Chapter 4

Theorem III: Qualia are Physical Phenomena

Qualia are mental phenomena that are consciously experienceable, and we have learned some of their important characteristics, as discussed in the previous chapter. However, many questions about them remain. The most important ones are whether these phenomena are physical or non-physical, what they are physically and ontologically, and why and how they occur. 

Regarding the first question, some think that qualia are non-physical phenomena—happening without physical rules, such as unpredictably occurring in some people but not in others and arbitrarily occurring in one form in some people but in other forms in others. This kind of thinking leads to the concept of a p-zombie, which is defined as “a being that is physically identical to a human but lacks qualia and consciousness,” and the conjecture that there may be p-zombies living among us; that is, some of us may not have qualia and consciousness in their minds even though they behave completely like us [1–23]. It also leads to the concept of variable qualia, which are qualia (of the same things) that vary in their manifestations among people—for example, qualia of a certain color may appear as red in some people but as blue or green or other colors in other people [12,24–28]. On the contrary, some believe that qualia are physical phenomena, governed and predictable by some physical rules and occurring consistently and similarly among people. 

This chapter attempts to find the answer to the first question—the question of whether qualia are physical phenomena. The second and third questions—the questions of their physical and ontological nature and the causes and mechanisms of their occurrences—which are more difficult to answer, are investigated in the next chapter.

4.1 Physical Properties of Qualia

Like mental processes, qualia have many properties. Some are physical properties, which are properties that are directly related to the physical world and can be investigated physically; some are functional properties, which are properties that are related to qualia’s functions, such as being ineffable, intrinsic, and private [12,19,22–24,28–30]; being irreducible [19]; being directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness [30]; and various other functional properties [31,32]. However, to determine whether qualia are physical phenomena and what qualia are physically and ontologically, it is necessary to examine their physical properties.

Qualia, as defined in Section 3.1, have many physical properties. Ten of them that this theory considers important and helpful in identifying the nature of qualia are as follows:


Physical properties of qualia (PQ)

PQ1. Defining physical properties

  • PQ1.1 They are mental phenomena.
  • PQ1.2 They are consciously experienceable.

PQ2. Additional physical properties

  • PQ2.1 Their existence is restricted to their neural processes..
  • PQ2.2 Their existence with their neural processes is consistent.
  • PQ2.3 Their manifestations are diverse and represent something.
  • PQ2.4 Their manifestations match their neural processes’.
  • PQ2.5 Their chronological aspects match their neural processes’.
  • PQ2.6 Their structures are definite.
  • PQ2.7 Their structures are determined by their neural processes.
  • PQ2.8 Their interactions are via their neural processes.

PQ1. Defining physical properties

Defining physical properties are physical properties that we believe things that should be called qualia should have and that we use in their definition. They are as follows:

PQ1.1 They are mental phenomena.

This is in the definition of a quale (Section 3.1)—a quale is a mental phenomenon that is consciously experienceable. If we verify this property, we find that it is valid to our intention because we never find a non-mental phenomenon that is called or should be called a quale.     

Because qualia are mental phenomena (phenomena of the mind) and because the mind is non-material and coexists with the brain (Theorem I), qualia must be non-material phenomena and coexist with the brain. This physical property will help us determine the exact nature of qualia in the next chapter.

PQ1.2 They are consciously experienceable.

 This is also part of the definition of a quale. If we verify this property, we find that it is valid to our intention because we never find a mental phenomenon not consciously experienceable (such as perception of the blood level of sodium, pressure in vessel walls, or autonomic reflexes) that is called or should be called a quale. This property is one of the most important physical properties of qualia. It will help us identify what qualia are physically, so let us investigate it in detail.

When we analyze this property, we find that it requires a quale to have the following three physical properties: A quale must

     1. be readable by the consciousness neural process,

     2. be able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process, and

     3. be information about what itself is like.

