Theorem II: A Mental Process is the Information Processing Part of Its Neural Process.
2.1. The signal-processing part
In Theorem I, it has been proven that a mental process is part of its neural process, which is the signal-processing part of the functioning neural circuit. But which part of the signal-processing part is a mental process? The signal-processing part itself is composed of two parts. The first one is the obvious, material part: the processing of physical signals, which are electrical and/or electrochemical signals. The other one is the inconspicuous, functional part: the processing of abstract signals, which is the information that is inherent in the physical signals. In reality, when signal processing is going on, not only the physical signals are being circulated and processed in the process but the inherent information is being circulated and processed concomitantly in the process also. Both parts of the signal processing – the electrical/electrochemical signal– processing part (EPP) and the information–processing part (IPP) – are inseparable; they are the complementary aspect of the other and cannot occur independently. As the EPP is material, it cannot be the mental process, which is non-material. On the contrary, because the IPP is non-material, it can be the mental process. Therefore, it is possible that the information processing part of the neural process is the mental process.
However, it is also possible that another unknown neural process’s part, U (see Figure 2.1 below), not the EPP or the IPP, is the mental process. If this novel entity U is the mental process, it must have all the physical properties that a mental process must have, which are as follows (see details in the previous chapter):
Physical properties of the mind and mental processes (MP)
MP1. Required physical properties.
MP1.1. Its nature is non-material.
MP1.2. Its activities are signal-processing.
MP2. Observed physical properties.
MP2.1. Its location is at its neural process.
MP2.2. Its occurrence is from and its existence is with its neural process.
MP2.3. Its information is part of its neural process’s information.
MP2.4. Its function is part of its neural process’s function.
MP2.5. Its changes are with its neural process.
MP2.6. Its processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.
MP2.7. Its activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.
Figure 2.1 Unknown Neural Process’s Part: U
But if this novel entity U is not the EPP or the IPP, several questions arise as follows:
- What is the nature (other than being non-material) of U?
- How can it occur? If it occurs from the neural process, how can the neural process, which does not have apparatuses to produce anything that can contain information, except patterns of signals, produce it?
- If it is neither the EPP nor the IPP, how can it have all the neural process’s information? What is the mechanism that the neural process transfers its information to U instantaneously and constantly?
- If it is neither the EPP nor the IPP, how can it function as part of and change with the neural process?
At present, there are no answers to the questions above. So, if this novel entity U is the mental process, several new hypotheses are needed to explain the important matter above. On the other hand, if the IPP is the mental process, no additional hypotheses are needed. The answers to the four questions above are obvious:
- Its nature is the information-processing process of the neural process.
- It occurs as part of the signal-processing process of the neural process, as discussed above in the first paragraph.
- It is the information-processing process of the neural process, so it naturally has the information of the neural process.
- It is the information-processing process of the neural process, so it naturally functions as part of and changes with the neural process.
Also, because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, it naturally has all the physical properties of mental processes, as listed above. This can be proved orderly as follows:
MP1. Required physical properties.
MP1.1. Its nature is non-material.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, its nature is non-material – as required.
MP1.2. Its activities are signal-processing.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its activities are signal-processing – as required.
MP2. Observed physical properties.
MP2.1. Its location is at a neural process.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its location is at its neural process – as required.
MP2.2. Its occurrence is from and its existence is with a neural process.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its occurrence is from and its existence is with its neural process – as required.
MP2.3. Its information is part of a neural process’s information.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its information is part of its neural process’s information – as required.
MP2.4. Its function is part of a neural process’s function.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its function is part of its neural process’s function – as required.
MP2.5. Its changes are with a neural process.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its changes are with its neural process – as required.
MP2.6. Its processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.
Because the IPP is the information-processing part of its neural process, naturally, its processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive – as required.
MP2.7. Its activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.
Because the IPP is the complementary aspect of the electrical/electrochemical signal- processing part (EPP), which is associated with electromagnetic activities, and because both parts always occur together, the IPP’s activities are associated with electromagnetic activities – as required.
Therefore, because the mental process and the IPP have identical physical properties, every physical phenomenon of the mental process can always be explained as a phenomenon of the IPP, and vice versa. Physically, then, the mental process and the IPP are identically the same entity.
For non-physical properties, if the IPP is the mental process, does it also have the non-physical properties that some philosophers think are the properties of the mind and mental processes, such as being private, subjective, intentional, representational, etc. [1-6]? The answer is yes. As the IPP and the mental process of the same neural process contain the same information and function identically, what can be proved to be the functional properties of the mental process can be proved to be the functional properties of the IPP too. For example, because the IPP (which is part of a neural process) occurs privately in an individual and because only that individual is the subject who experiences it, it is certainly private and subjective. Similarly, if it can be proved that a mental process is intentional or representational by some arguments, then the IPP, which has the identical information and function to the mental process, can also be proved to be intentional or representational by the same arguments. Therefore, from all aspects, both physical and non-physical, the mental process and the IPP are the identical entity.
2.2. Theorem II
Thus, there are two hypotheses – that the IPP is the mental process and that some novel, non-material, entity U is the mental process. However, the latter hypothesis has to devise a novel entity and needs several additional hypotheses to explain several matters as listed above. As, at present, there is no evidence that this hypothesized novel entity has some properties that the IPP does not have and that this hypothesized novel entity can explain anything more than the IPP can, it is unnecessary to invent this novel entity and rational to conclude that the IPP is the mental process. Therefore, this theory asserts this as Theorem II:
Theorem II. A mental process is the information processing part of its neural process.
