The Original Version – Chapter 4

Theorem III: Qualia are Physical Phenomena

Qualia are phenomena of mental processes and results of neural processes, as discussed in section 3.4. But are they physical or non-physical phenomena and what is the exact nature of these phenomena? Regarding the first question, even though qualia are results of neural processes and thus results of physical processes, whether they themselves are also physical phenomena is another matter. Some people think that they may be a kind of non-physical phenomena, happening without physical rules, such as occurring in some people but not occurring in some people arbitrarily (unpredictably) and occurring differently in different people. This kind of concept perhaps results from the difficulties in explaining their nature. It leads to the concept of a p-zombie, which is defined as “a being that is physically identical to a normal human except that it lacks qualia and conscious experiences” [1-5], and the concept of different qualia [4-6], which are qualia (of the same thing) that appear differently in different people (such as the quale of color C may appear as red in some people but as blue in some people). However, some believe that qualia are physical phenomena, occurring consistently and unchangeably in people with some physical rules. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether qualia are physical phenomena or not. As for the exact nature of these phenomena, which is more difficult to ascertain, the issue will be examined in the next chapter.

4.1. Physical properties of qualia

Like mental processes, qualia have many properties. Some are physical properties, which are properties that can be tested physically; some are non-physical properties, which are properties that cannot be tested physically, such ineffable, intrinsic, and private [6], or irrevocability [7]; and some are functional properties, which are properties of their functions, such as output flexibility, and enduring in short-term memory [7], or transparent phenomenal states, involve temporal aspect, enormous multivariability, and combinatorial capacities [8,9]. However, in order to determine what qualia physically are, it is necessary to examine their physical properties, which are as follows:

Physical properties of qualia (QP):

QP1. Required physical properties.

QP1.1. Their nature is mental phenomena.

QP1.2. Their characteristics are phenomenal and consciously experienceable.

QP2. Observed physical properties.

QP2.1. Their nature is non-material.

QP2.2. Their activities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

QP2.3. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their specific neural processes, and both are consistent.

QP2.4. Their places of occurrences are selectively and specifically limited to some specific neural processes.

QP2.5. Their capacities are limited and identical to those of their specific neural processes.

QP2.6. Their details are determined by and are identical to their specific neural processes, with definiteness in form of occurrence.

QP2.7. Their changes are dependent on their specific neural processes.

QP2.8. Their interactions depend on and are via their specific neural processes.

 

QP1. Required physical properties.

Required physical properties are physical properties that qualia are required to possess by their definition. They are as follows:

QP1.1. Their nature is mental phenomena.

This follows from the definition of quale (section 3.1.): a quale is a mental phenomenon. Physically, this means that a quale is part of a neural process because a mental phenomenon is part of a mental process and because a mental process is part of a neural process.

QP1.2. Their characteristics are phenomenal and consciously experienceable.

This also follows from the definition of quale (section 3.1.): a quale is a mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics; therefore, qualia’s characteristics must be (A) phenomenal and (B) consciously experienceable. What do these mean physically?

(A) Phenomenal. Physically, phenomenal characteristics are something that has the following properties:

A1. They are information about something.

A2. They are indescribable (or ineffable).

A3. They are unique.

Now, let’s examine these three properties in detail.

A1. They are information about something.

All phenomenal characteristics are information about something, such as

– red is information about a light,

– sound pitch is information about a sound,

– pain is information about a physical injury of tissue,

– memory is information about a past event, and

– happiness is information about a personal feeling.

A2. They are indescribable.

Physically, this means that the consciousness neural process has no information to describe them. This requires the following two properties.

A2.1. The information that phenomenal characteristics are in A1 must be about something that is not the phenomenal characteristics themselves. For example, the phenomenal characteristic “Red” [Figure 4.1] is information about the 700-nm light that it is representing, but it is not information about the phenomenal characteristic itself – in other words, the phenomenal characteristic “Red” describes the 700-nm light but does not describe itself. As a result, the consciousness neural process has some information to describe the 700-nm light (i.e., describe it as red) but has no information to describe the phenomenal characteristic itself.

