The 1st ed – Chapter 2

Theorem II:

The Mind is Identically the Information-processing Part of the Brain

 

2.1. The possibilities of the nature of a mental process

In Theorem I, it has been proven that a mental process is part of its neural process, which is a certain neural process that the mental process is totally dependent on, in the sense that the mental process is created by, is at the same places as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with this neural process. However, even if a mental process must be part of its neural process, it is possible that, functionally, it occurs as a separate, additional entity to its neural process but functions in unity with and as part of its neural process, like the soul (in many beliefs) that is envisioned to be a separate, additional entity to the brain but to function in unity with the brain. However, it is also possible that, functionally, a mental process occurs intrinsically in its neural process without any additional entity occurring, like the affirmative information that occurs intrinsically in the head-nodding process without any additional entity occurring.

Therefore, there are two possibilities of how, functionally, a mental process occurs in relation to its neural process:

Possibility 1. A mental process occurs separately from its neural process as an additional entity. Thus, its functions and effects are separate from those of its neural process but retain functional unity with its neural process.

Possibility 2. A mental process occurs intrinsically in its neural process with no additional entity occurring. Thus, its functions and effects are intrinsically part of its neural process’s functions and effects and are always in functional unity with its neural process.

Now, the mean to find out which possibility is correct is to examine the physical properties of the proposed mental process in each possibility. This is because anything that is a mental process must have all the physical properties of mental processes as discussed in the previous chapter, which are as follows:

Physical properties of a mental process (PM)

PM1. Required physical properties.

PM1.1. Its nature is non-material.

PM1.2. Its capabilities are signal-processing.

PM2. Observed physical properties.

PM2.1. Its location is at its neural process.

PM2.2. Its occurrence is from and its existence is with its neural process.

PM2.3. Its information is part of its neural process’s information.

PM2.4. Its function is part of its neural process’s function.

PM2.5. Its changes are with its neural process.

PM2.6. Its processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

PM2.7. Its activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Now, let’s examine the physical properties of the proposed mental processes in the two possibilities, one by one.

   Possibility 1: A mental process occurs separately from its neural process as an additional entity.

Suppose a novel entity M (Figure 2.1) is a mental process that functionally occurs separately from its neural process as an additional entity.

Figure 2.1 A functionally separate, additional novel entity M

PM1.1. The nature of this novel entity M must be non-material, but what is the exact nature of this non-material entity? Up to the present time, there is no answer to this question.

PM1.2. The capabilities of M must be signal-processing. But if M functionally occurs separately from its neural process, how can it perform signal-processing? How can its neural process send its electrical/electrochemical signals to M, instantaneously and continuously, so that it can perform the signal-processing? How can M send its processed signals back to its neural process? A neural process does not have organelles or apparatus to send signals to and receive signals from anything other than other neural processes.*

(* For a separate entity M to send its signals or information to a neural process, it must be able to affect millions of neurons in the neural process correctly and accurately, that is, it must be able to affect billions of neural membrane channels and synaptic channels at correct positions, at a precise time, and in a correct way so that appropriate depolarizations occur and result in appropriate signals circulating in the neural process in a precisely correct pattern. How can M know about these exact details, and how can M carry out such effects? See more discussion of this matter in Chapter 8.)

PM2.1. M’s position must be at its neural process. It is clear that M has this property.

PM2.2. M’s occurrence must be from and its existence must be with its neural process. But if M occurs from the neural process, how can the neural process produce it? A neural process does not have apparatuses to produce anything that can contain information, except electrical/ electrochemical signals. But if M does not occur from the neural process, then what creates it? And if there is something that creates M, questions will arise, such as what is the nature of that thing, how can it create M, and why does it create M only in association with the neural process process – why not independently of the neural process? Or if M occurs from nothing by itself, many questions will also arise, such as how can it do that, where can it do that, when can it do that, and what is the mechanism that ties its occurrences with only its neural processes?

PM2.3. M’s information (or details) must be part of its neural process’s information. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, how can it have information (or details) from its neural process? Like MP 1.2. above, how can its neural process send its information to M, instantaneously and continuously?

PM2.4. M’s function must be part of its neural process’s function. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its function cannot be part of its neural process’s function. Or, if its function somehow matches with its neural process’s function so perfectly that its function seems to be part of the neural process’s function, how can it do that or what is the mechanism that keeps its functions matching with its neural process’s functions all the time?

PM2.5. M’s changes must be with its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, it changes should be independent of its neural process.  Or, like PM2.4., if its changes somehow match with its neural process’s changes so perfectly that its changes seem to be part of the neural process’s changes, how can it do that or what is the mechanism that keeps its changes matching with its neural process’s changes all the time?

