Chapter 6

Consciousness

Consciousness is one of the most important mental phenomena of the mind. It can rightly be considered the supreme mental phenomenon because it makes us sentient in a special way that differentiates us from present-day artificial intelligence (AI). Without it, no matter how intelligent we are, we will be just robots of some kind, roaming this planet without having awareness and experiences of what it is like to be ourselves, to see colorful flowers, to hear melodious music, to feel tender touch, to feel happiness, and so on in our minds.

However, consciousness is a term that has various meanings [1–21], and the meaning used above is just one of them. This theory investigates consciousness only in this meaning to answer questions about it. First, this chapter clarifies what consciousness in this meaning is and how it relates to consciousness in other meanings. The next chapter resolves the questions of its nature: what it is physically and ontologically, why and how it occurs, and other related questions.

6.1 Consciousness: Definition

 If our mind is examined while we are not engaged in any specific activity, it will be found to have many mental processes going on concurrently as resting-state mental processes—for example, thinking casually, experiencing a light mood, and perceiving trivial sensations (such as non-exciting visions, soft sounds, and light touches) from the uneventful surroundings. When there is a strong enough stimulus, either external (a flash of light, a loud call, a needle prick, etc.) or internal (a popping-up thought of an urgent task, a sudden reliving of a past exciting incident, a pang of sorrow, etc.), our attention will be directed to that stimulus, and our concentration will focus on it. In addition, the mind will become less aware or even unaware of the resting-state mental processes that are unrelated to the stimulus. For example, when exciting news appears on television and we turn to watch it, we may become less aware or unaware of the sounds in the surroundings, not register pain in our backs, and not feel any emotion that we felt before. Thus, normally, when we are awake, many mental processes occur in a dynamic state—some become dominant for some time, and some become marginal or even disappear for some time. However, whether we are doing nothing or concentrating on something, some mental processes are always at work if we are awake and in a normal condition. One of them functions to be aware of and experience mental phenomena (such as image, sound, and emotion) with awareness and experiences of what those mental phenomena are like (such as what the image of flowers is like, what the sound of music is like, and what the feeling of happiness is like) occurring.     

Because this mental process functions to be aware of and experience mental phenomena with awareness and experiences of what the mental phenomena are like occurring, this mental process functions to be consciously aware of and consciously experience mental phenomena (see Section 3.1), and the awareness and experiences of what those mental phenomena are like that occur are called conscious awareness and conscious experiences, respectively (see Section 3.4). Accordingly, in this theory, this mental process will be called the consciousness mental process and can be defined as:

Definition: The consciousness mental process is the mental process that functions to be consciously aware of and consciously experience mental phenomena.

Equivalently, it can also be defined as:

Definition: The consciousness mental process is the mental process that functions to create conscious awareness and conscious experiences.

However, under normal conditions, the mind is consciously aware of and consciously experiences several mental phenomena (such as images, sounds, touch, emotions, and thoughts) simultaneously. Hence, under normal conditions, several kinds of conscious awareness and conscious experiences occur concurrently. Therefore, under normal conditions, the consciousness mental process functions to create a composite of all conscious awareness and conscious experiences. If we define consciousness as what the consciousness mental process functions to create, then consciousness is the composite of all conscious awareness and conscious experiences. This is its definition in this theory:

Definition: Consciousness is the composite of all conscious awareness and conscious experiences. 

According to the definitions and discussions of conscious awareness and conscious experiences in Section 3.4, the above definition means in detail that consciousness is the composite of all awareness and experiences of what qualia are like. Equivalently, it means that consciousness is the composite of awareness and experiences of what all occurring qualia are like. In real life, this means that consciousness is the composite of awareness and experiences of, among other things, what an image of a house, a sound of a song, an odor of a flower, a feeling of happiness, and a thought of one’s self are like. Since qualia are representations of things in our lives (see Section 3.7), in plain language, consciousness is the composite of awareness and experiences of what the things in the outside world are like in their various representations (image, sound, smell, taste, touch, etc.). In this theory, when conciseness is required, this last description will be shortened to “consciousness is awareness and experiences of what things are like.”

Also, because the composite that is consciousness comprises only conscious awareness and conscious experiences, to be concise, the shorter terms—the composite, conscious awareness and conscious experiences, and conscious awareness and experiences—will be used (instead of the full, longer term: the composite of …) interchangeably to mean consciousness in general discussions about it. Which term will be used depends on the aspect being focused on at that point. Also, when we investigate consciousness in a specific situation, such as perception of an image, sound, or smell individually, the term consciousness of or (be) conscious of, such as consciousness of a red color quale, consciousness of a musical sound quale, or (be) conscious of a flower smell quale, will be used instead of the base terms consciousness and conscious to denote this specificity. Consciousness of in this usage is just conscious awareness and a conscious experience of that quale; it is not consciousness in general, which is the composite of all conscious awareness and conscious experiences. 

