The Original Version – Chapter 1

Theorem I: A Mental Process is Part of Its Neural Process

 

1.1. Properties of the mind and mental processes

The mind and mental processes have many properties, some are physical properties, which are properties that can be tested physically, and some are non-physical properties, which are properties that cannot be tested physically, such as being private, subjective, intentional, representational, etc. [1-6]. However, in order to determine what the mind and mental processes physically are, it is necessary to examine their physical properties, which are as follows:

Physical properties of the mind and mental processes (MP)

MP1. Required physical properties.

MP1.1. Their nature is non-material.

MP1.2. Their activities are signal-processing.

MP2. Observed physical properties.

MP2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

MP2.2. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their neural processes.

MP2.3. Their information is part of their neural processes’ information.

MP2.4. Their functions are part of their neural processes’ functions.

MP2.5. Their changes are with their neural processes.

MP2.6. Their processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

MP2.7. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

 

MP1. Required physical properties.

Required physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are required to possess by their definitions (D1, the previous chapter). They are as follows:

MP1.1. Their nature is non-material.

By definition, the mind is a non-material entity, and so are its mental processes, which are the mind’s parts that perform certain functions. This definition comes from the fact that they have never been found by any means to have mass, shape, and size and have never been found to be tangible, visible, audible, smellable, or testable.

MP1.2. Their activities are signal-processing.

Because the definition requires that the mind can sense (i.e., receive), process, and send signals, their activities must be signal-processing. In fact, if we examine all the activities of the mind, we will find that they are all signal-processing. The mind does nothing else.

MP2. Observed physical properties.

Observed physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are observed to possess. They are as follows:

MP2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

The mind and mental processes have definite locations in space. There has long been an unfounded belief among many people and even some philosophers that the mind and mental processes do not have definite locations in space [2]. However, this belief has never been scientifically proved. On the contrary, at present, there is a lot of evidence that the mind and mental processes have definite locations. They always occur in the functioning brain. Never have they been found elsewhere, such as in the heart, the abdomen, or the hand. This is evident from the fact that such a body part can be injured, removed, or replaced without any effects on the mind or mental processes. Also, they have never been found to occur or exist in a non-functioning or dead brain either. If one wants to find, examine, test, manipulate, or destroy them, then find, examine, test, manipulate, or destroy the functioning brain. Thus, for all physical intents and purposes, the mind and mental processes have definite locations in space:  in the functioning brain.

Where in the functioning brain do the mind and mental processes occur? They do not occur in the blood vessels, the meninges, or any other tissue of the brain other than the functioning neural circuits. This is evident from the facts that diseases that affect only brain tissue other than neural circuit tissue, such as atherosclerosis of the brain blood vessels, pure meningitis, or isolated meningeal carcinomatosis, do not have effects on the mind and mental processes. On the contrary, diseases, pharmacologic agents, electrical stimulations, or magnetic stimulations that affect only neural circuit tissue but do not affect other brain tissue have effects on the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes occur must be in the functioning neural circuits. Furthermore, advance in cognitive neuroscience at present has revealed that each specific mental process’s occurrence can be pinpointed to its specific neural circuit, such as mental processes for the visual identification of a face are found to occur at the occipital face area, the fusiform face area, and in the ventral anterior temporal lobe where various facial identification neural circuits are [7-10]. This is true in general. Therefore, mental processes’ locations are at their functioning neural circuits.

Where in the functioning neural circuits do the mind and mental processes reside? The functioning neural circuit is composed of the signal-processing part, the metabolism part, the blood circulation part, and the structural modification (of synapses, dendrites, etc.) part. Because the mind and mental processes must have signal-processing abilities (property MP1.2.), they cannot reside in the metabolism part, the blood circulation part, and the structural modification part because these parts cannot receive, process, and send signals (the structural modification part can just store signals, but cannot receive, process, or send signals by themselves) [11-19]. The only part that can process signals and that the mind and mental processes most likely reside in is the signal-processing part. This is proved by the fact that anything that affects the signal-processing part but does not affect the other parts, such as an electrical stimulation, magnetic stimulation, or a pharmacologic agent that affects only the signal-processing part, can affect mental processes and the mind. Therefore, the locations where mental processes exist are specifically the signal-processing part of their functioning neural circuits: the neural processes.