PM2.6. M’s processing abilities must be fast, dynamic, and information-intensive. M can be fast and dynamic by its nature, but how can it be information-intensive. To be information-intensive, it must receive information from something. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, as discussed in PM1.2. and PM2.3. above, how can it get information from its neural process? Or, if it does not get information from its neural process, how and where can it get information that is exactly like that of its neural process from anything else?

PM2.7. M’s activities must be associated with electromagnetic activities. There is no evidence that this cannot be true because M’s position is at its neural process (PM2.1.) and because its neural process is always associated with electromagnetic activities.

So, the possibility that M, a novel entity that functionally occurs separately from a neural process but is able to retain a functional unity with its neural process, is the mental process has several critical questions that, at present, have no answers.  Therefore, if this novel entity M is the mental process, several new hypotheses are needed to explain these important matters.

Now, let’s examine Possibility 2.

   Possibility 2. A mental process occurs intrinsically in its neural process with no additional entity occurring.

If a mental process occurs intrinsically in its neural process with no additional entity occurring, then it must be some intrinsic part of the neural process, which is the signal-processing part of a functioning neural circuit. But which intrinsic part of the signal-processing part is the mental process? The signal-processing part itself is composed of two intrinsic parts. The first one is the obvious, material part: the processing of physical signals, which are electrical/electrochemical signals. The other one is the inconspicuous, functional part: the processing of abstract signals, which is the information that is inherent in the physical signals. In reality, when the signal processing is going on, not only the physical signals are being circulated and processed in the process but the inherent information is being circulated and processed concomitantly in the process also. Both parts of the processing – the electrical/electrochemical signal– processing part (EPP)  and the information–processing part (IPP) – are inseparable; they are the complementary aspect of the other and cannot occur independently. As the EPP is material, it cannot be the mental process, which is non-material. On the contrary, because the IPP is non-material, it can be the non-material mental process. Therefore, it is possible that the information-processing part of the neural process is the mental process because it is non-material and it occurs intrinsically in its neural process (Figure 2.2).

 

Figure 2.2 An intrinsically occurring IPP

Now, let’s examine the physical properties of the IPP to see whether it has all the physical properties of a mental process.

PM1.1. The IPP’s nature must be non-material. This property is satisfied because the IPP is non-material, as discussed in the paragraph above.

PM1.2. The IPP’s functions must be signal-processing. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the signal-processing process, as discussed in the paragraph above.

PM2.1. The IPP’s location must be at its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the signal-processing process, which is the neural process, so its location must be at its neural process.

PM2.2. The IPP’s occurrence must be from and its existence must be with its neural process. These properties are satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the neural process, so its occurrence must be from and its existence must be with its neural process.

PM2.3. The IPP’s information must be part of its neural process’s information. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the neural process, so its information must be part of its neural process’s information.

PM2.4. The IPP’s function must be part of its neural process’s function. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the neural process, so its function must be part of its neural process’s function.

PM2.5. The IPP’s changes must be with its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP functions is an intrinsic part of its neural process, so its changes must be with its neural process.

PM2.6. The IPP’s processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the information-processing part of the neural process, which, by its nature, has fast, dynamic, and information-intensive abilities.

PM2.7. The IPP’s activities are associated with electromagnetic activities. This property is satisfied because the IPP is an intrinsic part of the neural process and because a neural process is always associated with electromagnetic activities.

Evidently, the IPP completely has the physical properties of a mental process. Conversely, if we examine the physical properties of the IPP, we will find that there are no identifiable physical properties that the IPP has but the mental process does not. Therefore, the IPP and the mental process have identical physical properties, and, physically, the IPP and the mental process are the identical entity.

For functional properties, if the IPP is the mental process, does it also have the functional properties that some philosophers think are the properties of the mind and mental processes, such as being private, subjective, intentional, representational, etc.  [1-6]? The answer is yes. As the IPP and the mental process of the same neural process have the same information and function identically, what can be proved to be the functional properties of the mental process can be proved to be the functional properties of the IPP too. For example, because the IPP (which is part of a neural process) occurs privately in an individual and because only that individual is the subject who experiences it, it is certainly private and subjective. Similarly, if it can be proved that a mental process is intentional or representational by some arguments, then the IPP, which has the identical information and function to the mental process, can also be proved to be intentional or representational by the same arguments. Therefore, in all aspects, both physical and functional, the mental process and the IPP are the identical entity.

2.2. Theorem II

Thus, there are two possibilities – that some novel, non-material entity M that occurs separately and additionally to its neural process is the mental process and that the IPP which occurs intrinsically in its neural process is the mental process. However, the former hypothesis has to devise a novel entity and needs several additional hypotheses to explain how it can have properties of a mental process, which it must have, as discussed above. As, at present, there is no evidence that a mental process has some properties that this hypothesized novel entity has but that the IPP does not have and that this hypothesized novel entity can explain anything more than the IPP can, it is unnecessary to invent this novel entity and rational to conclude that the IPP is the mental process. Moreover, as proved in the previous paragraph, the IPP and the mental process have identical properties and they are an identical entity. Therefore, this theory asserts this as Theorem II:

Theorem II. A mental process is identically the information-processing part of its neural process.