Finally, it is important to note that consciousness by this definition involves phenomenality or manifestation of what itself is like in the mind in two aspects:

     I. Because awareness and experiences of what qualia are like (what an image of a house, a sound of a song, an odor of a flower, etc. are like) occur when we are conscious of those qualia, it means that awareness and experiences of the phenomenality of those qualia occur when we are conscious of them.

     II. Because we can be consciously aware of and consciously experience what our consciousness is like, our consciousness itself is consciously experienceable and manifests what itself is like in the mind; thus, consciousness itself is a quale and has phenomenality. 

Sometimes, to emphasize the involvement of phenomenality, the term phenomenal consciousness [2,4,8–10,12,15–18,22–37] will be used, but it means the same as consciousness.

6.2 Other Definitions of Consciousness

The definition of consciousness in the previous section is just one definition among several others. Consciousness is an artificial concept. The mind comprises numerous interrelated mental processes and has various aspects. It is arbitrary for anyone to choose, according to his or her opinion, which aspect to focus on and which one or ones of those mental processes should be called or grouped together to be called “consciousness” [7]. This results in the term “consciousness” having varied meanings and referring to related but not the same entities. Hence, to avoid confusion in the following discussions, which involve consciousness of varied definitions, consciousness (regular typeface) is used in this chapter to represent a term that is used generally and can have varied meanings, whereas consciousness (bold and italics) is used to denote a term that has a fixed meaning as defined in the previous section. Their adjective forms are conscious and conscious, respectively. In other chapters, only consciousness (regular typeface) is used to avoid difficulties in reading; most of the time, it refers to consciousness as defined by this theory, but sometimes, consciousness in other meanings, depending on the context.

     Some of the most common meanings of the terms consciousness and conscious are as follows:

1. A creature’s state of being awake, responsive, and capable of performing mental functions. For example, he lost consciousness in a car accident and was unresponsive afterward, with no eye opening, vocalization, or motor response to any stimuli; however, a few hours later, his consciousness returned to normal—he became awake, responsive, and capable of performing mental functions normally, with eye opening, vocalization, and motor responses to stimuli, as usual. 

Compared with consciousness, consciousness in this meaning is different because it does not require that awareness and an experience of what something that one is conscious of is like must occur; just being awake, responsive, and capable of performing mental functions is enough for consciousness to occur. Therefore, any animal that is awake, responsive, and able to perform mental functions can rightfully be said to be conscious and have consciousness in this meaning. Similarly, because functioning robots are manifestation-wise awake, responsive, and capable of performing electronic functions comparable to human mental functions, such as sensing stimuli, processing information, and commanding their effectors (e.g., sound-producing devices, arms, or legs), resulting in human-like behaviors, such as sensing things (see, hear, smell, etc.), assessing situations, making decisions, remembering things, and performing human-like activities (move around, talk, work, etc.), one can argue that, at least manifestation-wise, robots are conscious and have consciousness in this meaning.

2. A mental state of being aware of something. In this meaning, consciousness is typically used in its adjective form, conscious. For example, he is conscious of the smell in the room; she is conscious of the pain in her body; and we are conscious of what is going on around us. 

Compared with conscious and consciousness, conscious and consciousness in this meaning are different because they do not require that awareness and an experience of what something that one is conscious of (such as the smell or pain) is like must occur; just being aware of something is enough to be conscious and for consciousness to occur. Therefore, one can argue that animals and robots are also conscious of things and have consciousness in this meaning because they are aware of things around them, such as images, sounds, smells, and other things, and can react to them accordingly.

3. A mental state of being aware of something with attention, resulting in detailed information about that thing gaining access into the brain’s workspace, where it is distributed to various parts of the brain (or becomes globally available) to be processed by other processes (such as analyzing, memorizing, and reporting processes). Because, in this case, consciousness occurs when something’s information gains access into the brain’s workspace, many authors call this type of consciousness “access consciousness” or “a-consciousness” [4,8,10,12, 16,18,22–25,32,38–43]. For example, when a man was walking through a crowd in a mall, his attention was caught by a loud announcement; he became conscious of the message that there would be a show at the convention hall on the third floor at 4 pm; after thinking for a while, he decided to attend, remembered the place and time, and called his friends to tell them about it. This means that the detailed information about the message had gained access to his brain’s workspace and was distributed globally to other processing processes with the occurrences of, in addition to access consciousness of the message, several other activities, including analyzing, decision-making, memorizing, and reporting. This contrasts with the sounds of the crowd and other things in the mall that may have entered his mind in another way: without attention and detailed information. Although he was aware of them, as evidenced by the fact that he was able to tell that there were sounds in the surroundings other than the sound of the announcement, his consciousness of these background sounds lacked the important characteristics mentioned above—further processing of the details of those sounds (such as analyzing, memorizing, and reporting) did not occur (because the detailed information did not enter the brain’s workspace and, thus, was not distributed globally for wider processing). In this case, some kind of consciousness of the surrounding sounds (such as consciousness in the second or fifth meaning) must have occurred, but it was not access consciousness like the one that occurred for the announced message. 