Figure 4.1 Phenomenal Characteristic “Red”

   A2.2 The phenomenal characteristics must not react with anything other than the consciousness neural process. As a result, there are no phenomena other than the experience that they create in the consciousness neural process to yield information about them. Thus, except for the experience of what they are like, the consciousness neural process has nothing to describe them.

Noticeably, this is different from information from other sources, such as the information of the 700-nm light from a paper, TV, or computer. This latter kind of information of the 700-nm light has the carrier (the dye, paper, TV, or computer) that yields information about itself (such as the dye, paper, TV, or computer can be seen, touched, and tested with various devices) too (see Figure 4.2), so we can describe both the 700-nm light (as red) and the carrier of the information (as the dye, paper, TV, or computer) – that is, the carrier is describable. For phenomenal characteristics, this is not the case.

Figure 4.2 Information from a Physical Source

A subtler example is the “red” information that is carried on radio wave in TV broadcasting. Although the carrier (the radio wave) of the information is intangible and cannot be seen, it interacts with electromagnetic devices and creates phenomena that we can detect in our devices in measurable forms as frequency, amplitude, and polarity, and can we can use these to describe the radio wave. But phenomenal characteristics do not react with anything else other than consciousness neural process as discussed above, and there are no sensory receptors (or other kinds of sensors) to sense or to get information about phenomenal characteristics themselves. Overall, there is nothing that describes (give information about) phenomenal characteristics. Consequently, all phenomenal characteristics are indescribable (except for the conscious experience that occurs in the conscious neural process).

A3. They are unique in characteristics.

When consciousness experiences each phenomenal characteristic, it will observe that each kind (visual, auditory, emotion, thought, etc.) is unique – different from other kinds but that it cannot describe the difference in details (because they are indescribable as discussed above). Physically, this means that each phenomenal characteristic is able to induce consciousness neural process into a unique signaling state, different from all other signaling states, so that the consciousness neural process observes it as unique.

Therefore, physically, it can be concluded that the phenomenal characteristics are information about something that is not themselves, do not react with anything other than the consciousness neural process, and are able to induce consciousness neural process into a unique signaling state.

(B) Consciously experienceable. Physically, what are characteristics that are consciously experienceable? If qualia’s characteristics are consciously experienceable, then the consciousness must be able to experience them. Physically, this means that they must be readable by the consciousness neural process and that they must be able to induce the consciousness neural process into the signaling states that signal* conscious experiences of themselves. But because conscious experiences always occur with conscious awareness (see section 3.2), this means that they must be able to induce the consciousness neural process into the signaling states that signal* both the conscious experiences and the conscious awareness of themselves. This is a very important property. It aids in understanding the nature of qualia, conscious experiences, and how they occur.

(* “signals” means “has the signaling pattern that contains the information of”. Please see 7. Signaling state (SS) in the chapter Introduction and Definition for more details.)

To be noted is that this property B is different from property A3. Although property A3 states that a phenomenal characteristic is able to induce the consciousness neural process into a unique signaling state, it does not state that a phenomenal characteristic is readable the consciousness neural process or not. Something may have property A3 but not property B because of some reasons such as it is not connected to the consciousness neural process, so although it has the ability to induce the consciousness neural process into a unique signaling state, it does not have access to the consciousness neural process and is not readable.

In summary, from A1-3 and B, that a quale has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics physically means that a quale

  1. is information about something (A1) that is not itself (A2),
  2. does not react with anything else other than the consciousness neural process (A2),
  3. must be able to induce consciousness neural process into a unique signaling state (A3),
  4. must be readable by the consciousness neural process (B), and
  5. must be able to induce the consciousness neural process into the signaling state that signals the conscious experience and the conscious awareness of itself (B).

Therefore, anything that proves to be a quale must have these properties.

QP2. Observed physical properties.