Generally, mental processes are identically the information-processing parts of their neural processes. Because the mind consists of all mental processes while the functioning brain consists of all neural processes, the mind is identically the information-processing part of the functioning brain. However, because information processing always occurs in a functioning brain, not in a non-functioning or dead brain, the term “functioning brain” can be stated simply as “brain”, without causing misconception. Theorem II regarding the mind can thus be stated as:

Theorem II. The mind is identically the information-processing part of the brain.

Figure 2.3 The mind

That is, the non-material entity that exists in an animal with a nervous system and that can sense, operate, and send signals is identically the information-processing part of the brain (Figure 2.3A). It is important to note is that the information-processing part is the functional part, not the conventional physical parts (such as the neural structure, the electrical/electrochemical activities, the metabolism, and the circulation) of the brain. To explain the phenomena of the mind, therefore, a novel entity (Figure 2.3B) is not needed; only the correct point of view to see the unobvious part of the obvious entity – the information-processing part of the brain – is.

2.3. Physicalism and dualism

Because the mind is part of the functioning brain in the sense that it is created by, is at the same place as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with the functioning brain (Theorem I), the mind is part of a physical entity. Moreover, because the mind is the information-processing part of the brain (Theorem II), if we consider information and information-processing entity to be physical entities, then the mind is a physical entity. Therefore, in these senses, this theory supports physicalism [7-13], i.e., that everything is physical. However, because the mind is an information-processing entity, it is an informational entity, not a conventional physical entity like mass, energy, or force. It is basically different from the conventional physical entities and can be considered to belong in a basically different category from that of the conventional physical entities. That is why the mind is so different from the conventional physical entities and the universe of the mind is simply the informational part of the whole universe. Thus, this theory supports dualism [7,12,14,15] in the sense that there are not one but two basically different classes of entities in this universe but not in the sense that there are two classes of entities that function independently of each other. Entities in the informational class function with their counterparts in the conventional physical part as one and are not epiphenomena of entities in the latter class because they are inseparable parts of their counterparts in the latter class. Thus, mental processes are not epiphenomena of their neural processes, and the mind is not an epiphenomenon of the functioning brain. Unlike epiphenomena, such as sound or heat from a working engine, which can be ridden of in some ways without affecting the essential function of the engine (such as let the engine work in a vacuum to get rid of the sound or use an effective heat sink to get rid of the heat),  mental processes cannot be ridden of from their neural processes, and the mind cannot be ridden of from the functioning brain at all. This is because information is inherent in physical signals and cannot be separated from them, so mental processes and the mind are inherent in neural processes and the functioning brain, respectively, and cannot be separated from them. There cannot be neural processes without mental processes, and there cannot be the functioning brain without the mind. Also, it is not that neural processes and the functioning brain cause mental processes and the mind to function according to them – they both function together as one. Neural processes and the functioning brain are just the physical signal side while mental processes and the mind are just the information side of the signaling process. It is the nature of this universe that there exist these two sides in the signaling process.

2.4. Implications

Because the electrical/electrochemical signal-processing part of the neural process, or the EPP, is the physical counterpart of the IPP, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be surrogates for the physical characteristics of the IPP. And because the mental process and the IPP are the same entity, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be taken to be surrogates for the mental process, too. Thus, by this theory, it is basically possible to study (measure, monitor, compare, etc.) mental processes physically (qualitatively and quantitatively) by studying the physical characteristics of the EPP, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process, the details of the signaling pattern, the electrical and magnetic parameters of the signaling process. For example:

– The EPP characteristics, such as the signaling pattern, can be used to identify exactly what the mental process is, such as what the exact visual image, thought, or emotion is occurring in the person’s mind.

– The EPP characteristics, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process or the electrical or magnetic parameters of the signaling process, can be used to objectively quantify and compare mental processes, such as to quantify how intense the pain feeling, anger emotion, or alertness that the person is experiencing is and to compare who is experiencing the pain or anger more.

Also, because the EPPs and the IPPs are inseparable, complementary to each other, and cannot occur independently of each other, anything that affects the EPPs will similarly affect the IPPs. Thus, they will always be created, changed, and destroyed similarly in all events and experiments. This can be the basis for experiments about the IPPs and mental processes by using the EPPs as surrogates.