Compared with consciousness, consciousness in this meaning or access consciousness is different because it does not require that awareness and an experience of what something that one is conscious of (such as the announcement sound) is like must occur; just being aware of something with attention with the result that its detailed information becomes globally available and can be processed in various ways, as mentioned above, is sufficient for consciousness or access consciousness to occur. Therefore, when used in this meaning, one can argue that animals and robots also have consciousness or access consciousness because they can be aware of things with attention so that detailed information about those things becomes globally available in their minds or processing systems (in the case of robots)—this is evident from their behaviors, which reflect acquisition, integration, and utilization of the available detailed information.

4. A composite of mental processes that performs complex functions, resulting in complex abilities and behaviors. These complex functions are numerous, such as binding several components of sensory inputs (such as shape, color, and brightness components of a visual input) into a single unified percept (such as a complete image), selecting a certain stimulus from various stimuli to process, directing attention to and maintaining concentration on the selected stimulus, creating and modulating emotions, recognizing oneself and others’ selves, remembering things, searching past memories, utilizing past experiences, analyzing situations, comparing choices, making decisions, planning actions, executing flexible, goal-directed behaviors, and creating and using tools [1,2,18,44–49]. For example, healthy people are conscious in this meaning because they can perform the complex mental functions just mentioned, as is evident from their complex behaviors, which require complex mental functions.

Compared with consciousness, consciousness in this meaning is different because it does not require that awareness and an experience of what something that one is conscious of is like must occur; just being able to perform complex mental functions resulting in complex abilities and behaviors is enough for consciousness to occur. Therefore, when used in this meaning, one can argue that several types of animals, such as insects, fish, reptiles, birds, and mammals, have consciousness because they exhibit complex abilities and behaviors that require complex mental functions. Many people consider these complex mental functions as markers of consciousness in animals or even as animal consciousness itself [43,44,50–53]. Similarly, one can argue that robots also have consciousness in this meaning because functioning robots have electronic processing functions that are equivalent to these complex mental functions, resulting in similar complex abilities and behaviors. For example, they can perceive complex stimuli, remember and recall things, analyze situations, make decisions, plan actions, command their effectors to work, and play complex games (such as chess, Go, and bridges) [54–58].

5. A mental state of being aware of and experiencing something with awareness and an experience of what that thing is like occurring. For example, when we look at a red color and a red color quale occurs in our minds, awareness and an experience of what the red color quale is like occur; that is, consciousness of the red color quale occurs. Because awareness and an experience of what the red color quale is like—which are awareness and an experience of the red color quale’s phenomenality—occur, many authors call this kind of consciousness “phenomenal consciousness” or “p-consciousness” [2,4,8–10,12,15–18,22–37]. 

Compared with consciousness, consciousness in this meaning is similar because it requires that awareness and an experience of what something that one is conscious of is like must occur. In this meaning, we cannot be certain or argue with strong evidence that animals have phenomenal consciousness because they cannot report to us whether they are aware of and experience what something that they are conscious of is like in their minds. Also, it is certain that present-day robots do not have phenomenal consciousness because they are definitely unaware of and do not experience what something that they are aware of is like in their processing systems. This is because, in a robot, every function requires a specific circuit or software—no function in a robot is possible without a specific circuit or software. But a present-day robot simply does not have a specific circuit or software for it to be aware of and experience what something is like (because we, its creators, do not build such circuits and software for it as we, at present, plainly do not know how to do so). Therefore, it is clear that current robots do not have phenomenal consciousness (a more detailed discussion on this matter is provided in Chapter 9, Section 9.3.1: Do computers and robots have qualia and consciousness?).

People usually use the terms conscious and consciousness in the first, second, or fourth meanings. The terms in the third meaning are mostly used by neuroscientists. Several neurological theories of consciousness, such as the Global Workspace Theory [59–64], Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis [65–70], and extended theory of the global workspace of consciousness [71], are about consciousness in this meaning. Animal cognition and robotics scientists usually use consciousness in the fourth meaning. Most philosophers, as well as some neuroscientists, discuss the terms in the fifth meaning; the hard problem [1–3,8,16,17,26,29,36,37,72–78] and explanatory gap of consciousness [1–3,8,15,16,25,27,29,35–38,73,79–83] are the problems about consciousness in this meaning. Consciousness investigated in this theory, consciousness, is also consciousness in this fifth meaning.

It should be noted that these types of consciousness are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they usually occur together. For example, the consciousness that occurs when one attends to a stimulus (such as the announcement sound in the example above) is consciousness in all the five meanings: consciousness in the first meaning because one is awake, responsive, and capable of attending the announcement; in the second meaning because one is conscious of the announcement; in the third meaning (or a-consciousness) because one pays attention to the announcement with the result that its detailed information gains access into the mind and becomes globally available for various processing processes; in the fourth meaning because one is able to perceive and interpret the announcement (which requires complex mental functions); and in the fifth meaning (or p-consciousness) because one can be aware of and experience what the quale of the announcement sound is like. However, sometimes, the consciousness that occurs can be consciousness in only some but not all meanings. For example, in the example of the man in the mall, consciousness of the background sounds can be considered consciousness in all but the third meaning, as discussed previously.

