Chapter 5

Theorem IV: A Quale is a Signaling Pattern

From the previous two chapters, it can be concluded that qualia are non-material, neural-process–associated, physical phenomena. This chapter will answer the other major problems about them: What is the nature of these phenomena—what are they physically and ontologically—and why and how do they occur? At present, there are several theories about what qualia are and how they occur [1–10]. However, none of them seems to be unanimously accepted as conclusive, and none seems to be able to bridge the explanatory gap of how non-material, phenomenal qualia can arise from material, phenomenon-less (i.e., phenomenality-less) neural processes in the brain [11–27] and satisfactorily answer the hard problem of qualia, or the problem of why and how qualia occur [28,29]. This theory finds that the answers to these questions exist in the qualia’s physical properties, which have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter and will be used to find the answers in the following sections. 

5.1 The Nature of qualia

Because qualia are non-material, neural-process–associated physical phenomena, there are two mutually exclusive possibilities of how a quale exists in relation to neural processes: 

     Possibility I. A quale functionally exists separately (occurring and functioning separately) from all neural processes, similar to a separate-from-the-brain entity commonly illustrated in general pictures that depict qualia, such as an image quale of a house, a sound quale of a song, or an odor quale of a flower in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Qualia exist as separate entities.

     Hence, its functions and effects are separate from those of all neural processes, even though it is somehow associated with its neural process in various aspects, as discussed in the previous chapter, by some mechanisms.

     Possibility II. A quale functionally exists intrinsically (occurring and functioning intrinsically) in a certain neural process, called the quale’s neural process, similar to different information that exists intrinsically in different signaling of the sign language in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2 Information exists as intrinsic entities.

     Hence, its functions and effects are naturally inherent in its neural process’s functions and effects, and it is naturally associated with its neural process in all aspects. Now, similar to the case of finding the nature of mental processes in Chapter 2, the means of identifying which possibility is correct is to examine the physical properties of the proposed entity in each possibility. It is based on the principle that the entity that a quale is must have all the physical properties of qualia. These properties are listed here again for ease of reference:

Physical properties of qualia (PQ)

PQ1. Defining physical properties

• PQ1.1 They are mental phenomena.
• PQ1.2 They are consciously experienceable.

PQ2. Additional physical properties

• PQ2.1 Their existence is restricted to their neural processes.
• PQ2.2 Their existence with their neural processes is consistent.
• PQ2.3 Their manifestations are diverse and represent something.
• PQ2.4 Their manifestations match their neural processes.
• PQ2.5 Their chronological aspects match their neural processes’.
• PQ2.6 Their structures are definite.
• PQ2.7 Their structures are determined by their neural processes.
• PQ2.8 Their interactions are via their neural processes.

Next, let us examine the two possibilities to see which one yields an entity that has all the stated physical properties of qualia.

5.1.1 Possibility I: A quale is a functionally separate entity.

Suppose a quale is an entity Q that functionally exists separately from all neural processes, as shown in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3 Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes.

PQ1.1 Q is a mental phenomenon.

As discussed in PQ1.1 in the previous chapter, this property means that Q is a non-material phenomenon that coexists with the brain. Theoretically, Q can be a non-material phenomenon simply by its nature. But if it functionally exists separately (occurring and functioning separately) from all neural processes, then how can it appear to coexist with the brain? Another crucial question is: What is this entity, physically and ontologically?

If we try to find the answer to these questions, we will find that, indeed, there are phenomena that are non-material and functionally separate from all neural processes but still coexist with the brain. They are numerical (not physical, which is material) changes in quantities of a) metabolic activities (e.g., heat generation, oxygen consumption, and intracellular biochemical reactions), b) regional blood circulation (e.g., regional blood volume and flow rate), or c) physical components (e.g., mass, energy, and entropy) of their neural circuits. However, these numerical changes can only increase or decrease in value in all kinds of neural processes. Thus, they do not possess sufficient variations to function variedly enough to be various types of qualia—image, sound, taste, emotion, thought, etc.—in different kinds of neural processes. Therefore, a quale cannot be any of these numerical changes, and the entity that a quale is, Q, which has this property, must be a novel, non-material entity. This necessitates a new hypothesis for its nature.

PQ1.2 Q is consciously experienceable.

As summarized in section PQ1.2 in the previous chapter, this property means that Q must

     1. be readable by the consciousness neural process,

     2. be able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process, and

     3. be information about what itself is like.