Definition: The outside world and the external world.

“The outside world” and “the external world” are the terms that will be used frequently in this theory. They are “outside” and “external” from the mind’s point of view and mean the world that includes everything except the mind and the place where it resides: the neural processes of the brain. Thus, the body and even the non-neural process part of the brain, such as the cerebral blood vessels and the meninges, are also included in the outside/external world.

MP2.2. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their neural processes.

From the discussion of their locations above, it is obvious that the occurrences of mental processes are from and the existence of mental processes is with their neural processes. That is, the occurrence of a specific mental process is from and the existence of that mental process is with its specific neural process only. For example, the visual perception mental process must occur from and exist with the visual perception neural process: when the visual perception neural process starts functioning and continues to exist (such as when visual stimuli arrive at the visual cortical areas, when the ischemic visual neural process recovers from ischemia after blood reperfusion occurs, or when the visual neural process is stimulated by a migraine aura [20-27], epileptic activity [28-34], electrical stimulation [35-37], or magnetic stimulation [38-47]), the visual perception occurs and continues to exist. Conversely, when its specific neural process stops functioning, the mental process ceases to exist. For example, when the visual neural process stops functioning (such as because there are no visual stimuli, because there is an abrupt cessation of blood supply in acute ischemic stroke, or because there is a sudden injury to the neural process), the visual perception ceases to exist too. The visual perception mental process has never been found to occur or exist by itself; its occurrence is from and its existence is with its neural process only. This is true for all other mental processes. As the mind is composed of mental processes, the mind’s occurrence is from and its existence is with the functioning brain (the composite of functioning neural processes) only. This has always observed to be true.

MP2.3. Their information is part of their neural processes’ information.

The mental process’s information, which manifests as the mental process’s details (such as the color, the brightness, and the movement of all the points in a mental visual image [48-50] or the pitch, timbre, and loudness of a sound [51-56]), is from its neural process and is therefore part of its neural process’s information. There can be no mental process information that is not from its neural process because the mental process does not have other sources of information. If this is not the case, there must be mental process information that is not from its neural process left manifesting after the neural process stops functioning. For example, there must be some part of the visual image left in the mind even after the occipital lobes have been destroyed. But these never happen. On the contrary, it always happens that whenever the information in the neural process changes or disappears, the information in the mental process changes or disappears accordingly. For example, when there is a lesion in the ventral or caudomedial occipitotemporal or ventromedial occipital cortex, which functions to create color information of the opposite visual field, the visual perception in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color-information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [57-60]. Therefore, mental processes’ information is part of their neural processes’ information.

MP2.4. Their functions are part of their neural processes’ functions.

The mind’s and mental processes’ functions in sensing something in the outside world, performing mental operations, and affecting the outside world cannot occur alone by themselves but require and occur from the functions of their neural processes. They are thus part of their neural processes’ functions, and their capabilities are limited by their neural processes’ capabilities.

  1. In sensing something in the external world, the mind and mental processes cannot sense anything in the outside world directly but require sensory neural processes (and the function of sensory receptors). For example, to see or hear anything in the external world needs the visual or auditory neural process (and the function of visual and auditory receptors) to function for them, respectively. If these neural processes do not function, the mind cannot see or hear anything.

Also, the mind and mental processes can sense only what all the brain’s neural processes can. In humans, the mind and mental processes can sense only visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, proprioception, vestibular, and some internal organ stimuli because the brain’s neural processes can sense only these stimuli. What the brain’s neural processes cannot sense, the mind and mental processes cannot sense either. For example, because the human brain’s neural processes cannot sense magnetic stimuli, which can create magnetoreception in birds, bats, bees, and sharks [61-63], and cannot sense electric stimuli in the way that electroreception is created, like that in an electric fish [64], the human’s mind and mental processes cannot sense these stimuli either. Also, the mind and mental processes cannot sense any specific sensation unlimitedly but can sense it only in some limited ranges (such as the limited frequency ranges of the visible spectrum and the audible spectrum and the limited spatial range of the visual field) and with some limited acuity (such as the limited acuity of vision, hearing, and touch feeling) that are identical to those of the neural processes. For example, the mind can see only in the visible spectrum, within the restricted visual field, and with limited acuity – all the identical limited capabilities of the neural processes.