These three properties are derived as follows:

     1. As discussed in Section 3.1, for a quale to be consciously experienceable, the mind must be able to be aware of and experience what the quale is like (what an image quale of a house is like, what a sound quale of a song is like, what an odor quale of a flower is like, etc.). According to Theorem I, this is possible only if some neural process can be aware of and experience what the quale is like, which means that the quale must be readable by this neural process so that the neural process can be aware of and experience what the quale is like. In this theory, the neural process that functions to be aware of and experience what mental phenomena are like and create awareness and experiences of what they are like is called the consciousness neural process. Therefore, a quale must be readable by the consciousness neural process.

     2. Because awareness and an experience of what a quale is like occur when the mind is aware of and experiences what the quale is like, a quale must be able to induce awareness and an experience of what itself is like in the consciousness neural process.

     3. Because awareness and an experience of what a quale is like occur, a quale must be information about what itself is like so that, after the consciousness neural process reads the quale, it can have the information about what the quale is like and use this information to create awareness and an experience of what the quale is like. For example, an image quale of a house must be information about what the image quale is like so that after the consciousness neural process reads the quale, it can use the information to create awareness and an experience of what the image quale of the house is like. Otherwise, the consciousness neural process would lack the needed information to create awareness and an experience of what the quale is like.

Therefore, for a quale to be consciously experienceable, it must have these three properties. Similarly, anything that proves to be a quale must also have these three properties. In the next chapter, these properties will help us identify the nature of qualia.

PQ2. Additional physical properties

Additional physical properties are physical properties that qualia are observed to possess in addition to their defining properties. They are as follows:

PQ2.1 Their existence is restricted to their neural processes.

Because qualia are mental phenomena, they exist with mental processes. Because mental processes coexist with their neural processes (Theorem I), qualia also coexist with neural processes. However, as qualia exist only with some mental processes (Section 3.3), qualia exist only with some neural processes, called qualia’s neural processes. These neural processes are those involved in the final stages of sensory perceptions (such as the final visual perception neural processes and the final auditory perception neural processes) and those involved in the final stages of some highest-level emotion, cognition, and execution processes (please see C1 and C2, Section 3.4). These neural processes are exclusive to the latest-evolved parts of the brain.This selectivity indicates that some specific characteristics of these neural processes must be the factors that enable them to be associated with qualia. Also, the fact that qualia occur selectively in the latest-evolved parts of the brain instead of the more primitive parts of the brain (such as the basal ganglia, brainstem, and cerebellum) or randomly all over the whole nervous system indicates that certain evolutionary processes were involved in this selectivity. Thus, it is probable that some characteristics of neural processes, such as unique neural circuitries or special processing processes, have evolved for qualia to occur and coexist with them.

Moreover, the occurrences of each kind of quale are specifically fixed and limited to a certain kind of neural process. For example, visual qualia (color, brightness, shape, etc.) occur only with visual perception neural processes (those in the visual cortices) and never occur with other neural processes (those in other brain areas); vice versa, only visual qualia, not any other types of qualia (e.g., auditory, somatosensory, and emotion), occur with visual perception neural processes. This specificity can be demonstrated using techniques such as fMRI, MEG, ECoG, and intracortical and single-unit recordings. For example, when a subject reports an occurrence of a visual quale, neural processes only in the visual cortices will be found to become active; when the subject reports the disappearance of that visual quale, these processes will be found to become inactive; conversely, when the neural processes in the visual cortices are stimulated to become active, such as by electrical or magnetic stimulation, only visual qualia, not other kinds of qualia, will be reported to occur. This kind of specificity is also true for all other kinds of qualia. Therefore, some specific characteristics of neural processes must be the factors that determine which type of quale (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.) occurs with which kind of neural process.

In summary, the restrictions in where qualia can exist have the following features:

     – Which neural processes have qualia, or where qualia occur and exist in general, is determined by some neural process characteristics (the selectivity).

     – Which specific neural process a certain kind of quale (visual, auditory, olfactory, etc.) occurs and exists with, or where specific types of qualia occur and exist, is also determined by neural process characteristics (the specificity).

     – These characteristics are probably the result of neural-process evolution.