We can verify these properties are as follows:

1. Q must be readable by the consciousness neural process. However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, there will be no functional connections between Q and any neural process, including the consciousness neural process. Hence, the problem is how Q can be readable by the consciousness process. A new hypothesis is needed to account for this property.
2. Q must be able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process. Again, the same problem is how Q can do so if Q has no functional connections with the consciousness neural process. A new hypothesis is needed to account for this property as well.
3. Q must be information about what itself is like. However, if Q functionally exists separately from neural processes, how and where can it get raw information to form the information about “what itself is like”? For example, if Q is an image quale of a house or a sound quale of a song, as depicted in Figure 5.3, how and where can it get information about the house or the song to form the information about “what the image of the house is like” or “what the sound of the song is like”? For Q to have this information, it certainly needs to have access to the raw information about the image of the house or the sound of the song in the first place so that it can use it to form the information about “what the image of the house is like” or “what the sound of the song is like.” However, if Q has no functional connection with neural processes, it cannot get the raw information from the outside world via neural processes. If Q gets the necessary information directly from the outside world, how can it do that? That is, how can the outside world send the needed information (about images, sounds, smells, etc.), all of which are carried by physical carriers (electromagnetic waves, sound waves, odorant molecules, etc.), to Q, and how can the non-material Q receive these physical signals (e.g., with what receptors and with what mechanisms)? Thus, a new hypothesis is needed to explain where and how Q gets the required information from the outside world.

Therefore, for Q, an entity that functionally exists separately from neural processes, several new hypotheses must be established to explain how it can be consciously experienceable.

PQ2.1 Q’s existence is restricted to its neural processes.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, why must it exist only with its neural process? For example, if Q is a visual quale, why must Q exist only with the visual perception neural process, a neural process in the occipital cortex? Why does Q not sometimes exist with this neural process but sometimes with other neural processes, such as neural processes in the basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellum? What is the mechanism that restricts Q’s existence to its neural process?

PQ2.2 Q’s existence with its neural processes is consistent.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, including its neural process, why must it exist consistently with its neural process? For example, if Q is an auditory quale, whenever the auditory perception neural process functions, why does Q consistently occur and exist with this neural process? Why does Q not exist inconsistently with this neural process (sometimes occurring but sometimes not occurring with this neural process)? What is the mechanism that keeps Q’s existence with its neural process consistent?

PQ2.3 Q’s manifestation is diverse and represents something.

Q’s manifestation can be diverse in type by its nature. However, how can Q represent something? To represent something, it must have information about that thing to form the representation. For example, if Q is an image quale of a house or a sound quale of a song, as depicted in Figure 5.3, it must first have information about the house’s image or the song’s sound to form a representation of the house’s image or the song’s sound in the mind. However, if Q exists separately from all neural processes, where and how can it get the needed information? This poses a similar problem to that in problem 3 of PQ1.2.

PQ2.4 Q’s manifestation matches its neural processes’s.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional restrictions from any neural process, so why do its manifestation details, ranges, and changes match those of its neural processes? For example, if Q is a visual or an auditory quale, why do its details (e.g., color, brightness, and shape of all points in the visual quale; or pitch, timbre, and loudness of all sounds in the auditory quale) match those of the visual or auditory perception neural process, respectively? Also, why do its ranges (i.e., spectral, amplitude, and spatial) match those of the visual perception or auditory perception neural process, respectively? Further, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional connections to any neural processes, including its neural process, so why must its changes match those of its neural process; why cannot it independently change?

In sum, what mechanism keeps Q’s manifestation details, ranges, and changes matching those of its neural processes?

PQ2.5 Q’s chronological aspects match its neural process’s.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional restrictions from any neural process, so why do its chronological aspects (the time it occurs, represents things, and disappears) match those of its neural process? For example, when a foot hits a hard object, why does Q (a dull, aching pain quale representing this injury) not occur immediately after the hit but delayed for hundreds of milliseconds to a few seconds, which is the same amount of time its neural process takes to process the signal before signaling the pain to other parts of the brain? Why does Q not occur simultaneously with the hit and represent it in real time? Also, when we stop spinning around, we will continue to have Q (a quale representing the feeling of spinning) for a while. Only when the neural process stops creating this feeling does Q disappear. Why does Q not disappear at once when we become still? If Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, why and how does it do so?