2. Regarding mental operations, the mind and mental processes cannot function between themselves directly but require neural processes. For example, to consciously perceive the meaning of the visual word “home”, the visual mental process that perceives the meaning of this word cannot relay this perception to the consciousness mental process directly – this interaction has to occur via the visual perception neural process, its connection with the consciousness neural process, and the consciousness neural process. If there is damage to either of the neural processes or to the connection between them, the interaction between the two mental processes cannot occur and the conscious perception of the word “home” will not occur.

Also, the mind and mental processes can operate information only as the brain’s neural processes can. What the brain’s neural processes cannot do, the mind and mental processes cannot either. For example, the mind cannot solve complex mathematical equations instantly, even if it tries to, because there is no neural circuit and neural process capable of doing that; the mind cannot think as fast as it wishes, no matter how hard it tries, because it is limited by the rate of neural processing; and the mind cannot go to sleep instantly whenever it wishes, even if it tries to, because the neural processes that control sleep-wake cycle cannot do that [65-68]. In pathological conditions, when the capabilities of the brain and its neural processes are altered, the capabilities of the mind and its mental processes are affected likewise. For example, under stimulation from stimulants or depression from sedatives, the mind cannot maintain its normal operation, not stimulated or not depressed, even if it tries to, because neural processes’ functions are stimulated or depressed by those substances.

3. In the matter of affecting the outside world, the mind and mental processes cannot affect the outside world directly but require neural processes. For example, to affect anything in the external world with its hand needs volitional motor neural processes that control the muscles of the hand. If the volitional motor neural processes do not function, the mind cannot command the hand to do anything, even if it is its hand.

Also, the mind and mental processes can affect the world by only what the brain’s neural processes can do to affect the world, that is, by volitional motor movement (such as using hands, legs, and vocalizing organs), by non-volitional motor movement (such as smooth muscle contraction and various motor and autonomic reflexes), and by secretion of hormones or other substances (such as pheromones, sweat, and digestive enzymes). What the brain’s neural processes cannot do, the mind and mental processes cannot do either. For example, the mind cannot command the body or a physical object to levitate, teleport, or change physical form, even if it tries to, because there are no neural processes capable of doing that (no mystical mental power to do such deeds has ever been definitely proved to exist). Even its own body or itself, the mind can affect only as much as the brain’s neural processes can. What the brain’s neural processes cannot do, the mind cannot do either, even if it is its own body or itself. For example, the mind cannot, no matter how hard it tries, heal the body wound instantly, slow down or reverse aging processes in its body, or halt a dementing disease that is affecting itself because the brain’s neural processes cannot do that.

If some of the brain’s neural processes are impaired and lose some capabilities, the mental processes that depend on the impaired neural processes will be impaired and the mind will lose those capabilities too. For example, when the brain loses the capabilities to perceive vision, perform cognitive functions, or initiate volitional motor movement because the visual perception neural processes in the occipital lobe, the cognitive neural processes in the frontal lobe, or the motor neural processes in the precentral gyrus are impaired by stroke, trauma, tumor, etc., respectively; the mental processes of visual perception, cognition, and initiation of volitional movement will unavoidably be impaired, and the mind will inevitably lose capabilities to do these functions too. Thus, the mind’s and mental processes’ functions are just part of neural processes’ functions.

MP2.5. Their changes are with their neural processes.

When there are changes in neural processes, the corresponding mental processes will change with their neural processes simultaneously and accordingly (qualitatively and quantitatively). For example, in an acute case, mental processes change instantly with neural processes when a sudden head injury occurs, and the types (quality) and degree (quantity) of mental processes’ changes depend on the types and degree of neural processes’ injury. In a subacute case of a brain tumor destroying the frontal lobe, the person’s personality, intellect, and emotion change gradually and worsen proportionally to the degree and types of neural process destruction. In a chronic case of Alzheimer’s disease, the patient’s personality, intellect, memory, and language capability change little by little but relentlessly as more and more neural processes in various brain areas degenerate slowly but inexorably.