Thus, qualia’s existence is not random but restricted to some specific neural processes, called qualia’s neural processes.

PQ2.2 Their existence with their neural processes is consistent.

Another cardinal characteristic of qualia’s existence is its consistency. Qualia not only specifically but also consistently occur and exist with their neural processes. For example, whenever we open our eyes to experience visual qualia of the outside world, if the visual perception neural processes and other parts of the visual system function normally, the visual qualia always occur and continue to exist as long as our eyes stay open. We never experience episodes of perception with visual qualia alternating with episodes without visual qualia while we open our eyes.

The consistency of qualia’s occurrences and existence extends across time and biological changes. For example, visual qualia have always occurred whenever we open our eyes since we were babies up until now, even though our visual neural processes have been changing biologically throughout time (and we now are quite different biological entities from those we were as babies). It never happened that, at times in our lives, we did not have visual qualia when we opened our eyes, yet we were able to go about not hitting things in the way, describe the appearances of things we saw accurately, and interact with them correctly. Similarly, this consistency in occurrences and existence is true for all other kinds of sensory perception. 

At this point, it should be noted that blindsight [33–37] and chromatic blindsight [38], the conditions of persons seemingly having visual perception without conscious visual perception, i.e., without visual qualia occurring, are not evidence that visual qualia do not consistently occur, because people with blindsight or chromatic blindsight have abnormalities in their visual perception neural processes. Hence, there is no contradiction to the above-stated consistency, which holds under normal circumstances. Specifically, it means that qualia consistently occur and exist with their normal neural processes; when their neural processes are abnormal, qualia possibly do not occur. Moreover, it should be pointed out that perception in these abnormal situations, in which qualia do not occur, is not as good as perception in normal situations, in which qualia occur—they have less detail and are of poorer quality.

The consistency of qualia’s occurrences and existence extends across people and places as well. For example, people with normal visual systems everywhere always have visual qualia when they open their eyes. It is not the case that some healthy people do not have visual qualia, but some do. This is evident from the fact that all healthy people can comprehend the meaning of the term “visual qualia,” which means they can relate the term to some of their previous mental experiences. People who never experience visual qualia would not have information about visual qualia in their minds, would not be able to associate the term “visual qualia” with anything they have experienced, and thus would not know what the term “visual qualia” refers to. They would surely be surprised when learning that other people have something they do not. Some of them would likely question what other people are talking about, what visual qualia are like, why they do not have them, and so on. Philosophers and neuroscientists who do not have qualia would certainly report the absence of qualia in their minds to the scientific community and formally establish in the literature that some healthy people, such as them, do not have qualia. They would definitely not engage in discussing this matter or participate in conferences, research, or experiments about this matter seriously as if they had these phenomena. This matter is also conversely true for us. If some people said that they had qualia of the perception of blood level of sodium and other blood constituents or if they were discussing these qualia or having conferences, doing some research, or conducting experiments about them, we would be surprised. We would undoubtedly not engage in discussing those qualia knowingly with them or participate in those conferences, research, or experiments seriously as if we had the qualia. Instead, we would tell them that we did not have those qualia and would ask them many questions about the qualia, such as what their characteristics were. 

Some people who do not have visual qualia would probably seek medical advice. This actually happened—a patient with cerebral achromatopsia from a stroke sought medical attention because of a colorless sight (a sight without perceivable color qualia) even though he still had subconscious color perception (i.e., he was able to describe the colors of objects correctly above chance to some degree even though he denied perceiving those colors) [38]. In this patient, the absence of visual qualia occurred from the absence of the color perception neural process. This case confirms that, when one lacks visual qualia, one does seek medical advice because of the deficit. Yet, clinically, there are no medical records about people with normal visual systems who lacked or lost visual qualia. This non-existence of such records has been true for several hundred years or more. Therefore, it can be concluded that the absence of visual qualia in people with normal visual systems never occurs and that visual qualia consistently occur in people with normal visual systems. This kind of consistency is also true for other types of qualia.