Observed physical properties are physical properties that qualia are observed to possess. They are as follows:

QP2.1. Their nature is non-material.

Like mental processes, qualia have never been found by any means to have mass, shape, and size. Also, another significant observation is as follows. Because qualia (such as a vision of a house in one’s mind, an emotion of happiness, and a reliving of a past event) appear and disappear suddenly and usually change their highly structured details (such as the details of a lively dynamic vision, emotion, and past event) rapidly in milliseconds and continuously (because we always look at different scenes, feel different emotions, think of different events, etc. continuously), if qualia are material phenomena, there must exist cellular machinery in the brain that is capable of forming material substances with such highly structured details and processing them at such a rapid pace (in milliseconds) continuously. But, neither such capable neural apparatuses nor material substances that can be qualia have ever been found by various kinds of brain imaging, during brain surgeries, or in pathologic studies of brain tissue. Therefore, qualia must be non-material phenomena.

QP2.2. Their activities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

Because qualia, such as qualia of the dynamic scenes of the external world, the lively sounds in the outside world, and the actively changing thoughts, appear and disappear suddenly and usually change their highly structured details frequently and rapidly in milliseconds, their activities are dynamic and fast. Also, because qualia, such as visual images of various scenes in the external world, sounds of speeches, and the complex thinking, calculating, or recalling past events, have a lot of details, their activities are information-intensive. Thus, qualia’s activities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

QP2.3. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their specific neural processes, and both are consistent.

Qualia always occur whenever their specific neural processes start creating them and disappear whenever their specific neural processes stop creating them. For example, visual qualia occur whenever neural processes for visual perception start creating them (when opening eyes to see, when having migraine aura [10-17] or epileptic visual aura [18-24], when being stimulated by electrical [25,26,27]or magnetic stimulation [28-31], etc.) and disappear whenever their neural processes stop creating them (when falling asleep, when having acute stroke, when being inhibited by magnetic stimulation [28-32], etc.), emotion qualia occur whenever neural processes for emotion start creating them (when encountering something fearful, when being stimulated by psychedelic drugs [33-37], when being stimulated by electrical stimulation [38,39,40], etc.) and disappear whenever their neural processes stop creating them (when suppressed by cognitive control, when modulated by meditation [41-46], when tranquilized by medications [47-50], etc.), and thinking qualia occur whenever neural processes for thinking start creating them (on waking up from sleep, on recovering from general anesthesia, on convalescing from cerebral concussion, etc.) and disappear whenever their neural processes stop creating them (when falling asleep, when being suppressed by general anesthesia, when becoming dysfunctional by cerebral concussion, etc.). Qualia have never been found to occur or exist independently without the functioning of their specific neural processes.

To be noted here is the consistency of qualia’s occurrences. If certain neural processes create qualia, they always create their qualia whenever they function – it is not that sometimes they create their qualia but sometimes do not. This is conversely true for neural processes that do not create qualia – they never ever create qualia. So, qualia do not occur haphazardly – they either consistently occur or consistently do not occur in certain neural processes. For example, whenever we open our eyes to experience visual qualia of the outside world, if the visual perception neural processes and other parts of the visual system are intact, the visual qualia always occur and continue to exist as long as we open our eyes to see. We never experience episodes of perception with visual qualia alternating with episodes of perception without visual qualia when we open our eyes to see the world. Vice versa, we never sometimes experience the qualia of sodium blood levels, glucose blood levels, cortisol blood levels, or blood levels of other constituents and sometimes do not experience these qualia – we always never experience the qualia of these blood levels.

The consistency of qualia’s occurrences and existence also extends across time and across biological changes. For example, visual qualia have always occurred whenever we open our eyes to see the world since when we were babies up until now, even if our visual neural processes have been changing biologically throughout these times (and we now are quite different biological entities from what when we were babies). Memory lapses put aside, it never occurs to us that, at times, we did not have visual qualia when we opened our eyes, yet we were able to go about not hitting things in the way and were able to describe the appearances of things in front of us correctly (even if we did not have visual qualia of them!). If such episodes ever occurred, it meant that we sometimes had visual awareness without visual qualia occurring. But this never happened. And this is true for other sensory perceptions as well.

