. Thus, in the world of the IPP, gaps do not exist, and there is only a continuous expanse of information, information processing, and information transfer. It should be noted here that, similarly, there are no gaps between various kinds of perception (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.), emotions, thoughts, and other mental phenomena in our minds.

 2) Now, when the signals that are circulating in the reentrant neural circuit (Figure 8.7) are read by the IPP, the information in the signaling state will be processed and interpreted by the IPP (Figure 8.8). How the signaling state appears to the IPP depends solely on the information in the signaling state. If the information means consciousness of a quale (i.e., conscious awareness and experience of a quale or awareness and an experience of what the quale is like) to the IPP, it will be interpreted as such, and consciousness of the quale will naturally and inevitably occur in the IPP. 

We can determine whether the signaling state of the consciousness neural process appears to its IPP as consciousness by checking the consciousness neural process’s reports (of how the signaling state appears to it) that are sent to other neural processes. Some of these neural processes can reveal those reports to the outside world by verbal, written, or other types of language. Because these neural processes function to report to each other and the outside world factually, if they reveal that the consciousness neural process reports to them that the signaling state appears as consciousness, the signaling state must certainly appear as consciousness to the IPP of the consciousness neural process, and consciousness must really have appeared in the IPP of the consciousness neural process.

Indeed, such is the case in everyday life. For example, in the case of someone looking at a red color, we can assess how the signaling state of the consciousness neural process appears to the consciousness neural process itself by asking the person who is looking at the red color. A visually healthy and cooperative person will report (by verbal, written, or other types of language) that he or she sees a red color quale and is aware of and experiences what the red color quale is like in his or her mind. Such a report means that the neural processes that reveal this event (by speaking, writing, or other signaling) have received accounts from the consciousness neural process that the signaling state resulting from looking at the red color appears to its IPP as consciousness, or conscious awareness and experience, of the red color quale (Figure 8.9).

Figure 8.9 Appearances of a red-color quale and the consciousness of it in the IPP

Therefore, when observed from the outside, the consciousness neural process’s signaling state of seeing a red color naturally appears phenomenon-less to the observer because it is not read and interpreted. On the other hand, when read from the inside, it must appear as phenomenal consciousness of a red color quale to the consciousness neural process’s IPP because it is read and interpreted.

To summarize, similar to the case of qualia, when viewed from the third-person point of view, signals appear as a complex composition of physical, phenomenon-less signals because they are observed but not read; hence, the information in them is not interpreted and thus cannot display itself. Contrastingly, when read from the first-person point of view, the signals appear to be something that their information means because they are not observed but read, so the information in them is interpreted by the reader and displays itself to it. Thus, if a signal, such as a special signaling state, has the information that means conscious awareness and experiences, or consciousness, to the consciousness neural process, it will naturally and inevitably appear to the consciousness neural process as consciousness. And consciousness will and must occur in the brain. Fundamentally, there is no physical law that a) restricts information from meaning consciousness, b) forbids information that means consciousness to a receiver from appearing as consciousness to the receiver, and c) precludes occurrences of consciousness, which is a non-material phenomenon, in the non-material world of the information-processing process (as depicted in Figures 8.8 and 8.9), and thus in the mind and the brain, in which the information-processing process exists. 

8.3 Remarks

The explanatory gap has been an essential problem in philosophy and cognitive neuroscience for a long time. There have been many discussions about it, and numerous concepts and theories have been proposed to solve it; for example, please see References 1–19, 28–30. However, the issue has been unsettled. 

If this problem is examined critically, it can be seen that it originated from the assumption that non-phenomenal physical entities, such as the brain, are the basic entities, primarily present, and that phenomenal entities, such as qualia and consciousness, arise from or are caused by the former entities later. Thus, there is a need to explain how that can happen. But there are no physical laws that underlie and govern a causal link between the physical and phenomenal entities. Hence, the explanatory gap arises and persists.

However, the assumption has no empirical basis. It is possible that both types of entities have always coexisted since their beginnings. Thus, there is no need to explain how one type can arise from or cause the other, and the explanatory gap never exists. The question is: If this is the case, what are the entities that always exist with the brain and are qualia and consciousness? According to this possibility, they must already coexist with the brain; it is only that we do not recognize them.

Once we identify that qualia and consciousness are patterns in the forms of signaling patterns and signaling states, respectively, everything falls into place. Patterns with their information have naturally existed with physical entities since the universe’s inception (please see I.3 The Nature of Information, Extra Chapter I). At a certain evolutionary stage, some of them evolved into SSSs and SSPs, which were qualia and consciousness, respectively. Because SSSs and SSPs are evolved forms of previously existing entities—patterns—not emerging new entities, no explanation is needed for the presumed emergence of qualia and consciousness. Also, from the third-person point of view, our usual point of view when we think about or investigate patterns and information in labs, they do not appear phenomenally as they do when viewed or, to be exact, read from the first-person point of view, the natural point of view of functioning neural processes. This is because the information in the patterns is not read and interpreted in the former case but is in the latter case.

Thus, the explanatory gap of how qualia and consciousness can occur in a physical system can be explained by existing scientific knowledge about physical patterns and information, specifically information meaning and interpretation, about their evolution, and about the observer’s point of view or the way the observer interacts with information.

The explanatory gap is part of the hard problem of qualia and consciousness—the “how” part. It will be revisited with the “why” part and other related problems of the hard problem in the next chapter, which offers full discussions with various perspectives of the problem.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

Figure 8.10 WE

Once more, every time you wonder how material signals

can give rise to qualia and consciousness,

remember to move into the world of information processing

and experience everything from there.

You will be in the dazzling world of qualia

and the experiential world of consciousness.

…

That world always exists

side by side with the outside physical world

since the birth of everything.

WE live there!

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

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References

1. Block N. Chapter 77. Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In: Gazzaniga MS, editor. The Cognitive Neurosciences. 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2009:1111–1122. https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Theories_of_Consciousness.pdf
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