6.3 Other Meanings and Related Terms

There are still other but less common usages of the word consciousness in other meanings. For example, some use the term consciousness interchangeably with the mind [12,13,84] or all mental processes that function to evaluate and model the world [85] or with a non-material entity that pervades the universe, the term used in some beliefs and religions [18,85–89]—all of these probably have too broad meanings. Some use consciousness to mean thought or self-consciousness, which is obviously too narrow a meaning [4,15–18,20,36]. Also, some use consciousness to mean knowledge—that is, “one is conscious of something” means “one has knowledge of it”; this meaning is certainly too narrow as well [4,17,18,36]. Moreover, things are even more complicated because other words are sometimes used to refer to consciousness, such as awareness, feelings, the first-person perspective, phenomenality, phenomenal experience, qualia, and subjective experience [74,90]. Therefore, the reader should be careful about the meanings of the terms consciousness, conscious, and other mentioned wordings when finding them in literature.

Regarding the content of consciousness, because consciousness in some usages (such as that in the first and fourth meanings) does not require that, to be conscious or have consciousness, one must manifestly be conscious of something, some authors use the word “intransitive consciousness” [16,24,45,91] to describe such consciousness. On the other hand, the word “transitive consciousness” [12,16,24,45,91–93] is used to describe consciousness that overtly has content (such as that in the second, third, and fifth meanings), in which case one can be said to be conscious of something. In addition, some authors consider consciousness to be “state consciousness” or “mental-state consciousness” if the consciousness is just a state of the mind (such as that in the second, third, and fifth meanings) but “creature consciousness” if the consciousness is a property of the whole creature (such as that in the first and fourth meanings) [12,16,24,45,91,92].

Finally, many specific terms are used by different authors for different types of consciousness that have different types of awareness content. The most basic consciousness, which has awareness only of sensory perception, is usually called “primary consciousness” [27–29,94–100], “core consciousness” [101,102], “sensory consciousness” [28,51], “perceptual consciousness” [94,96], or “anoetic consciousness” [100,103]. A more complex consciousness that has awareness of not only sensory perception but also other things is called “higher-order consciousness” or “higher-level consciousness” [94,95,99]. More specifically, in addition to awareness of sensory perception, a higher-order consciousness that has awareness of executive control, decision making, voluntary action, one’s own thoughts, and one’s own awareness is called “noetic or reflective consciousness” [94–96,100,103], and a higher-order consciousness that also has awareness of one’s own identity over time is called “autonoetic consciousness” [100,103]. It should be noted that the definitions of these terms do not specify phenomenality as a part of consciousness. Thus, even with the current technology, we can make computers or robots aware of the content of these types, and one can argue that such computers or robots have consciousness as defined in these terms. On the contrary, this theory requires phenomenality to be part of consciousness but does not specify the kind of its content. The consciousness’s content can be simple awareness of sensory perception or complex awareness of executive control, decision making, voluntary actions, etc. The determining point is that, if phenomenality occurs, it is consciousness; if not, no matter how complex its content is, it is not consciousness.

In summary, the meaning of consciousness is similar to consciousness in the fifth meaning. To reiterate, consciousness is the composite of all conscious awareness and conscious experiences—the composite of all awareness and experiences of what qualia are like. This theory deals with consciousness in this meaning because only in this meaning is consciousness phenomenal consciousness, which differentiates sentient from non-sentient beings and separates us from AI, as noted previously. Without having the awareness and experiences of what qualia are like, even the most highly intelligent and capable brains will function and be just like central processing units in present-day computers and robots. For other authors, the opinions may be that consciousness should also include complex mental functions [18,45–49], such as those exemplified in the fourth meaning of consciousness. However, those functions can be set up even in today’s computers, robots, and other types of AI, and AI can be even better (faster, more accurate, more stable, less exhaustible, more knowledgeable, etc.) at those functions than we are. On the other hand, AI cannot be aware of and experience what qualia are like, while, contrastingly, we can. Thus, those functions do not distinguish us from AI, but awareness and experiences of what qualia are like do. In addition, opinions may vary on how many of those functions and which ones of them should be included in the entity that one wants to call consciousness. Therefore, because the term consciousness, as defined in Section 6.1, differentiates us from AI and suffices for discussions on the most important problems of consciousness, such as the hard problem and explanatory gap, it is adequate and will be used as the working definition in this theory. This definition can be considered the minimum definition of consciousness; a wider definition that includes some complex mental functions is possible but is not needed in this theory. It will be seen that any wider definition will not affect the conclusions and predictions of theorems in this theory, which uses this minimum definition.