PQ2.6 Q’s structure is definite.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional restrictions from any neural process, so why must its structure be definite? Why can freely existing visual qualia not have variable numbers and types of basic components and variable spectral characteristics among billions of people at different places and times? For example, why can visual qualia not have five basic components in some people, such as the reader, while having 1,2,3, or 6,7,8, or other numbers of basic components in others (i.e., the author, people around us, and all other people); and why can spectral characteristics of color qualia of the light spectrum, such as that in Figure 4.1, not vary between people—why cannot they be different between the reader, the author, and other people? What mechanism maintains the definiteness of their structures in all their free existence among billions of people, everywhere, and all the time?

PQ2.7 Q’s structure is determined by its neural process.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional restrictions from any neural processes, including its neural process, so why must its structure be determined by its neural process?

PQ2.8 Q’s interactions are via its neural process.

However, if Q functionally exists separately from all neural processes, it freely exists without functional restrictions from any neural processes, including its neural process, so why can it not interact with other qualia or mental processes directly? Why must its interactions occur via its neural process?

It is evident that Possibility I—a quale is an entity that functionally exists separately from all neural processes—raises several critical questions of how such an entity can have all the required physical properties of qualia, and several additional hypotheses are needed to support this possibility.

5.1.2 Possibility II: A quale is a functionally intrinsic entity.

If a quale is a functionally intrinsic entity in a neural process, what is it? Because this entity must fulfill the properties of qualia—most importantly, it must be consciously experienceable (because, indeed, the mind can be aware of and experience what the quale is like, and conscious awareness and experience of the quale do occur)—this entity must be a non-material entity that is readable by the consciousness neural process and can induce conscious awareness and experience of itself in the consciousness neural process. 

First, let us find a neural process’s intrinsic entity that is readable by the consciousness neural process. A neural process is the signal-processing process of its neural circuit. It intrinsically comprises many parts, such as signal reading, analysis, integration, internal transfer, and external transfer. Now, the only neural process’s part readable by other neural processes, including the consciousness neural process, is the external transfer of signals, and the only part of the signals’ external transfer readable by other neural processes is the signaling pattern. This is because neural processes communicate with each other through their signaling patterns. Therefore, signaling patterns fulfill the property of being a non-material entity readable by the consciousness process.

However, before we go on to check whether signaling patterns can induce conscious awareness and experiences of themselves in the consciousness neural process, let us be certain that we do not miss any other intrinsic entity that is readable by the consciousness process. In the literature, some theories propose that consciousness, a closely related phenomenon to qualia, arises from the brain’s electromagnetic field (EMF) [30–33]. Because the brain’s and neural processes’ EMFs are non-material and functionally occur intrinsically in the neural processes, can a quale be its neural process’s EMF? The answer is negative because, again, a quale must be readable by the consciousness neural process, but a neural process’s EMF is not. This is because neural processes did not evolve to communicate via EMFs; they have evolved to communicate only via electrical/ electrochemical signals at neural synapses. The synaptic electrical/electrochemical signals are determined almost exclusively by the propagating axonal [34–40] (or, in some far fewer cases, dendritic [41–45]) action potentials, with probable minimal influence from something else, such as the surrounding EMFs, heat, and mechanical forces. Therefore, because neural processes do not communicate via EMFs, a neural process’s EMF is not readable by the consciousness neural process and thus cannot be a quale.     

Next, let us check whether signaling patterns can induce conscious awareness and experiences of themselves in the consciousness neural process. The fact is that, as noted above, we can be consciously aware of and experience qualia, which means that the consciousness neural process must be able to get information about qualia from something and be induced to form conscious awareness and experiences of them. Because the only things that the consciousness neural process can get information from are neural-process signaling patterns, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, some signaling patterns must be able to provide the consciousness neural process with qualia’s information and induce conscious awareness and experiences of the qualia in it. However, the consciousness neural process receives numerous signaling patterns from various kinds of neural processes because its circuit, the consciousness neural circuit, is an extensive network with extensive connections.* But when it processes the signals from these neural processes, it does not create conscious awareness and experiences for all of them.