To summarize, in healthy people, qualia consistently occur and exist with their neural processes. This consistency indicates that qualia’s occurrences and existence are not haphazard but are strictly determined by some characteristics of their neural processes.

PQ2.3 Their manifestations are diverse and represent something.

Qualia’s manifestations are diverse in type. For example, they can manifest as visual, auditory, olfactory, emotion, or thought qualia. Notably, various types of qualia manifestations are categorically different from each other. Moreover, each type is infinitely diverse in details, complexity, and dynamicity. For example, visual qualia can vary from those of static, plain color screens to those of newspaper pages to those of lively scenes in a bustling city center, and auditory qualia, from those of soft, monotonous sounds to those of people’s conversations to those of noisy, crowded music concerts. 

Importantly, qualia’s manifestations represent something. For example, a visual quale of a house represents the visual aspect of the house; a sound quale of a song represents the auditory aspect of the song; an odor quale of a flower represents the olfactory aspect of the flower; an emotion quale of happiness represents one agreeable kind of feeling; and a thought quale of something represents a mental cognitive activity of that thing.

Thus, anything that proves to be qualia must be able to manifest itself diversely in types and details and must represent something.

PQ2.4 Their manifestations match their neural processes’.

Qualia’s manifestation details, ranges, and changes are not random but match those of their neural processes.

Qualia’s manifestation details, such as color, brightness, shape, dimension, and movement of all points in a visual quale; pitch, timbre, loudness, formant, and attack of all sounds in an auditory quale; and types and strengths of an olfactory quale, are not haphazard but match those of their neural processes. If this is not the case, then qualia’s details that are not those of their neural processes will be found to exist. For example, when people look at a house without anything around it, they may see a car in front of it, even if the image of the car is neither created in the neural process from normal seeing nor from some abnormal processes, such as illusion or hallucination. However, these kinds of strange phenomena never happen. 

Qualia’s manifestation ranges, such as the frequency and amplitude ranges of visual and auditory qualia and the spatial ranges (visual field) of visual qualia, are not random or unlimited but match those of their neural processes. If this is not the case, then qualia in the ranges outside those of their neural processes will be found to exist. For example, there will be visual qualia occurring outside the neural process’s visual field (such as in the visual field covering the area behind the head), or there will be auditory qualia occurring below or above the frequency ranges of the auditory neural processes (such as in the infrasonic or ultrasonic range). However, qualia in such excess ranges never occur. Thus, qualia’s manifestation ranges match those of their neural processes.

Regarding changes, whenever the manifestation details of their neural processes change, those of the qualia change accordingly and simultaneously. For instance, when one looks around, resulting in new visual information in the visual neural process, the details of the visual qualia’s manifestations will change accordingly and simultaneously—they cannot remain unchanged or change to those of another visual scene that one is not viewing. Another example is that, when there is a lesion in the ventral or caudomedial occipitotemporal or ventromedial occipital cortex, color-perception neural processes in these areas, as well as the perceived color information of the opposite visual field, will be impaired. Consequently, the qualia in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [39–42]—they cannot still retain their color components. On the other hand, if their neural processes do not change, qualia cannot change. For example, when one stares at a house, an image quale of the house will remain the same as long as one keeps looking at the house; it cannot change to a quale of something else, such as a car, a tree, or an animal, even if the mind tries to change it. Therefore, when there is no change in their neural process, qualia cannot change, but when there is a change in their neural process, qualia cannot resist the change and must change similarly and simultaneously.

Therefore, qualia’s manifestations match those of their neural processes.

Qualia’s manifestation time aspects, which are the time they occur and the time they represent things, are not arbitrary but match those of their neural processes. Specifically, qualia’s manifestations do not occur or represent things in real time but in a time-lag manner corresponding to their neural processes’ processing time. For example, when our foot hits something hard, the pain quale does not occur immediately but is delayed for about a second. The delayed time is the time it takes for the injury signal to travel to the brain and get completely processed, resulting in the pain quale. Another example is that a visual quale of a house represents the visual aspect of the house not in real time but about 300–400 ms in the past [43–45]. This delay correlates with the time the visual perception system takes to process the visual signal to form the image. Similarly, all other visual qualia and all auditory qualia represent visual and auditory events not in real time but in a time-lag manner that depends on their neural processes’ processing time (with significant additional signal traveling time outside the body in the case of auditory events).