6.4 Other Aspects of Consciousness 

There are some other aspects of consciousness that should be discussed to understand consciousness more comprehensively. They are as follows:

     I. It should be noted that the consciousness mental process does not function to be consciously aware of and consciously experience all mental phenomena (or products of mental processes). Therefore, conscious awareness and experiences, and thus consciousness, do not occur for all mental phenomena, as discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. Some mental processes do not have mental phenomena or other components that the consciousness mental process can be aware of and experience such that awareness and experiences of what something in these mental processes is like occur. Thus, there is no consciousness of these mental processes. These mental processes are called subconscious or unconscious mental processes [18,104–135]. Mental processes whose mental phenomena the consciousness mental process can be consciously aware of and consciously experience are called conscious mental processes (which differ from the consciousness mental process). It is only the phenomena (or products) of these conscious mental processes, not how they perform their functions, that the consciousness mental process is consciously aware of and consciously experiences [18,76]. For example, the final-stage visual-perception, emotion-generation, and thought-formation mental processes are conscious mental processes because they have phenomena (or products)—mental images, emotions, and thoughts—that the consciousness mental process can be consciously aware of and consciously experience, not because the consciousness mental process can be aware of and experience how these mental processes perform their functions to produce their phenomena. In other words, we are conscious of the products of mental processes, not of their processing processes [18,76].

     Mental processes other than those in the above examples are also conscious mental processes if they have phenomena that are consciously experienceable. They can be classified into two groups, C1 and C2, as discussed in Section 3.4. They are listed here again for ease of reading: 

     C1. Mental processes in the final stages of all external sensory perception processes and of some internal sensory perception processes, such as those in the final-stage visual, auditory, olfactory, vestibular, and visceral pain perception processes, which have phenomena or products that are consciously experienceable, such as mental images, sounds, smells, equilibrioception (sense of balance), and visceral pain.

     C2. Mental processes in the final stages of some of the highest-level emotion-cognition-execution processes, such as those in the final stages of emotion-generating, thinking, planning, decision-making, and motor-commanding processes, which have phenomena or products that are consciously experienceable, such as emotions, thoughts, mental plans, decisions, and motor commands. 

     However, as discussed in Section 3.5, the vast majority of mental processes are unconscious mental processes; they do not have phenomena or any other components that are consciously experienceable, and consciousness does not occur with these unconscious mental processes. They can be classified into two groups, UC1 and UC2, as discussed in Section 3.5. They are also listed here again for ease of reading:

UC1. Mental processes in a) the early stages of all sensory perception, b) all stages of non-sensory stimulus perception, and c) some special situations. Some examples are a) those in the early stages of visual, auditory, and somatosensory perception, b) those in all stages of perception of blood constituent levels, vessel pressure, and reflex stimuli, and c) those in cases of subliminal perception [135–139], binocular rivalry [140–147], attentional blinks [148–154], inattentional blindness [155–161], and blindsight [162–165]. We are not aware of and do not experience what something is like in those mental processes.

UC2. Mental processes in a) the cerebral hemispheres except those specified in C1 and C2 and b) all other structures of the nervous system (the brainstem, cerebellum, spinal cord, and peripheral, autonomic, and enteric nervous systems). Mental processes in this group are numerous. Examples include those that function for unconscious attention, unconscious thinking, unconscious reading, unconscious visual perception and face recognition, unconscious mathematical operations, unconscious decision making, unconscious control of muscle tone and motor coordination, unconscious control of spontaneous breathing, unconscious control of cardiac functions and vessel contraction, unconscious control of blood constituent levels, unconscious control of gastrointestinal tract secretions and movements, and unconscious control of all reflexes [18,104–135]. We are not aware of and do not experience what something is like in those mental processes.

II. Because consciousness in the second, third, and fifth meanings has content, it always occurs with other mental processes (i.e., conscious mental processes C1 and C2) that provide the content (e.g., sensory perception, emotion, and thought) for the consciousness. In other words, consciousness never occurs alone in these meanings [93].* Therefore, it is possible to view consciousness and the content (provided by the conscious mental processes) as parts of a larger entity, which may be called “consciousness plus” or other comparable terms. However, many still call this larger entity “consciousness,” as in the third and fourth meanings. Because consciousness in this larger form is commonly referred to simply as consciousness, both in the literature and by the media and general public, one must be mindful that the term consciousness found in the literature or media may have this meaning, not the meaning defined by this theory or other definitions.

[*Some authors believe that consciousness can occur alone without content and call this type of consciousness “minimal phenomenal experience” (MPE), “consciousness as such,” or “pure awareness” [166–168]. However, this is, at present, controversial.]

