Theorem VI – IX: Identity, Similarity, and Difference of Neural Processes, Mental Processes, and Qualia
7.1. Theorem VI1
Because identical neural processes have identical information processing parts and because the information processing part of a neural process is the mental process, identical neural processes have identical mental processes.
*In cases of neural processes that have qualia:
Because identical neural processes have identical special signaling patterns and because the special signaling pattern of a neural process is a quale, identical neural processes have identical qualia.
Theorem VI1. Identical Neural Processes have Identical Mental Processes and Identical Qualia*.
That identical neural processes have identical qualia* means that identical people, with identical brains and neural circuits, looking at the same red color and having identical neural processes for the visual image of red color occurring in their brains, must have identical qualia of the red color occurring in their minds. Also, with identical neural processes for conscious experience of the red color qualia occurring in their brains, they must have identical conscious experience of the red color qualia occurring in their minds. This is true in general for all qualia and conscious experiences.
7.2. Theorem VI2
Because similar neural processes have similar information processing parts and because the information processing part of a neural process is the mental process, similar neural processes have similar mental processes.
Because similar neural processes have similar special signaling patterns* and because the special signaling pattern of a neural process is a quale, similar neural processes have similar qualia.
Theorem VI2. Similar Neural Processes have Similar Mental Processes and Similar Qualia*.
That similar neural processes have similar qualia* means that similar people, with similar brains and neural circuits, looking at the same red color and having similar neural processes for the visual image of red color occurring in their brains, must have similar qualia of the red color occurring in their minds. Also, with similar neural processes for conscious experience of the red color qualia occurring in their brains, they must have similar conscious experience of the red color qualia occurring in their minds. This is true in general for all qualia and conscious experiences.
7.3. Implications
The theorems predict that if one person’s consciousness neural process can access and read the signaling pattern of a perception neural process (such as a visual perception neural process) of another person who is experiencing the same thing (such as looking at the same color), the first person will find that the quale that occurs in the second person’s perception neural process is similar to the quale that occurs in his/her perception neural process. This seems to be impossible to test at the present time, but it can approximately be verified in craniopagus twins (conjoined twins whose craniums are fused together) who share some perception neural processes that are not much different.
Any animals that have similar brain structures (similar neural circuits, connections, and physiology) to those of humans should have similar signaling patterns occurring in their brains and thus should have similar qualia and conscious experiences occurring in their minds. Therefore, it can be inferred that they have qualia and conscious experiences similar to us [1,2]. The more similar brains to ours they have, the more similar qualia and conscious experiences to ours occur in them. The more different brains from ours they have, the more different qualia and conscious experiences from ours they experience. For example, we can infer that a dog mentally sees a house (consciously experiences a visual quale of the house) similarly to us (except that they are color-blinded by their inherent lack of some retinal photoreceptors). Bees, however, with compound eyes, ability to sense UV light, and different eye and brain structures from ours [3], probably see the house (consciously experiences a visual quale of the house) in a very different way (maybe in a totally different quale from our visual qualia) that we cannot imagine because we do not and cannot have signaling patterns similar to bees’ signaling patterns occurring in our brains.
As identical/similar neural processes have identical/similar qualia, different qualia or qualia of the same thing that have different phenomenal characteristics in identical/similar people are not possible. This will be discussed more in details in Chapter 9.
As identical/similar neural processes have identical/similar mental process, mind reading and thought identification by physical instruments are possible by comparing signaling patterns of neural processes of mental processes or qualia in question with those of the known ones [4,5,6].
7.4. Predictions
- Craniopagus twins who share a certain perception neural process and can access the shared neural process of the other twin will find that the quale (of some object) that occurs in his/her neural process is similar to the quale (of the same object) that occurs in the other’s neural process provided that their neural processes for that perception are similar.
- If, in the future, there is a way to connect neural processes of different persons together so that one person’s consciousness neural process can access and read the signaling pattern of a perception neural process (such as a visual perception neural process) of another person who is experiencing the same thing (such as looking at the same color), the first person will find that the quale that occurs in the second person’s perception neural process is similar to the quale that occurs in his/her perception neural process.
- A transplanted neural tissue that results in a neural process that is similar to the previously-functioning neural process will yield a corresponding mental process, be it perception, motor, or cognition, that is similar to the previously-functioning mental process. Theoretically, neural transplantations for diseases such as Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s dementia, cortical visual impairment, and cortical sensory impairment will work if they result in correct functioning neural processes.