2.5. Predictions

1. A mental process can be identified, quantified, or monitored by identifying, quantifying, or monitoring only its EPP, respectively. These actions on the EPP are both necessary and sufficient for the respective actions on the mental process to occur, and these actions on anything else without having the actions on the EPP will not result in the actions on the mental process.
2. A mental process can be created, modified, tested, or destroyed by creating, modifying, testing, or destroying only its EPP, respectively. These actions on the EPP are both necessary and sufficient for the respective actions on the mental process to occur, and these actions on anything else without having the actions on the EPP will not result in the actions on the mental process. Experimentally, isolated actions on the EPP, without having actions on anything else, can be done by electrical stimulations, magnetic stimulations, and pharmacologic agents that have effects on only signal transmissions of neural process.
3. In any event or experiment, all predictions that are true for the EPP, such as that the EPP will occur, change, or disappear, will be simultaneously true for the IPP and the mental process of that EPP, and the changes that occur in the EPP and that occur in the IPP and the mental process of that EPP will be identical in quality, quantity, and temporal pattern. For example, if the EPP changes its function abruptly from processing visual signals of the static, faint, homogenous red color to processing visual signals of the dynamic, vivid, complex movie, the changes in the IPP and the mental process of that EPP will be simultaneous and identical in quality, quantity, and temporal pattern (i.e., identical changes from homogeneous to complex [quality], from faint to vivid [quantity], and abruptly from static to dynamic [temporal pattern]).

2.6. Remarks

It is to be noted that the idea that mental processes are caused by specific brain activation pattern is not a novel one. For example, Moutoussis K [4] wrote that “… a specific brain–activation pattern, leading to the formation of a specific percept. The Causal Theory of Perception (see Grice, 1961; Lewis, 1980; Snowdon, 1981) is a philosophical standpoint in harmony with this view …  specific, individual perceptual experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation pattern …”. Also, the idea that the mind and mental processes are just the signal-processing processes is not novel either. For example, Roederer JG [16] stated that “when does a specific distribution of neural firings actually become a mental image? This neural activity distribution does not become anything—it is the image.”. These ideas are also evident even in sci-fi novels and movies. The movie “The Matrix”, for example, certainly based their plots on these principles. However, this theory proves this concept methodologically, and it specifically proves that it is the neural process’s information-processing part that is identical to the mental process and states it explicitly as a theorem.

Looking ahead:

All the puzzles about the mind and mental processes are not yet completely solved. Theorem I and II are true for the mind and all mental processes. However, when the mind and mental processes function, sometimes there are mental phenomena called qualia and consciousness (conscious awareness and conscious experiences) occurring. What are these additional phenomena? Are Theorem I and II applicable to these phenomena as well, or are they different entities that need additional theorems? These questions will be answered in the following chapters.

——————————————

What happens when we see, hear, and feel things around us, experience moods, think of various things, and command our hands, lips, and body to move, if not information, information, and information are being processed.

We are just information-processing entities living on the informational side of the universe.

——————————————

< Back to Chapter 2 (current edition)

---

References

1. De Sousa A. Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: Part 1 (neurobiological and cognitive models). Mens Sana Monogr. 2013 Jan-Dec;11(1):100–150. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3653219/
2. Fieser J. Chapter 3: Mind. Great Issues in Philosophy. Copyright 2008, updated 5/1/2016. https://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/class/120/3-mind.htm
3. Jacob P. Intentionality. Zalta EN, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition). Retrieved 2017 Apr 20 from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/intentionality/
4. Moutoussis K. The machine behind the stage: A neurobiological approach toward theoretical issues of sensory perception. Front Psychol. 2016;7:1357. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5020606/
5. Pernu TK. The five marks of the mental. Front Psychol. 2017;8:1084. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5500963/
6. O’Madagain C. Intentionality. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 2017 Apr 20 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/intentio/
7. Calef S. Dualism and mind. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://www.iep.utm.edu/dualism/
8. Chambliss B. The mind-body problem. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Cogn Sci. 2018 Jul;9(4):e1463. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1463. Epub 2018 May 4. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29727520
9. Giannetti E. The possibility of physicalism. Dement Neuropsychol. 2011 Oct-Dec;5(4):242–250. doi: 10.1590/S1980-57642011DN05040002. PMCID: PMC5619037. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5619037/
10. Gillett C, Loewer B, editors. Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 2001. Cambridge, United Kingdom. ISBN 0521801573 hardback. https://www.physicalism.com/physicalism-discontents.pdf
11. Stoljar D. Physicalism. Edward N. Zalta, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/physicalism
12. Wikipedia. Mind–body dualism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_dualism
13. Wikipedia. Physicalism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism
14. Robinson H. Dualism. Edward N. Zalta, editor. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/
15. Zimmerman D. Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2^nd edition. 2005. p113-122. http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/zimmerman/Dualism.in.Mind.pdf
16. Roederer JG. Pragmatic information in biology and physics. Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci. 2016 Mar 13;374(2063). PII: 20150152. http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/374/2063/20150152.long

 

< Back to Chapter 2 (current edition)