(* Current evidence suggests that the potential consciousness neural circuit or network is a) the Default Mode Network or Resting State Network [46–68], which is an extensive neural network for background consciousness and consciousness while resting; b) the network of Global Workspace theory proposed by Baars [69–75] or the network of the Global Neuronal Workspace hypothesis by Dehaene [76–83], both of which are extensive neural networks for access consciousness or consciousness of episodic stimuli that gain access into consciousness; or c) some combination of the networks in a) and b), such as the neural network in the extended theory of global workspace of consciousness proposed by Song [84]. See detailed discussions in Section 6.6.)

Hence, not all signaling patterns can induce conscious awareness and experiences of themselves, or awareness and experiences of what themselves are like, in the consciousness neural process—only some of them can. Those that can must be different from those that cannot—they must have certain special properties that enable them to induce conscious awareness and experiences of themselves in the consciousness neural process. One necessary property is that they must have information that means what themselves are like to the consciousness neural process so that, after the consciousness neural process reads them, it can use this information to form awareness and experiences of what they are like. Other probable special properties may be that the signaling patterns have special forms, are connected to the consciousness neural circuit via some special channels, or are connected to some special parts of the consciousness neural circuit. No matter what the special properties are, this theory assigns the term “special signaling patterns” to signaling patterns that can induce conscious awareness and experiences of themselves, or awareness and experiences of what themselves are like, in the consciousness neural process.

Definition: A special signaling pattern (SSP) is the neural process’s signaling pattern that can induce conscious awareness and a conscious experience of itself in the consciousness neural process.

Because a special signaling pattern (SSP) is non-material, is an intrinsically occurring entity in the neural process, is readable by the consciousness neural process, and can induce conscious awareness and experience of itself in the consciousness neural process, it can be the entity that a quale is. However, if qualia are SSPs of their neural processes, the SSPs must have all the physical properties of qualia; otherwise, qualia cannot be these SSPs. Do the SSPs have all the physical properties of qualia? This matter can be verified as follows:

PQ1.1 SSPs must be mental phenomena. That is, they must be non-material phenomena that coexist with the brain (see PQ1.1 in the previous chapter). Because SSPs are signaling patterns, they are information and thus non-material phenomena. Because they are signaling patterns of neural processes, they always coexist with the brain. Therefore, they are non-material phenomena and coexist with the brain—as required.

PQ1.2 SSPs must be consciously experienceable. Again, as summarized in Section PQ1.2 in the previous chapter, this means that each SSP must
1. be readable by the consciousness neural process,
2. be able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process, and
3. be information about what itself is like.

We can verify these properties are as follows:

1. Because, by definition, an SSP is a signaling pattern that can induce conscious awareness and a conscious experience of itself in the consciousness neural process, an SSP is readable by the consciousness neural process—as required.
2. Because, by definition, an SSP is a signaling pattern that can induce conscious awareness and a conscious experience of itself in the consciousness neural process, an SSP can induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process—as required.
3. Because an SSP can induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process, it must be the information about what itself is like so that the consciousness neural process, after reading the SSP, can use this information to create awareness and an experience of what the SSP is like. Thus, an SSP is information about what itself is like—as required.

Therefore, with all the required properties satisfied, the SSPs are consciously experienceable—as required.

All additional physical properties of qualia can be verified as follows:

PQ2.1 Because SSPs occur only in the neural processes that produce SSPs, they do not and cannot occur randomly in the brain but occur restrictedly in the brain areas where these specific neural processes exist. Also, because only some specific neural process produces a certain SSP and no other neural processes produce this SSP, a certain SSP occurs with some specific neural process only. For example, the color-perception neural process produces an SSP that is the color-perception quale, and no other neural processes produce this SSP, so this SSP, the color-perception quale, occurs restrictedly with the color-perception neural process. All other qualia similarly occur restrictedly with their neural processes. Therefore, SSPs’ existence is restricted to their neural processes—as required.

PQ2.2 Because SSP-producing neural processes always produce their SSPs whenever they function, SSPs consistently occur and exist with their neural processes whenever their neural processes function, and because these neural processes stop producing their SSPs whenever they stop functioning, SSPs consistently disappear whenever their neural processes cease functioning. Thus, SSPs’ existence with their neural processes is consistent—as required.