The consistency of qualia’s occurrences and existence extends across people and across places too. For example, people anywhere with normal visual systems always have visual qualia when they open their eyes to see the world. It is not that some people (with normal visual systems) have qualia but some do not. This is evident by the fact that when people (such as philosophers or neuroscientists with normal visual systems) talk about visual qualia there is no surprise or confusion in what the term “visual qualia” refers to. If some people never experience visual qualia, they will not have information of visual qualia in their minds and will not be able to know what the term “visual qualia” refers to. They (philosophers, neuroscientists, qualia-interested people, and others who do not have visual qualia) will certainly be surprised when they learn that other people have something they do not have. They will likely point out to others that they do not have these phenomena and will certainly not be able to engage in discussing this matter seriously as if they had these phenomena. Instead, they will query what we are talking about, what qualia are like, and why they do not have these qualia. (This is also conversely true for us. If some people say that they have qualia of the blood level of sodium or other blood constituents, we will be surprised and point out to them that we do not have such qualia, and we will not be able to engage in discussing these qualia with them as if we had these qualia. Instead, we will query them what their qualia are like.) Some of the people who do not have visual qualia will probably seek medical advice. But these never happen. Clinically, there are no medical records about such people, who have normal visual systems but do not have qualia.  So, it can be concluded that absence of visual qualia in people with normal visual systems never occurs and that visual qualia consistently occur in people with normal visual systems. This is also true for other kinds of qualia. (See more discussion about this matter in the section Lying Zombie, Chapter Zombie.)

Therefore, neural processes that produce qualia always produce qualia no matter when, where, or in whom they are. Qualia’s occurrences and existence are thus consistent. This indicates that qualia’s occurrences/non-occurrences and existence/non-existence are not arbitrary or haphazard but are strictly determined by some characteristics of their neural processes so that they must keep occurring and existing consistently in certain neural processes and not occurring and not existing consistently in certain neural processes.

QP2.4. Their places of occurrences are selectively and specifically limited to some specific neural processes.

Qualia have never been found to occur anywhere other than in the functioning brain. And in the functioning brain, they have so far been found selectively in some specific neural processes only – those involved in the final-stage sensory perceptions (such as the final visual perception neural processes and the final auditory perception neural processes) and those involved in highest-level cognitive and executive functions (such as the neural processes for emotion, thinking, making decisions, and commanding volitional movement), as noted in section 3.4. These neural processes are exclusively the neural processes in the latest evolved parts of the brain. This selectivity indicates that some specific characteristics of these neural processes must be the factors that enable them to produce qualia. And the fact that qualia occur selectively in the latest-evolved parts of the brain, not in the more primitive parts of the brain (such as the midbrain, medulla, and cerebellum), indicates that some kind of evolutionary processes is involved in this selectivity. Thus, it is probable that some characteristics of neural processes such as unique neural circuitry with unique signaling patterns have evolved for qualia to occur.

Moreover, the occurrences of qualia of each kind are specifically limited to neural processes of that specific kind only. For example, visual-kind qualia (color, brightness, shape, etc.) occur in only vision neural processes and never occur in auditory, emotion, thought, or other kinds of neural processes; vice versa, only visual-kind qualia, not any other kinds of qualia, occur in vision neural processes. This is true for all other kinds of qualia too. This specificity indicates that some specific characteristics of the neural processes must also be the factors that determine which kind of qualia (and in effect, which kinds of phenomenal characteristics) occur in which kind of neural processes

In conclusion, the selectivity and specificity in places of occurrences of qualia indicate that

– which neural process can produce qualia is determined by some specific characteristics of that neural process (the selectivity),

– which type of qualia (and in effects, which type of  phenomenal characteristics) occurs in a certain neural process is also determined by some specific characteristics of that neural process (the specificity), and

– these characteristics that determine qualia’s places of occurrences are the result of neural process’s evolution.