This is also true in experiments and psychoactive drugs administration: whenever neural processes (such as visual, auditory, or somatic perception neural processes) are changed by electrical [69-71] or magnetic stimulations [72-80], their mental processes (such as vision, auditory, or somatic perception) will change simultaneously; and whenever psychoactive drugs, such as sedatives, anxiolytics, or psychedelics [81-89], exert effects on neural processes, mental processes will change accordingly and simultaneously.

Thus, when there are changes in neural processes, the mind and mental processes cannot resist the corresponding changes even if they try not to. On the other hand, if neural processes do not change, the mind and mental processes cannot change even if they try to. For example, one cannot change behavior, understand difficult things, or attain a spectacular sports skill all of a sudden when one wishes because the involved neural processes cannot change so.

MP2.6. Their processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

Because the signals that the mind and mental processes operate on are signals that have information in the order of millions of bits, such as the information that is contained in a visual image [90], the mind and mental processes must have information-intensive processing capabilities of this order. And because the signals that the mind and mental processes operate on are signals that are always changing and changing fast, in the order of milliseconds, such as the visual [90] and audio signals of a movie, the mind and mental processes must have fast, dynamic processing capabilities of this order, also.

MP2.7. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Although the mind and mental processes are non-material entities, their activities are not physically traceless – they are associated with electromagnetic phenomena. And wherever there are the mind and mental processes, electromagnetic activities are always there. Their electrical activities can be recorded as EEG (electroencephalography) at the scalp, as ECoG (electrocorticography) at the cerebral cortex surface [91-95], or as single-unit recordings in the cortex (intracortical neural recording) [96-97]. Their magnetic activities can be recorded as MEG (magnetoencephalography) just outside the brain [98-99]. Not only can these electromagnetic activities signify the presence of the mind and mental processes, but they can also give information about the state or events of the mind and mental processes at that moment. For example, continuous isoelectric EEG (i.e., no EEG activity) signifies that there is no mind or mental processes occurring; generalized slow-wave EEG that is unresponsive to stimulation signifies that the mind and mental processes are being severely deranged [100-102]; spike discharges over the occipital area can signify that visual epileptic aura is occurring; generalized 3 Hz spike-and-wave discharges signify that the mind is in the state of absence seizure [103-105]; and various sleep EEG patterns signify that the mind is in certain stages of sleep [106,107]. As specific patterns of electromagnetic activities are always present when and where there are the mind and mental processes in specific states and change or vanish when and where the mind and mental processes change or cease to exist, the mind’s and mental processes’ activities are definitely associated with electromagnetic activities.

1.2. Theorem I.  

From the observed properties listed above, it is evident that, physically, a mental process is totally dependent on its neural processes. Stating otherwise: physically, nothing about a mental process exists that is not dependent on its neural process. And because a mental process occurs from its neural process, exists with its neural process at the same location, has its information and function as part of its neural process’s function, and changes and disappears with its neural process, it can be concluded that a mental process is part of its neural process, in the sense that it is created by, is at the same place as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with its neural process. This theory asserts this as Theorem I.

Theorem I. A mental process is part of its neural process.

Because this neural process must have the information of the mental process and because the information of a neural process is contained in its signaling pattern (see D6, the previous chapter), it can be concluded that this neural process has the signaling pattern that contains the information of the mental process. This can be stated concisely as this neural process signals the information of the mental process (see D7, the previous chapter). Theorem I can thus be stated in another form as

Theorem I. A mental process is part of the neural process that signals the mental process’s information.

For example, a mental process of a visual perception of a house is part of the neural process that signals the visual perception of the house – the mental process cannot occur without this specific neural process.

In general, because a mental process is part of its neural process, mental processes are parts of their neural processes and the mind, which is composed of mental processes, is part of the functioning brain, which is composed of neural processes. Therefore, the mind – the non-material entity that exist in an animal with a nervous system and that can sense, process, and send signals – is now proved to be part of the functioning brain in the sense that it is created by, is at the same place as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with the brain. In other words, the theorem proves that the mind does not exist and does not function independently of the brain.