     III. Regarding the operation of consciousness mental processes, it is to be noted that, although, at any moment under normal conditions, consciousness consists of conscious awareness and experiences of several mental phenomena simultaneously, the intensity and accuracy of the awareness and experiences of these mental phenomena are usually not equal. During any period, only one or a few mental phenomena have primary conscious awareness and experiences, whereas others have secondary conscious awareness and experiences. The former have intense and accurate awareness and experiences, whereas the latter have less intense and less accurate awareness and experiences. For example, when we are watching a movie, our primary conscious awareness and experiences will be of the visual perception, auditory perception, and emotions that are movie-related, while our conscious awareness and experiences of non-movie-related sensory perception and emotions, time, etc. will become less intense and less accurate. Even in the case of a mental phenomenon that has the primary conscious awareness and experience, the intensity and accuracy of the awareness and experience of that mental phenomenon are usually not equal for all its parts. For example, the intensity and accuracy of the awareness and experience of an image will be maximal at the center of the visual field but diminish drastically for the periphery of the visual field. Reports of parts that have secondary awareness and experiences are usually inaccurate or sometimes outright wrong. These inaccuracies commonly occur in daily life. Even the reader can notice that the reader cannot accurately describe things that are not in the central visual field, such as the letters that surround the text the reader is reading right now, or cannot accurately report what has happened in the surroundings during the past five minutes while the reader was reading this chapter. Such inaccuracies in secondary conscious awareness and experiences can be demonstrated more objectively in experiments involving phenomena such as attentional blinks, inattentional blindness, and change blindness [169–173].

     IV. It is undeniable that these kinds of secondary awareness and experience exist and that we are not unconscious of those objects that do not have primary awareness and experiences. Evidently, we can be aware that, apart from the thing at the center of our interest and attention, there is something that we can inaccurately register in the background or periphery—the background and periphery are not blank [174–176]. Obviously, we do not live in a world consisting only of primary awareness and experiences. Because we are conscious of these background objects in the sense that awareness and experiences of what their qualia are like occur in our minds, conscious awareness and experiences or phenomenal consciousness must have occurred. However, because we cannot accurately report these background objects in detail, their detailed information does certainly not enter the global workspace to be widely distributed and used in various ways, as previously discussed in the third meaning of consciousness. Thus, access consciousness in the sense that is discussed there (which is the sense used in the Global Workspace or Global Neuronal Workspace Theory [59–70]) does certainly not occur in these kinds of secondary awareness and experience. Nevertheless, if one relaxes the definition of access consciousness and uses it in the sense that some information has gained access to the mind, has been registered, and is at least roughly reportable, access consciousness in this relaxed sense must certainly occur for these kinds of secondary awareness and experience. 

     V. Because the details of objects that we are aware of in secondary awareness can vary from completely wrong to partially correct to almost completely correct, it means that consciousness content in secondary awareness can be present in a graded fashion [177–180]—it does not need to be present in an all-or-none fashion as consciousness content of something that we pay attention to has been shown to be [181,182]. The consciousness content of something in an unattended situation can be degraded by being fragmented (only some parts of that thing being registered), less salient (having less effect on impression, memory, emotion, etc.), too generic (classifiable only in a general category not in a specific category, such as a skittering mouse identifiable only as a small animal), or flash-like (appearing very briefly) [178]. It has been found that, at the representational level, the factors that can affect perceptual representations are the object’s intensity, precision, stability, and availability for working memory [178]. Relatedly, several recent studies have suggested that consciousness can admit of degrees and proposed a graded perceptual awareness scale for objective quantification [24,45]. 

     VI. Another interesting but controversial issue is whether phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness must occur together or whether one can occur without the other [26,32,38,183–185]. In addition, the mechanism for phenomenal consciousness occurring without access consciousness is still being debated, especially the much-discussed one—the overflowing [26,38,186–189]. However, the discrepancy in the occurrence of the two types of consciousness is real and does exist. For example, in the case of the man in the mall discussed previously in the third meaning of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness of the background sound occurs, but access consciousness of the background sound does not. Again, it seems that the discrepancy lies in the definition of “access” in access consciousness (as just discussed in IV). If “access” must involve attention and result in the accessing information becoming globally available, processed in various ways, and reportable in detail (i.e., “access” in the strict sense), then phenomenal consciousness can sometimes occur without access consciousness. On the other hand, if “access” means merely that information about something has gotten into the mind’s processing system, resulting in registration of that thing with at least that thing being roughly reportable (i.e., “access” in the relaxed sense as noted in IV), then phenomenal consciousness always occurs with access consciousness. 

6.5 Conscious Alertness and Awareness

Functionally, consciousness in most meanings, including consciousness, can be considered to have two major aspects: a) alertness (wakefulness or arousal) and b) awareness and experiences (registration and feelings of something, which is consciousness content) [4,18,20,21,111, 183–185,190–194]. Alertness depends on a neural network called the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) [20,102,183,192, 193,195–198], whereas awareness and experiences depend on the consciousness neural circuit (discussed in detail in the next section). The ARAS is a neural network in the core of the brain extending from the rostral pons to the thalami and bilateral basal forebrains, from where it sends extensive axonal projections to the cerebral cortices, including those of the consciousness neural network. There can be no conscious alertness if there is no stimulation from the ARAS, even though the consciousness neural network is intact and able to function, such as in the case of extensive brainstem hemorrhage, infarction, and injury. The level of conscious alertness varies according to the activation from the ARAS—the stronger the activation, the higher the level of alertness. Thus, alertness can vary on a continuum of states, from the lowest to the highest level. Frequently used terms for some of these states, from the lowest to the highest level, are coma, stupor, drowsiness, normal alertness, and heightened alertness.