Summarily, qualia’s manifestations match those of their neural processes.

PQ2.5 Their chronological aspects match their neural processes’.

Qualia’s chronological aspects, which are the time they occur, represent things, and disappear, are not arbitrary but match those of their neural processes. Specifically, qualia do not occur or represent things in real time but in a time-lag manner corresponding to their neural processes’ processing time. For example, when our foot hits something hard, the dull, aching pain quale does not occur immediately but is delayed for about hundreds of milliseconds to a few seconds. The delayed time equals the time it takes for the injury signal to travel to the brain and get completely processed, resulting in the dull, aching pain quale. Thus, the quale represents the impact’s effect on the foot about a second in the past, not in real time. Another example is that a visual quale of a house represents the visual aspect of the house not in real time but about 300–400 ms ago [43–45]. This delay correlates with the time the visual perception system takes to process the visual signal to form the image. Similarly, all other visual qualia and all auditory qualia represent visual and auditory events not in real time but in a time-lag manner that depends on their neural processes’ processing time (with significant additional signal traveling time outside the body in the case of auditory events).

The time a quale disappears also matches the time its neural process ceases functioning. When the neural process does not end its processing, the quale cannot disappear. For example, when we look at a bright lamp and then close our eyes to see nothing, we will keep seeing an afterimage quale even if we do not want to. This quale can disappear only when its neural process stops creating the afterimage. Similarly, when we stop spinning around, we will continue to have a quale representing the feeling of spinning for a while. This quale will persist until its neural process stops creating this feeling.

Summarily, qualia’s chronological aspects match those of their neural processes.

PQ2.6 Their structures are definite.

Another cardinal characteristic of qualia is that their structures are definite—that is, each type of quale has the same structure across people.

     The structure of any type of quale consists of

     1. the number and types of basic components of that type of quale and

     2. the spectral characteristics of that type of quale.

The number and types of basic components of any type of quale are always definite. For example, visual qualia always have the following five basic components: color, brightness, shape, dimension, and movement; auditory qualia always have the following eight basic components: pitch, loudness, timbre, formant, attack, sustain, decay, and release; and olfactory qualia always have the following two basic components: odor type and strength. It should be noted that these are the number and types of basic components in humans. In other animals, they may be different. For example, animals that can perceive the polarization of light, such as some species of insects, cephalopods, and fish [46–50], may also have polarization as a basic visual component.

 Also, it is essential to note that the number and types of basic components of each type of quale may vary according to how they are classified, which depends on the opinions of the authors. For example, some may include acuity as a basic visual component; thus, the number of basic visual components would be six; some may consider formant, attack, sustain, decay, and release as already included in the timbre; thus, the number of basic auditory components would be only three. However, the point here is the definiteness of the number and types—they are the same across all people. For example, if the correct number of basic components for visual qualia is five, it is five across all people—not four in some, five or six in others, and so on—and the types of basic components for visual qualia, whatever they are, are the same across all people.

The spectral characteristics of any type of quale are likewise definite. For example, when people see the light spectrum, the associated color-qualia spectrum in the mind will be as shown (as two identical spectra) in Figure 4.1. The two spectra always have definite spectral characteristics, such as where color qualia change their hues along the spectrum (e.g., color qualia always change their hues markedly at wavelengths around 410, 470, 490, 570, and 610 nm—see the upper spectrum) and definite relations between color qualia at different wavelengths (such as color qualia at wavelengths 380 and 440 nm [60 nm apart] are clearly different in their hues, whereas those at wavelengths 660 and 720 nm [also 60 nm apart] are quite similar in their hues—see the lower spectrum). 