1.3. Generalizations

The evidence that is used to establish this Theorem is mainly evidence from human studies. A lot of similar evidence can be found for various higher vertebrates such as chimpanzees, dogs, dolphins, birds [108-113]; thus, it is reasonable to extend this Theorem to include the minds and mental processes in these higher vertebrates. Regarding animals in protostomes, although their nervous systems are anatomically inverted from those of deuterostomes, both of them are basically and functionally similar in that their neurons and other neural tissue are similar and are highly genetically conserved [114-117], that they consist of networks of neurons connecting with each other via synapses, and that their neural processes use electrical and/or electrochemical signals to send information between their neurons. Moreover, several kinds of higher animals in protostomes demonstrate complex behaviors like higher animals in deuterostomes [109,110, 118-123]. Therefore, it is rational to assume that the minds and mental processes also exist in these protostomes too. Finally, as both the required physical properties and the observed physical properties in section 1.1 can also be demonstrated in these animals, it is logical to infer that their minds and mental processes are physically similar to ours and that their mental processes are parts of their neural processes and their minds are parts of their functioning brains, as well. Accordingly, this theorem is generalized to include all animals with a nervous system and, with the mind defined as in definition 1, chapter Introduction and Definitions, asserts that mental processes are part of their neural processes for all animals with nervous systems.

1.4. Restrictions

This Theorem does not exclude the possibility that other kinds of mind and mental processes that are part of other processes exist. For example, it is possible that mind and mental processes of another kind exist in the electronic processes of integrated circuits of computers/robots and are part of electronic processes. Also, it is possible that mind and mental processes of other kinds exist in a non-carbon-based nervous system (the Horta in Star Trek “The Devil in the Dark” [124]), in a positronic brain of an android (Isaac Asimov 1920–1992 [125]), in clouds of molecules (The Black Cloud (Fred Hoyle 1957) [126]), or in a large composite of scattered single-cell organisms (The Nemesis, Issac Asimov [127]) and that they are part of some processes that are neither neural processes nor electronic processes. However, it is beyond the scope of this Theory to discuss this matter in further details.

1.5. Predictions

  1. A mental process will never be found to occur alone without an associated neural process, and the mind will never be found to occur alone without the functioning brain.
  2. Whenever a mental process is identified, a neural process that the mental process is part of will be found. A neural process can be verified to be the one that the mental process is part of by experiments that manipulate the neural process. If the neural process is the one, there will be corresponding changes in the mental process when there are changes in the neural process.
  3. The neural process that is found for the mental process will signal the mental process’s information (i.e., have the signaling pattern that contains the mental process’s information). This can be verified when the knowledge of signaling patterns of neural processes is advanced enough to the stage that any signaling pattern can be identified what it is.
  4. As in the process of proving this theorem, it does not matter whether the neural process that a mental process is part of occurs naturally or artificially (e.g., by electrical or magnetic stimulation), the neural process that the mental process is part of can be naturally or artificially occurring.

1.6. Remarks

It is to be noted that the concept that the mind and mental processes are dependent on neural processes is not a novel one. This concept has long been present in philosophy [128-133] and in cognitive neuroscience and related fields [129] for a long time. At present, scientific evidence (from clinical, neurophysiologic, neuroimaging, and neuro-pharmacologic studies and studies in other related fields) indicating that mental processes are results of neural processes and that the mind is the result of these brain processes are overwhelming to the point that this is irrefutable. Although this is not stated in cognitive neuroscience and related fields overtly as a theorem, it has been the basis of studies and experiments related to the mind in these fields for a long time, as can be seen when one searches the literature. However, because this concept is most basic and very crucial to the understanding the nature of the mind and mental processes, it is proved explicitly and stated definitely as Theorem I of this Theory. And this theory proves not only that mental processes are dependent on neural processes but also that they are part of their neural processes, in the sense that is specifically stated above. However, it is to be cautioned that this theory asserts that mental processes are part of their neural processes but does not assert that mental processes are identical with their neural processes and that the mind is identical with the brain. This theory does not support the concept that the mind and the brain are identical (The Mind-Brain Identity Theory [128,131,132]). On the contrary, according to this theory, it is basically impossible for the mind to be identical with the brain and for mental processes to be identical with neural processes because, by this theory’s definition, the mind and mental processes are non-material while the functioning brain and neural processes have both material and non-material parts. The entity that is the mind and mental processes will be discussed and identified in the next chapter.

This Theorem will be invalidated if there is evidence showing that a mental process has one or more properties that render it impossible to be part of a neural process.

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