PQ2.3 Because different types of neural processes that create different types of SSPs (for images, sounds, smells, emotions, thoughts, etc.) are in different brain areas (the occipital, temporal, olfactory, and frontal cortices, amygdala, etc.) and have different cytoarchitecture, myeloarchitecture, neural circuit connections, neurotransmitters, neurotransmitter receptors, and functions [85–102], these different types of neural processes are anatomically, structurally, and functionally different from each other. Therefore, each type creates a signaling pattern of its type, which is unique and different from those of other types. While major differences in patterns of SSPs are responsible for different types of manifestations (images, sounds, smells, emotions, thoughts, etc.), minor differences in patterns create different details in the same type (different images, different sounds, different emotions, etc.). With the estimated 100 to 1,000 trillion synapses in the brain [97,103–105] and with various kinds of encoded signals, such as population, rate, temporal, and mixed encoded signals [106–128], passing through this multitude of synapses, even a portion of the entire neural circuits of the brain can create virtually infinite numbers of unique SSPs that can represent practically anything, including all images, sounds, feelings, thoughts, and memories we experience throughout our lives. Regarding the mechanism for SSPs to represent things in the outside world, they can do so because their neural processes can get information about those things via various sensors and perception systems of the nervous system and later incorporate those things’ information into their signaling patterns. Hence, SSPs’ manifestations are diverse in type and detail and can represent various things—as required.

PQ2.4 Because SSPs are signaling patterns of their neural processes and neural processes display their manifestations (i.e., present their information to other neural processes) via their signaling patterns, SSPs’ and neural processes’ manifestation ranges and details are naturally the same. Also, because signaling patterns are intrinsic parts of neural processes, it is inevitable that SSPs’ manifestations change similarly to and concurrently with those of their neural processes..      

Thus, SSPs’ manifestations match their neural processes’—as required.

PQ2.5 Because neural processes display their manifestations (i.e., present their information) to other neural processes via their SSPs, neural processes’ and SSPs’ chronological aspects regarding their manifestations are the same. That is, the time neural processes’ and SSPs’ manifestations occur, represent things, and disappear are the same.

Notably, after a quale-producing neural process receives signals about something, it takes some time to process them before creating an SSP to represent that thing. Hence, the resulting SSP does not occur immediately when the body receives signals of that thing and thus does not represent that thing in real time but in a time-lag manner. The lagging time equals the time its neural process takes to process the signals and then produce the SSPs. Thus, the lagging time of an SSP is naturally the same as that of its neural process. Also, regarding disappearances, even though signals from a stimulus stop entering the body, such as when one closes the eyes after looking at a lamp or stops spinning one’s body after whirling for a while, the related neural process continues functioning and producing its SSP for some time. Hence, the SSP keeps occurring and representing that thing or event that no longer exists until its neural process ends producing it.     Accordingly, SSPs’ chronological aspects match their neural processes’—as required.

PQ2.6 Because the number and types of basic-component SSPs of any type of quale are determined by the number and types of basic-component neural processes of that quale type and because the number and types of such neural processes are fixed and definite (such as the number of basic-component neural processes of vision is always five, and the types of basic-component neural processes of vision are always color, brightness, shape, dimension, and movement) for all humans, the number and types of basic component SSPs of any type of quale are fixed and definite (not different among people). 

Also, because the spectral characteristics of SSPs of any type of quale are determined by the neural processes of that type of quale (such as the spectral characteristics of SSPs of the color quale are determined by the color perception neural process that produces the SSPs) and because the functions of those neural processes are definite (not different among people), the spectral characteristics of SSPs of any type of quale are definite (not different among people).     

Thus, SSPs’ structures are definite—as required

PQ2.7 Because the number and types of basic component SSPs and the spectral characteristics of SSPs of any type of quale are determined by their neural processes, the structures of SSPs are definite and determined by their neural processes—as required.

PQ2.8 Because SSPs are signaling patterns of neural processes and interactions of neural processes’ signaling patterns occur via their neural processes’ synapses, the SSPs’ interactions are via their neural processes—as required.

Therefore, SSPs have all the required physical properties of qualia. Also, because what qualia can function to do or be depends on their physical properties and because SSPs have the physical properties of qualia, it can be deduced that SSPs can function to do or be as the qualia can. Thus, SSPs can have functional properties of qualia, such as being ineffable, intrinsic, and private [13,24,25,129–133], being irreducible [133], being directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness [130], being irrevocable, having output flexibility, enduring in short-term memory [134], and having enormous multi-variability and combinatorial capacities [135]. For example, any signaling pattern is intrinsic and private because a certain signaling pattern occurs only in the individual who is having it. Also, all signaling patterns are ineffable because there is no sensory apparatus or neural circuit built to get information about what the signaling patterns are [19,136]. Neural circuits have evolved to get only information that signaling patterns contain, which is information about something else they are representing, not about what the signaling patterns themselves are. Thus, there is no information to describe them other than the “what things that they are representing are like” that the consciousness neural process receives from them.