The light spectrum color qualia

Figure 4.1 Two color-qualia spectra of the light spectrum

Another example is the pitch-qualia spectrum of a musical scale below. The spectrum also has definite spectral characteristics. At every doubling or halving of a sound frequency along the scale, pitch qualia will sound similar but one octave higher or lower, respectively. For example, please see Figure 4.2, C4, C5, and C6 have pitch qualia that sound similar to human ears (but in different octaves).

A chromatic scale

Figure 4.2 A pitch-qualia spectrum from C4 (261.63 Hz) to C6 (1046.50 Hz)

Accordingly, although we cannot be certain whether other people experience the same visual or auditory qualia as we do (e.g., whether other people experience our red as red or as blue or some other colors or experience our note C as note C or as note G or some other notes), we can be certain that the qualia structure of each type of quale is the same across people (that is, the number and types of basic components and the spectral characteristics of visual, auditory, and other qualia in the reader, the author, and other people are the same), because if it were not, we would be able to observe that we had different experiences of the qualia. However, except for slightly different experiences due to somewhat different perception systems in different people or different experiences due to pathological conditions (such as color blindness, presbycusis, or parosmia), different experiences of qualia among healthy people have never been observed. Different places and times do not result in different experiences either. Therefore, the qualia structure of each kind must be definite and the same across all healthy people, places, and times.

It is also important to note that the structure of each type of quale is not only definite but also remarkably unique and different from those of other kinds. Firstly, the number of basic components of each type of quale is different from those of other types. For example, the number of basic components of a visual, auditory, and olfactory quale is five, eight, and two, respectively. Secondly, their spectra are strikingly different from each other. For instance, the pitch qualia of a chromatic scale in equal temperament do not exhibit irregular changes in pitch or loudness along the scale as the color qualia of a light spectrum do in hue and brightness along the spectrum, even though both qualia have similar regularly changing wavelength or frequency patterns along the scale or spectrum. Also, the color-qualia spectrum does not exhibit repeated similar hues at every double frequency along its spectrum as the pitch-qualia spectrum does in pitch along its scale. Remarkably, different kinds of qualia are able to maintain their structural uniqueness and thus keep their differences from other kinds consistently across billions of people in all places and at all times. This strongly indicates that qualia’s manifestations are not haphazard but are determined by some physical rules. Otherwise, qualia’s manifestations would be haphazard—occurring with different numbers and types of components and with different spectral characteristics in different people. (This interesting matter will be investigated in more detail in Extra Chapter II: Variable qualia.)

PQ2.7 Their structures are determined by their neural processes.

Evidence in neuroscience indicates that the number and types of basic components of each qualia type are determined by the number and types of basic-component neural processes of that qualia type. For example, the number and types of visual qualia’s basic components (color, shape, direction, etc.) are determined by the number and types of basic-component neural processes of visual qualia. These basic-component neural processes function for perception of color, shape, direction, and other visual qualia components. The spectral characteristics of the qualia are also determined by the corresponding neural processes. For example, the spectral characteristics of color qualia and pitch qualia are determined by the color perception neural process and the sound frequency perception neural process, respectively. If these neural processes are affected, the qualia’s spectral characteristics will also be affected [51–62]. Therefore, qualia’s structures are determined by their neural processes.

(A similar notion has been presented in the literature before: Chalmers (1995,1996, 1997) called this kind of correspondence between mental states and physical states “structural coherence” [63–66], and Velmans (2002) said that “for every discriminable attribute of experience, there will be a distinct, correlated, physical state. As each experience and its physical correlate represent the same thing, it follows that each experience and its physical correlate encodes the same information about that thing. That is, they are representations with the same information structure.” [67].)

PQ2.8 Their interactions are via their neural processes.

Qualia cannot interact with mental processes or other qualia directly—they have to interact via their neural processes and connections. For example, the red color quale cannot directly interact with the consciousness mental process to create a conscious experience of the quale—it has to interact with the consciousness mental process via its neural process, the connection between its neural process and the consciousness neural process, and the consciousness neural process. This is evidenced by the fact that, if there is a lesion that destroys either of the neural processes or the connection between them, a conscious experience of the red color quale will not occur, even if the red color quale may have occurred.