Thus, qualia’s places of occurrences are not haphazard but are strictly determined by some evolved characteristics of their neural processes.

QP2.5. Their capacities are limited and identical to those of their specific neural processes.

Qualia’s capacities, or ranges of information that the qualia can attain, are not unrestricted but limited and identical to those of their neural processes. For example, a visual quale’s visual field extent and color spectrum range are limited and identical to those of the visual perception neural processes [51,52,53], and an auditory quale’s sound frequency and amplitude ranges are limited and identical to those of the auditory perception neural processes [54-59]. If this is not the case, the excess capacity of the quale will be found to exist when its specific neural process stops functioning – which has never been found to occur. On the other hand, excess capacity of the neural process may exist that is not manifested in its quale. However, the portion of the neural process that creates this excess capacity can be considered not part of the specific neural process of that quale, and only the portion of the neural process that has the identical capacity to its quale will be considered the specific neural process of that quale.

QP2.6. Their details are determined by and are identical to their specific neural processes, with definiteness in form of occurrence.

Qualia’s details, or information that the qualia contain, are not random but determined solely by their specific neural processes and are identical to those contained in their neural processes. For example, a visual quale’s details (e.g., color, brightness, and movement information of each point in the visual field) or an auditory quale’s details (e.g., pitch, timbre, and loudness of the sound) are determined solely by the visual perception [51,52,53] or the auditory perception neural process [54-59], respectively, and these identical bits of information are contained in the respective neural process. If the quale’s details are not determined solely by its neural process and if the quale can have extra details that its neural process does not contain, when its neural process stops functioning, there should be these extra details left manifesting, which has never been found to be the case. On the contrary, it always happens that, whenever the information in the neural process changes or disappears, the information in the corresponding quale changes or disappears accordingly. For example, when there is a lesion in ventral or caudomedial occipitotemporal or ventromedial occipital cortex, which functions to create color information of the opposite visual field, visual qualia in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color-information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [60-63].

Like capacities of neural processes, extra details that are contained in the neural process but are not manifested in its qualia are possible. However, the portion of the neural process that contains these extra details can be considered not part of the specific neural process of that quale, and only the portion of the neural process that has identical details to its quale will be considered the specific neural process of that quale.

One important characteristic of qualia’s details is that each kind of qualia has a definite form of occurrence, across people. The form of qualia is the number and type of components and the spectral characteristics of that kind of qualia. For example, visual qualia always have six components**; their types are always color, brightness, shape, dimension, acuity, and velocity; and they always have definite spectral characteristics (see Figure 4.3), such as the definite wavelengths where they change their hues along the spectrum (for example, the light spectrum always changes their hues markedly at wavelengths around 410, 490, 570, and 620 nm) and the definite relation between colors at different wavelengths (such as colors at wavelengths 380 and 440 nm [60 nm apart] are markedly different in their hues but colors at wavelengths 660 and 720 nm [also 60 nm apart] are quite similar in their hues).

(** The number of components may vary according to the opinions of various authors. However, the exact number is not the point; the point is the definiteness of the number – it is the same across all people. For example, if the correct number is 5 or 7, it is 5 or 7 across all people.)

Figure 4.3 Visible Light Spectrum Characteristics

Another example is auditory qualia. They always have five components** of pitch, loudness, timbre, envelope, and duration – which are not equal to those of visual qualia. The sound spectrum of a musical scale always has musical notes perceived similarly (but in different pitch) every octave higher or lower (see Figure 4.4). For example, C4, C5, and C6 sound similar to human ears (but in different octaves). This does not happen with hues in a light spectrum.