5.2 Theorem IV

In summary, there are two possibilities: I) A quale is a functionally separate entity from all neural processes and II) A quale is a functionally intrinsic entity in a certain neural process—specifically, a quale is the SSP of a neural process. The first possibility has to devise an unknown entity and needs several additional hypotheses to explain how this unknown entity can have the “must-have” physical properties of a quale. In contrast, the second possibility does not have to invent any new entity—an SSP is an inherent entity in a neural process—and it has all the required physical properties of a quale without having to formulate additional hypotheses to explain them. Therefore, based on parsimony, it is rational to choose the second possibility and conclude that a quale is an SSP. This theory asserts this conclusion as Theorem IV.

Theorem IV: A quale is a special signaling pattern (SSP).

This is the specific form of Theorem IV. However, because an SSP is a special signaling pattern—a signaling pattern in some special form—a quale is simply a special kind of signaling pattern. Furthermore, as a special kind of signaling pattern is basically a signaling pattern, a quale is fundamentally a signaling pattern. Thus, the more basic form and the most basic form of this theorem can be stated as:

Theorem IV: A quale is a special kind of signaling pattern.

Theorem IV: A quale is a signaling pattern.

Now, to avoid losing sight of what this means, let us expand the term quale according to its definition. We will see that this theorem means that a non-material phenomenon that is consciously experienceable (able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the mind) is a special kind of signaling pattern, or most basically, is a signaling pattern. In plain language, this means that an image of a house, a sound of a song, an odor of a flower, a feeling of happiness, a thought of one’s self, etc. in our minds are simply signaling patterns in our brains.

Because a neural process’s signaling pattern is the neural process’s information that is sent to another neural process, a quale or an SSP is a special kind of neural process’s information that is sent to another neural process. This special kind of information means a quale or a phenomenon manifesting what itself is like to any receiving neural process that can interpret it correctly. The consciousness neural process is one such a receiver. Thus, to the consciousness neural process, an SSP and its information mean a quale. Therefore, after the consciousness neural process reads and processes the SSP, it will interpret the SSP as such, and a quale will appear in its process. Furthermore, with its specialized ability, it can use this information to create conscious awareness and experience of the quale. This is how a phenomenal quale (or a phenomenon that manifests what itself is like in the mind) and conscious awareness and a conscious experience of the quale occur in the brain. For example, an SSP that is a visual quale of a house is the information that means the visual quale of a house (or the mental house image that manifests what itself is like) to the consciousness neural process. Hence, when the consciousness neural process reads the SSP, it will interpret the SSP as such, and the visual quale of the house will naturally and inevitably occur in the consciousness neural process and thereby in the brain. Further, with its specialized ability, it will create conscious awareness and experience of the visual quale from this information. Consequently, conscious awareness and experience of the visual quale of the house will and must occur in it and the brain.

In principle, for signaling patterns to be qualia or phenomena that manifest what themselves are like in the mind, they must have the correct information—again, the information that means qualia, phenomena that manifest what themselves are like, to some neural process. But how is it possible that signaling patterns can have such information? The answer is that it is a brute fact. In this universe, it is basically possible for some physical patterns to have such information. During its evolution, the nervous system has evolved countless kinds of signaling patterns with uncountable information meanings for neural processes to perform various functions. SSPs are just evolved signaling patterns with a new kind of information, qualia, for a new kind of neural process, the consciousness neural process, to perform a new function: a new kind of awareness and experience—conscious awareness and conscious experience. This interesting and important matter will be revisited and discussed in detail in Chapter 8: The Explanatory Gap.     Therefore, physically and ontologically, a quale is neither a novel physical nor a new non-physical entity but just an under-recognized part of a well-recognized physical entity. It is the signaling pattern of a neural process—the inherent, informational part of a physical process. Because a signaling pattern is inherent in a neural process, nothing in the brain emerges to be qualia. It seems as if something emerged to be qualia only because special signaling patterns have new information—the information that means “phenomena that manifest what themselves are like” or qualia—while other signaling patterns do not. Yet they also have their own information; it is only that their information means something else. To repeat this very important point, signaling patterns and information are inherent in neural processes; only the evolution of their meanings into new meanings makes it look as if something (qualia) emerged. However, regarding signaling patterns, information, meanings, and functions, it can be said that new signaling patterns with new information, new meanings, and new functions evolved, not emerged, from old signaling patterns with old information, old meanings, and old functions, with no novel entities emerging in the process. This kind of evolution is not exceptional. New signaling patterns with new information, meanings, and functions have constantly been evolving during evolution. This has always been true and, according to all the evidence we have, will always be.