Regarding the content, conscious awareness and experiences can vary in terms of both the quantity and quality of their content. The quantity of content depends on the extent of the consciousness network function. When there is an impairment of the consciousness network that decreases its functioning extent, such as in cases of cerebral infarction, injury, or hypoxia, the content’s quantity will decrease. The extent to which it decreases depends on the extent of the impairment. Thus, like conscious alertness, the quantity of consciousness content can vary on a continuum of states from consciousness with minimal content to consciousness with normal content. Frequently used terms for some of these states, from that with minimal content to that with normal content, are vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS), minimally conscious state (MCS), akinetic mutism [21,90,183,184,191,194,199–213], dementia [214–217], various cerebral neglect syndromes [218–221], and normal consciousness. In the first two categories, which represent severe conditions, patients can open their eyes and have some reflex responses, such as blinking, chewing, and yawning, but show no (in VS/UWS) or minimal (in MCS) signs of conscious awareness of their self and the environment (which can be investigated by clinical testing or by special investigations using EEG, evoked potentials, and fMRI) [21,183,191,194,199,202,203,205,206,222].

Concerning the quality of content, consciousness can vary in its content’s quality (or complexity): from consciousness of basic content, such as consciousness of sensory perception, to consciousness of more complex content, such as consciousness of one’s own mental activities, to consciousness of even more complex content, such as consciousness of one’s own self and consciousness of being conscious. Several authors call consciousness with these specific kinds of content using specific terms, namely, primary consciousness, higher-order consciousness, and reflective consciousness, as discussed in detail in the third paragraph of Section 6.3. Some authors call these kinds of differences “different degrees” or “different levels” of consciousness [56,94–96,103], which actually refer to different degrees or levels of consciousness content quality. Unfortunately, these phrases can be confused with the different degrees of awareness accuracy discussed in Paragraph V of Section 6.4 or with the different levels of alertness discussed in the first paragraph of this section. Accordingly, one must be careful about what kind of degree or level is being referred to when the term is used without specification or contextual clues.

These variable abnormalities in consciousness show that consciousness (in most meanings with the probable exception of access consciousness) is not an all-or-none but a graded phenomenon [48,51,85], depending on both the strength of stimulation from the ARAS and the functioning of the consciousness neural circuit. Conventionally, the graded level of conscious alertness and awareness can be scored using various scales, such as the Jouvet coma scale, Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), Full Outline of Unresponsiveness (FOUR) score, Bozza-Marrubini scale, and Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [213,223–231].

Presently, many scientists have the opinion that consciousness is a multidimensional phenomenon, having other important aspects, dimensions, or features than the aspects of alertness and awareness [48,206,232–236], such as subjective awareness, cognition, and behavioral aspects [233]; phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional aspects [48]; qualitative richness, situatedness, intentionality, integration, and dynamics and stability [206]; p-richness, e-richness, unity, temporality, selfhood, and many other features [44,235]. Thus, they believe that these elements should also be included in the complete assessment of consciousness [44,48,206,233,235]. Another important issue is that measurements of consciousness usually require signaling (e.g., verbal, ocular, or manual) from the patient. This can make consciousness measurements inaccurate if the patient has problems in the motor system that impair signaling. Therefore, objective consciousness measurements that are independent of the subject’s signaling ability and cover more than overall alertness and awareness are being developed, such as the perturbational complexity index (PCI), which employs transcranial magnetic stimulation [236–238], and the local global paradigm (LGP) [236,238–240]. However, at present, no method that objectively assesses consciousness in these various facets is standard or widely accepted [48,206,233].      

Despite these remarkable developments, it should be noted that this kind of multi-dimensional consciousness comprises various complex perception, emotion, and cognitive-executive functions, not only alertness, awareness, and experiences. As previously discussed, although these complex functions usually occur with consciousness, they are not consciousness, as defined in this theory, which is only awareness and experiences of what qualia are like. Hence, the reader should observe that the proposed consciousness measurements above, although clinically and scientifically valuable in assessing the overall complex brain functions, do not specifically measure conscious awareness and experiences or consciousness as the sole target of assessment. This fact must be considered when employing these measurements or interpreting the results.

6.6 Consciousness Neural Process and Circuit

Because the consciousness mental process is a mental process, it cannot occur alone by itself but must occur with some neural process (Theorem I). In this theory, this neural process is called “the consciousness neural process,” and its neural circuit, “the consciousness neural circuit.” Both the consciousness neural circuit and process function to create conscious awareness and experiences, or consciousness, as the consciousness mental process does. From the properties of consciousness, it can be predicted that some important characteristics of the consciousness neural circuit and process must be as follows:

1. The circuit must be an extensive network that connects to all neural circuits that have qualia so that awareness and experiences of all qualia are possible. These qualia neural circuits are neural circuits that function with conscious mental processes (C1 and C2, Section 6.4, which have qualia). However, it is not connected to the lower neural circuits that perform more basic functions, such as neural circuits in the basal ganglia, brainstem, cerebellum, and autonomic nervous system, in such a way that conscious awareness and experiences can occur. Consequently, there is neither conscious awareness nor conscious experience of anything in these neural circuits.
2. It must be able to read signals from the neural circuits that have qualia so that it can obtain the qualia’s information to process and create awareness and experiences of the qualia, i.e., the consciousness of the qualia.
3. It must have its signals fed back to itself so that it can be aware of and experience the created consciousness of the qualia (created as described above), which means its signaling state must be a reentrant signaling state.