Figure 4.4 A Musical Scale from C4 (261.63 Hz) to C6 (1046.5 Hz)

Also, the sound spectrum of a musical scale does not exhibit irregular changes in pitch or loudness along the scale as a light spectrum does in their hues and their brightness. Moreover, the combinations of different musical notes have characteristic results – they result in musical chords, which are distinct auditory phenomena from the musical notes; this is different from the combinations of different colors – they result in just new colors, which are not distinct visual phenomena from other colors.

Thus, although we cannot be sure whether other people experience the same color or sound qualia as we do or not, we can be certain that the number and type of components and the spectral characteristics of these qualia are the same across people because, if they were different, we would be able to observe that the we had different experiences of the qualia. But such different experiences among people have never been observed, so the form of qualia must be the same across people. The definiteness in form of qualia (definiteness in number and type of components and definiteness in spectral characteristics) indicate that qualia do not just occur randomly (or arbitrarily) in various forms by themselves, but some specific physical factors in the neural processes such as the anatomical arrangement of the neural circuits or the signaling pattern of the neural process, must be involved in determining the form of qualia.

QP2.7. Their changes are dependent on their specific neural processes.

When there are changes in neural processes, the corresponding qualia will change identically and simultaneously. For example, in physiologic conditions, visual qualia always change details identically and simultaneously with the visual perception neural processes when a person looks around; auditory qualia always change details identically and simultaneously with the auditory perception neural processes when a person listens to a speech or a song. In pathologic conditions: acute infarction of left occipital lobe, abruptly damaging visual neural processes of the right visual field, will immediately cause visual qualia to have defect in the right visual field, and a tumor of the left post-central gyrus, destroying neural processes for touch sensation slowly, will impair touch qualia on the right side of the body gradually.

QP2.8. Their interactions depend on and are via their specific neural processes.

Qualia cannot interact with other mental processes directly – they have to depend on and interact via their specific neural processes. For example, to consciously experience phenomenal characteristics of the red color quale, the consciousness neural process cannot experience the red color quale’s phenomenal characteristics directly – it has to experience them through the color perception neural process and the connection between both neural processes. This is evident by the fact that, if there is a lesion that destroys the color perception neural process and/or its connection with the consciousness neural process, the consciousness neural process will not be able to experience the red color quale’s phenomenal characteristics.

4.2. Theorem III

The consistency of qualia’s occurrences/non-occurrences and existence/non-existence, the selectivity and specificity of qualia’s places of occurrences, and the definiteness in form of occurrence discussed above are consistently true for billions of people living now and in the past. Thus, they indicate definitely that qualia are not arbitrary or haphazard phenomena but are consistent phenomena that are determined by some specific characteristics of neural processes, which are physical processes. Moreover, these properties and the rest indicate that qualia are totally dependent on neural processes in all physical aspects. Stating otherwise: physically, nothing about qualia exists that is not dependent on neural processes. Because their occurrences and existence are dependent on their specific neural processes and are consistent, their occurrences and existence are predictable. Because their places of occurrences are selectively and specifically limited to some specific neural processes, their places of occurrences are predictable. Because their capacities, details, forms, changes, and interactions are dependent on and determined by their specific neural processes, which are physical processes that can be predictable, their capacities, details, forms, changes, and interactions are predictable. Therefore, it can be concluded that qualia are physical phenomena – phenomena that are governed by physical laws and are physically predictable. This theory asserts this fact as a theorem:

Theorem III. Qualia are physical phenomena.

4.3. Predictions

  1. It will be found that qualia’s occurrences, places of occurrences, existences, capacities, details, forms, changes, and interactions are predictable with some physical laws.
  2. It will be found that qualia can be created, manipulated, measured qualitatively and quantitatively, monitored, or destroyed by performing the respective action to their neural processes.
  3. It will be found that, in any event or experiment, predictions that are valid for the neural processes of certain qualia, such as that the neural processes will start functioning, change, or stop functioning, will be valid for the qualia of those neural processes.

4.4. Remark

The Theorem will be invalidated if there is evidence that shows that one or more of qualia’s properties do not depend on neural processes.

< Back to The Current Chapter 4

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