7.5. Remarks
The ideas in the two theorems of this chapter are not totally new. Similar ideas were proposed before such as in “The principle of organizational invariance”: Chalmers DJ [7,8] says that “This principle states that any two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. If the causal patterns of neural organization were duplicated in silicon, for example, with a silicon chip for every neuron and the same patterns of interaction, then the same experiences would arise.”, and Moutoussis K [9] says that “… a specific brain-activation pattern, leading to the formation of a specific percept.” and “specific, individual perceptual experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation pattern.”
Theorem VI1 and Theorem VI2 will be invalidated if it is found that qualia of the same things perceived under identical conditions are not the same or are not similar, respectively.
7.6. Theorem VII
Because different neural processes have different information-processing processes and because information-processing processes are mental processes, different neural processes have different mental processes.
Because different neural processes have different signaling patterns and because signaling patterns are the information of neural processes (See D6, Chapter Introduction & Definitions), different neural processes have different information.
*In cases of neural processes that have qualia:
Because different neural processes have different special signaling patterns and because special signaling patterns are qualia, different neural processes have different qualia.
Theorem VII. Different neural processes have different mental processes, different information, and different qualia*.
7.7. Prediction
- This theory predicts that the gene therapy to correct color blindness by converting one type of existing photoreceptors to the missing type (such as converting green-sensitive cone cells to red-sensitive cone cells in people with red-color blindness) will be able to create new color percept in the patient. This is because such a photoreceptor conversion will result in a novel type of photoreceptor that will respond to light with novel signaling patterns (different from those of the previously existing photoreceptors) and because color perception of any point in the visual field depends on composite signals from the group of photoreceptors at the corresponding point in the retinal field [10-13] (which will be sent to the bipolar cells and then the retinal ganglion cells). As a result, the composite signals from the group of treated photoreceptors will be different from the composite signals from that group before the therapy, and the output pattern of signals from the retinal ganglion cells through the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus and then to the occipital cortex will be a novel pattern of signals that never occurred in that person before. This will result in a novel signaling pattern in the color perception neural process, and according to Theorem VII, a novel color quale will be generated from this novel neural process (with the novel signaling pattern). The patient will experience a new color quale that he/she has never experienced before and thus will perceive the world in more colors and will be able to better differentiate things with more perceived colors. This kind of treatment has been done successfully in animals, such as squirrel monkeys [14,15].
7.8. Remarks
Although, by Theorem VII, different neural processes cannot have identical mental processes, identical information, and identical qualia, they can have mental process, information, and qualia that are similar, but not identical. This is because Theorem VII does not specified that the difference must be extreme. The difference can thus be minor to the point that they can be considered similar. This explains the functional recovery in the nervous system when one neural process is destroyed and another neural process adapts itself to substitute for the destroyed neural process. Although they are not identical neural processes, the mental processes and qualia that result will be similar to the previous destroyed one enough to improve the lost function.
Theorem VII will be invalidated if it is found that identical mental processes or qualia can result from different neural processes.
7.9. Theorem VIII
Because mental processes are information-processing processes and because identical information-processing processes require identical neural processes, identical mental processes require identical neural processes.
Because information of neural processes is their signaling patterns and because identical signaling patterns require identical neural processes, identical information requires identical neural processes.
Because qualia are special signaling patterns and because identical special signaling patterns require identical neural processes, identical qualia require identical neural processes.
Theorem VIII. Identical mental processes, identical information, and identical qualia require identical neural processes.
7.10. Prediction
- If, in the future, mental processes, information, and qualia can be identified by methods that are not dependent on neural processes, it will be confirmed that identical mental processes, information, and qualia indeed require identical neural processes. (Current methods that are dependent on neural processes in identifying mental processes, information, and qualia cannot be used to confirm this theorem.)
7.11. Theorem IX
Conversely, because mental processes are information-processing processes and because different information-processing processes require different neural processes, different mental processes require different neural processes.
Because information of neural processes is their signaling patterns and because different signaling patterns require different neural processes, different information requires different neural processes.
Because qualia are special signaling patterns and because different special signaling patterns require different neural processes, different qualia require different neural processes.
Theorem IX. Different mental processes, different information, and different qualia require different neural processes.
7.12. Prediction
- It will be found that neural processes for different qualia, different information, and different mental processes are different. Obviously, this has already proved to be true in general cases, such as visual and auditory qualia, information, and mental processes require different neural processes, which are visual and auditory neural processes. More difficult to prove but more important theoretically is to prove that perception of a certain object A without qualia occurring and perception of that object A with qualia occurring require different neural processes. Indeed, Theorem IX and the whole Theory will be invalidated if it is proved that perception of a certain object A without qualia occurring and perception of that object A with qualia occurring do not require different neural processes.
7.13. Remark
Theorem IX will be invalidated if it is found that different mental processes or qualia can result from identical neural processes.
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