5.3 Physical Effects of Qualia

Do qualia have physical effects, or are they epiphenomena without any physical effects? The answer is that qualia have physical effects. This is the case because they are signaling patterns, so they can convey information to other neural processes and hence affect them. This matter can be investigated in more detail as follows:

Consider Neural Process V (Figure 5.4A), which functions to produce visual perception (V.P.) of a house without a quale occurring. Compare it with Neural Process V’ (Figure 5.4B), which functions to produce visual perception (V.P.) of the same house but with a visual quale of the house, Quale Q, occurring.

V.P. = visual perception, C.A. = conscious awareness, C.E. = conscious experience
Figure 5.4 Effects of a quale

It is obvious that there are differences between the signaling pattern of Neural Process V and that of Neural Process V’. Neural Process V produces visual perception of a house without a visual quale of the house, so its signaling pattern has information only about the visual perception of the house. On the other hand, Neural Process V’ produces both visual perception of a house and a visual quale of the house, so its signaling pattern has information about both the visual perception of the house and the visual quale of the house. Hence, the signaling patterns of the two neural processes must be different because they are information about different things. When these signaling patterns are sent to and then read by other neural processes, different physical effects will occur in those neural processes, at least because of the processing of different signaling patterns.

One evident and important differential effect is that there is no conscious awareness or conscious experience of any quale occurring in the consciousness neural process in the former case because there is no quale for them to occur (as in Figure 5.4A), whereas there are conscious awareness and experience of a quale (Quale Q) occurring in the consciousness neural process in the latter case because there is a quale for the consciousness neural process to process and then create conscious awareness and experience of that quale (as in Figure 5.4B). Because conscious awareness and experience must occur from some mental processes, which in turn must occur with some neural processes (Theorem I), a quale induces additional neural processes. As neural processes are physical, a quale induces physical processes and thus has physical effects.

Moreover, the physical impact of each signaling pattern on its own neural process is different because different signaling patterns entail different production, operation, and maintenance, which require different physical resources. Thus, apart from the effects of the quale on other neural processes, having a quale in a neural process also physically affects that neural process. Therefore, a system that has qualia is physically different from a system that does not. 

At present, it still cannot be definitively concluded from existing research and studies what the exact physical effects of qualia are. As qualia occur only in the final stages of sensory perception and some of the highest-level emotion, cognition, and execution mental processes, it is probable that qualia evolved to augment functions of these important mental processes, such as to augment effects of sensory-perception or emotion-generation mental processes so that they have stronger effects on other mental processes, such as thought or autonomic system mental processes [18,19,134]. Evidently, these effects must yield some benefits for the animals that possess qualia, such as (definitely) humans and (probably) other high-level animals that have similar brain structures capable of supporting qualia occurrences (e.g., other mammals, birds, and reptiles) [137,138]), because they seem to be thriving.

5.4 Predictions

According to Theorem III, a quale will be found to occur with a certain neural process, and this neural process can be found as described in Prediction 2 in Section 4.3. In the predictions below, this neural process will be referred to as its (the quale’s) neural process.