4.2 Theorem III

The eight observable, additional physical characteristics discussed above are the same for billions of people everywhere, at present and in the past. The fact that qualia have identical characteristics across countless people and across unlimited time and places indicates that qualia are not arbitrarily occurring phenomena but must be phenomena governed by some physical rules that cause them to always occur with the same characteristics. That is, qualia must be physical phenomena. Moreover, because the characteristics discussed above are closely associated with their neural processes, which are physical processes and predictable by physical laws, these characteristics are also predictable by physical laws. Therefore, it can be concluded that qualia are physical phenomena—phenomena that are governed and predictable by physical laws—that are associated with their neural processes in the aspects that have been discussed. This theory asserts this conclusion as Theorem III:

Theorem III: Qualia are neural-process–associated physical phenomena.

The above is the specific form of Theorem III. The basic form can be stated as:


Theorem III: Qualia are physical phenomena.

This means that mental phenomena that are consciously experienceable, such as an image of a house, a sound of a song, and an odor of a flower, in our minds, are physical phenomena. They occur under physical rules, are predictable, and are associated with neural processes.

4.3 Predictions

  1. All qualia’s characteristics (such as occurrence, existence, location, structure, and information) will always be predictable by some physical laws.
  2. A quale (such as a visual quale of a house, an emotion quale of happiness, or a thought quale of oneself) will be found to occur and exist with a certain neural process (such as the visual-perception, the emotion-generation, or the thought-formation neural process)—it will not be found to occur without a certain neural process. This means that, when and where there is a quale, the neural process that the quale is associated with will be found then and there.
    Note. A neural process can be identified as the associated neural process of the quale by investigations that observe and may also manipulate potential neural processes concurrently with observing the quale. In various investigations, the neural process that consistently changes concomitantly and correspondingly with the quale will be that neural process.
  3. For a paired quale and neural process as so identified, every event in the quale (such as an event in a dynamic visual quale of a movie, a dynamic emotion quale of alternating happiness, sadness, and indifference, or a dynamic thought quale of a complex deliberation) will be found to be associated with an event in the neural process (such as an event in a neural process in the occipital cortex, amygdala, or frontal lobe)—it will not be found to occur without a corresponding event in the neural process.
  4. For a paired quale and neural process as so identified, the predictions that are valid for the neural process in an event or experiment, such as whether the neural process will occur, change, or stop functioning, will be valid for the quale.

All the above predictions can be verified by experiments in conscious, communicative human subjects. A typical experiment is to monitor a quale’s occurrence, existence, change, etc. by having the subject report what happens to the quale in his or her mind while concomitantly monitoring the neural process by methods such as fMRI, MEG, ECoG, intracortical and single-unit recordings, and quantitative EEG and while the subject’s neural process is being manipulated by methods such as drug administration, transcranial magnetic stimulation, or transcranial electrical stimulation.

4.4 Remarks

The concept that qualia are physical phenomena is not new. Although this idea was not explicitly stated, many scientists conducted their research and developed their theories regarding qualia based on this concept, as is evident from their methodologies. Furthermore, several theories concerning qualia conclude that they are some forms of physical entities (for instance, see References 68–77). Nonetheless, there has never been a theory that explicitly proves and methodically establishes that qualia are physical phenomena, governed and predictable by physical laws, and are associated with some neural processes. To the author’s knowledge, this theory is the first one that does so.

However, there are still crucial questions to solve. What is qualia’s physical and ontological nature, and why and how do they occur? These puzzles will be investigated and answered in the next chapter.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

If qualia were not physical phenomena,

manifesting arbitrarily without physical rules,

their appearances would be haphazard.

For visual qualia, some people would see only shapes,

while others would see only colors,

yet others would see only brightness,

or other random combinations of visual attributes.

 Such strange inconsistencies never occur.

Qualia manifestations are consistent.

They must be physical phenomena,

manifesting under some physical rules.

⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓ ⁓

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References

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