Since the consciousness neural circuit and its neural processes are very important in creating consciousness, a large amount of research has been conducted on them. In the field of neuroscience, they are usually referred to as the neural correlates of consciousness. This term is usually described as the minimal neuronal mechanisms that are jointly sufficient for any one specific conscious percept [4,6,26,49,68,75,97,111,125, 193,241–266]. Although conclusive answers have not yet been obtained, some models are strongly supported by experimental evidence and are widely accepted. Regarding the neural circuit of consciousness, as far as one can conclude from the evidence at present, it seems very likely that the default mode network or resting state network, which includes several brain regions—the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, precuneus, and some parts of the parietal lobe, temporal lobe, cerebellum, and basal ganglia—and has the anterior medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex as the hubs, is the neural network for background or resting state consciousness [190,267–288]. This network functions to create consciousness for usual background stimuli, both external and internal, that enter the mind concurrently and continuously and do not require specific attention and concentration. It overlaps with the network that functions to create consciousness for episodic stimuli that gain access to the mind at times and attract specific attention [4,8,10,12,16,18,22–25,32,38–43]. At present, evidence shows that the network of the Global Workspace Theory proposed by Baars [59–64] or the network of the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis of Dehaene [65–70], both of which include a cortico-thalamic (C-T) core and a network of neurons with long-range axons densely distributed in the prefrontal, fronto-parietal, parieto-temporal, and cingulate cortices, is the network of this latter kind of consciousness, which is usually called access consciousness. Other studies point to similar networks that are in the superior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices [244,265,289], but others stress the posterior hot zone more, including the temporal, parietal, and occipital cortices [245,256]. Specifically, in the case of vision, ample evidence shows that cortical neural synchronization between neural processes in the occipital areas and parietal, temporal, or frontal areas is necessary for visual conscious experiences to occur [67,97,244,260,265]. Also, there are separate neural correlates for the visuospatial, emotional face, and written-letter processing components; that is, cortical neural synchronization between the dorsal occipital and parietal areas, between the parietal and frontal areas, and between the occipital, parietal, and temporal areas, respectively [97]. As for the complete neural network of consciousness, the one that functions to be conscious of both continuous background stimuli and episodic accessing stimuli, it is likely to be some combination of the two types of consciousness networks just discussed. Some proposed networks are the neural network in the extended theory of global workspace of consciousness submitted by Song [71], the overlapping network of a-consciousness and p-consciousness with two functional aspects introduced by Frigato [290], or the “functional rich club” presented by Deco et al. [291].

Finally, it should be repeated that the functions of the two major consciousness networks—one for episodic, attention-demanding stimuli and the other for continuous, non-attention–demanding stimuli—are not mutually exclusive. That is, the two consciousness networks do not work alternately in such a way that one is completely shut off while the other is working. For example, when the former network is functioning, such as when a subject in a consciousness experiment is attending to a visual stimulus on a screen, the latter network is still functioning, as evidenced by the fact that the subject is still aware of not only the target or the masks he or she is attending to but also other parts of the experiment (e.g., the signaling device that he or she must use and when and how he or she is supposed to signal) and the surroundings (e.g., the background vision, the ambient sound, and the room’s smell). Evidently, the subject can use the device to signal as he or she is supposed to and can later report some of the surroundings’ characteristics, which means he or she is aware of not only the target but also something else. However, the awareness of these background components is less intense and less accurate than that of the attended stimulus, and these background components cannot be reported in detail or with accuracy. Still, it is not that, while the mind is attending to something, such as the target in an experiment, it is not aware of anything else at all and that everything else vanishes [174–176]. Undeniably, we regularly have similar experiences in our daily lives. For example, when we are concentrating on listening to a song or to what somebody is speaking to us on the phone, the outside visual world does not disappear into nothingness even though we do not pay attention to it—we are still conscious of it to some degree and, hence, can describe it, at least roughly. It is of paramount importance that, in searching for the complete consciousness neural network, these facts must be taken into account.

6.7 Remarks

In conclusion, consciousness has various meanings. This theory selects to use consciousness in the meaning defined in Section 6.1 because consciousness only in this meaning is the one that makes us different from AI and that is the crux of the hard problem and the explanatory gap of consciousness, which this theory aims to resolve. 

The next chapter will answer fundamental questions about what this consciousness is physically and ontologically, why it occurs, how it occurs from physical systems, and other related questions.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

Among all the things that happen in the mind,

the only one thing that makes us fundamentally different from AI

is awareness and experiences of

what an image of a house, what a sound of a song, what an odor of a flower, what a feeling of happiness, what a thought of oneself, and so on

are like …

the phenomenal consciousness.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

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