1. Every quale will be found to be the signaling pattern of its neural process. For example, a visual quale and an auditory quale will be found to be the signaling patterns of the visual and the auditory perception neural processes, respectively.
2. It will be found that a) the signaling patterns that are qualia have categorically different characteristics from those that are not—that is, qualia are a special kind of signaling pattern (special signaling pattern or SSP)—and b) signaling patterns of different kinds of qualia (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.) are significantly different from each other but do have some basic characteristics in common.
3. A quale can be identified, quantified, or monitored by identifying, quantifying, or monitoring, respectively, only the SSP of its neural process. These SSP investigations are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding quale investigations to result, while these actions on anything else without involving the SSP will not result in the corresponding quale investigations.
4. A quale can be created, modified, tested, or destroyed by creating, modifying, testing, or destroying, respectively, only the SSP of its neural process. These actions on the SSP are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding actions on the quale to occur, while these actions on anything else without involving the SSP will not result in the corresponding actions on the quale.
5. In an event or experiment, all predictions that are valid for the SSP of the quale’s neural process, such as whether the SSP will occur, change, or disappear, will be identically valid for the quale. For example, if it is predicted that the SSP will change its pattern abruptly from being the signaling pattern of a static, faint, homogenous red to being the signaling pattern of a dynamic, vivid, complex movie, it will be found that the changes in the quale will be identical in all aspects, such as identical changes from a homogeneous color to a complex movie (quality), from faint to vivid (quantity), and abruptly from static to dynamic (temporal pattern).

All the above predictions can be verified by experiments in conscious, communicative human subjects. A typical experiment is to monitor a quale’s occurrence, existence, change, etc. by having the subject report what happens to the quale in his or her mind while concomitantly monitoring the signaling pattern of its neural process by methods such as MEG, ECoG, and intracortical recordings and while the signaling pattern is being manipulated by methods such as drug administration, transcranial magnetic stimulation, or transcranial electrical stimulation.

5.5 Remarks

It should be noted that the ideas that the signaling pattern of a neural process is a quale and that no new entity emerges from the neural process to be a quale are not novel. They have been proposed by several authors before, such as Clark (1995) [129], Llinás (2002) [139], Sevush (2006) [140], Orpwood (2007, 2010, 2013, 2017) [5–8], Loorits (2014) [3], Fazekas and Overgaard (2017) [141], and others [142–147]. Specifically, for example, Clark (1995) said that “subjective qualitative experience is identical to certain information-bearing, behavior-controlling functions, not something which emerges from them.” [129]. This theory just proves explicitly and specifically that it is the special signaling pattern, the signaling pattern in some special form, that is a quale. Similarly, it should be observed that the concept that some kind of neural information is a quale is not new either. This has already been proposed before by some authors, such as Orpwood (2007, 2010, 2013, 2017) [5–8], Balduzzi and Tononi (2009) [1], and Haun et al. (2017) [147]. Specifically, Orpwood asserted that qualia are information cycled through a hierarchy of networks in a resonant state. He proposed that the input information about what X is, when repeatedly cycled through a hierarchy of networks in a resonant state, will finally evolve into information about how X seems to the network and that this information about how X seems to the network is a quale. Balduzzi and Tononi theorized in the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) that qualia are a geometry of integrated information. They proposed that the quantity of consciousness is the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements and that the quality of experience (a quale) is specified by the informational relationships it generates, meaning that a quale is the geometry of the integrated information. 

     On the other hand, this theorem (Theorem V) does not contend that information must be repeatedly cycled through neural circuits to be a quale as Orpwood does. It is possible that information can become a quale in one pass through a quale-generating neural circuit if the neural circuit has a correct structural and operational configuration, like a special-purpose electronic chip that can execute a specific task, such as a calculation of a transcendental function, in one pass instead of multiple passes through simple logic circuits in a general-purpose chip with the help of some software. However, the characteristics of the structure and processing processes of the neural circuit that can create a quale in one pass are presently unknown, so this is just a theoretical possibility. Also, unlike the IIT, this theorem does not hold that qualia are the geometry of integrated information but asserts that qualia are information themselves. Based on this theorem, information can be a quale if and only if it means “quale” or “mental phenomenon that manifests what itself is like” to the consciousness neural process. Thus, according to this theorem, the meaning, not the complexity or geometry, of the information is the determining factor of whether any information is or can be a quale. Lastly, because this theorem asserts that a quale is a signaling pattern that a neural process sends to the consciousness neural process and because signaling patterns that neural processes send to others become effective only at neural synapses, ultimately, qualia are likely to be the patterns of synaptic electrical activities, not neuronal dendritic activities as Sevush (2006) [140] proposed.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

If we open our eyes and experience visual qualia

occurring right in front of us now,

with the fact that we can experience qualia

only if the brain can experience the qualia,

it is inescapable to conclude that we are, in fact,

experiencing neural signaling patterns

because the only things the brain can experience

… read and process …

are neural signaling patterns!

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

> Go to Chapter 6

< Go back to Chapter 4

<< Go back to Homepage

---

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