Or, because information is equivalent to signaling-pattern (see D6, chapter Introduction and Definitions), this can be stated equivalently as
Theorem II. A mental process is the signaling-pattern processing part of a neural process.
Generally, then, mental processes are the information processing parts of their neural processes. And because the mind comprises of mental processes while the functioning brain comprises of neural processes, the mind is the information processing part of the functioning brain. That is, the non-material entity that exists in an animal with a nervous system and that can sense, process, and send signals is identically the information processing part of the functioning brain (Figure 2.2A). To explain the phenomena of the mind, therefore, a novel entity (Figure 2.2B) is not needed; only the correct point of view to see the unobvious part of the existing entity is. The universe of the mind is simply the information processing part of the whole universe.
Figure 2.2
2.3. Restrictions
That a mental process is the IPP means that a mental process as known to be present in a human and, probably, in an animal with a nervous system is the information processing part of a neural process. This does not exclude the possibility that other kinds of mental processes might exist that are the information processing parts of other processes. For example, it is possible that other kinds of mental processes exist that are the information processing part of electronic processes in computer integrated circuits. Also, it is possible that other kinds of mental processes might exist that are not the information processing part of anything at all. However, this is not within the scope of this theory, which deals with mental processes in only humans and animals with a nervous system.
2.4. Implications
Because the electrical/electrochemical signal-processing part of the neural process, or the EPP, is the physical counterpart of the IPP, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be surrogates for the physical characteristics of the IPP. And because the mental process and the IPP are the same entity, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be taken to be surrogates for the mental process, too. Thus, by this theory, it should be possible to study (measure, monitor, compare, etc.) mental processes physically (qualitatively and quantitatively) by studying the physical characteristics of the EPP, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process, the details of the signaling pattern, the electrical and magnetic parameters of the signaling process. For example:
– The EPP characteristics, such as the signaling pattern, can be used to identify exactly what the mental process is, such as what the exact visual image, thought, or emotion is occurring in the person’s mind.
– The EPP characteristics, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process or the electrical or magnetic parameters of the signaling process, can be used to objectively quantify and compare mental processes, such as to quantify how intense the pain feeling, anger emotion, or alertness that the person is experiencing is and to compare who is experiencing the pain or anger more.
Also, because the EPPs and the IPPs are inseparable, complementary to each other, and cannot occur independently of each other, anything that affects the EPPs will similarly affect the IPPs. Thus, they will always be created, changed, and destroyed similarly in all events and experiments. This can be the basis for experiments about the IPPs and mental processes by using the EPPs as surrogates.
2.5. Predictions
- A mental process will be able to be identified, quantified, and monitored by identifying, quantifying, and monitoring only its EPP, respectively.
- A mental process will be able to be created, modified, tested, and destroyed by creating, modifying, testing, and destroying only its EPP, respectively.
- In any event or experiment, predictions that are valid for the EPP, such as that the EPP will occur, change, or disappear, will be valid for the IPP and the mental process of that EPP.
2.6. Remarks
It is to be noted that the idea that mental processes are caused by specific brain activation pattern is not a novel one. For example, Moutoussis K [4] wrote that “… a specific brain–activation pattern, leading to the formation of a specific percept. The Causal Theory of Perception (see Grice, 1961; Lewis, 1980; Snowdon, 1981) is a philosophical standpoint in harmony with this view … specific, individual perceptual experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation pattern …”. Also, the idea that the mind and mental processes are just the signal-processing processes is not novel either. For example, Roederer JG [7] wrote that “when does a specific distribution of neural firings actually become a mental image? This neural activity distribution does not become anything—it is the image.” These ideas are evident even in sci-fi novels and movies. For example, the novel “The Lion of Comarre” [8] and the movie “The Matrix“ [9] certainly based their plots on these principles. However, this theory proves this concept methodologically, and it specifically proves that it is the neural process’s information-processing part that is identical to the mental process and states it explicitly as a theorem.
This Theorem will be invalidated if there is evidence showing that a mental process and the information processing part of the neural process do not have identical properties.
Looking ahead:
All the puzzles about the mind and mental processes are not yet completely solved. Theorem I and II are true for the mind and all mental processes. However, when the mind and mental processes function, sometimes there are mental phenomena called qualia and conscious experiences occurring. What are these additional phenomena? Are Theorem I and II applicable to these phenomena too or are they different entities that need additional theorems? These questions will be answered in the following chapters.
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What happens when we see, hear, and feel things around us, experience moods, undertake thoughts, and command our hands, lips, and body to move, if not information, information, and information are being processed.
We are just living on the information processing side of the universe.
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References
- De Sousa A. Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 1 (neurobiological and cognitive models). Mens Sana Monogr. 2013 Jan-Dec;11(1):100–150. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3653219/
- Fieser J. Chapter 3: Mind. Great Issues in Philosophy. Copyright 2008, updated 5/1/2016. https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/120/3-mind.htm
- Jacob P. Intentionality. Zalta EN, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition). Retrieved 2017 Apr 20 from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intentionality/
- Moutoussis K. The machine behind the stage: A neurobiological approach toward theoretical issues of sensory perception. Front Psychol. 2016;7:1357. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5020606/
- Pernu TK. The five marks of the mental. Front Psychol. 2017;8:1084. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5500963/
- O’Madagain C. Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2017 Apr 20 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/intentio/
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- Clarke AC. The lion of Comarre, and against the fall of night. New Ed. PAN; 1982. ISBN-13: 9780330266581 ISBN-10: 0330266586
- The Matrix. Wikipedia. 2018 Apr 17. Retrieved 2018 Apr 18 from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Matrix
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