The 1st ed – Chapter 1

Theorem I: The Mind is Part of the Functioning Brain

1.1. Properties of the mind and mental processes

The mind and mental processes have many properties, some are physical properties, which are properties that can be tested physically, and some are functional properties, which are properties that are related to their functions, such as being private, subjective, intentional, representational, etc.  [1-6]. However, in order to determine the physical nature of the mind and mental processes, it is necessary to examine their physical properties, which are as follows:

Physical properties of the mind and mental processes (PM)

PM1. Required physical properties.

PM1.1. Their nature is non-material.

PM1.2. Their capabilities are signal-processing.

PM2. Observed physical properties.

PM2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

PM2.2. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their neural processes.

PM2.3. Their information is part of their neural processes’ information.

PM2.4. Their functions are part of their neural processes’ functions.

PM2.5. Their changes are with their neural processes.

PM2.6. Their processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

PM2.7. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

 

PM1. Required physical properties.

Required physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are required to possess by their definitions (D1, the previous chapter). They are as follows:

   PM1.1. Their nature is non-material.

By definition, the mind is a non-material entity, and so are its mental processes, which are the mind’s parts that perform certain functions. This definition comes from the fact that they have never been found by any means to have mass, shape, and size and have never been found to be tangible, visible, audible, smellable, or testable.

   PM1.2. Their capabilities are signal-processing.

Because the definition requires that the mind can sense (i.e., receive), operate, and send signals, the mind’s and mental processes’ capabilities must be signal-processing.

PM2. Observed physical properties.

Observed physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are observed to possess. They are as follows:

   PM2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

The mind and mental processes have definite locations in space. There has long been an unfounded belief among many people and even some philosophers that the mind and mental processes do not have definite locations in space [2]. However, this belief has never been scientifically proved. On the contrary, at present, there is a lot of evidence that the mind and mental processes have definite locations. They always occur in the functioning brain. Never have they been found elsewhere, such as in the heart, the abdomen, or the hand. This is evident from the fact that such a body part can be injured, removed, or replaced without any effects on the mind or mental processes. Also, they have never been found to occur or exist in a non-functioning or dead brain either. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy them, then find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the functioning brain, respectively. These actions on the functioning brain are both necessary and sufficient for the respective actions on the mind and mental processes to occur. Thus, for all physical intents and purposes, the mind and mental processes have definite locations in space:  in the functioning brain.

Where in the functioning brain do the mind and mental processes occur? They do not occur in the blood vessels, the meninges, or any other tissue of the brain other than the functioning neural circuits. This is evident from the facts that diseases that affect only brain tissue other than neural circuit tissue, such as atherosclerosis of the brain blood vessels, pure meningitis, or intracerebral calcification, do not have effects on the mind and mental processes. Also, injuries or electrical stimulations to these structures without affecting neural circuit tissue do not have effects on the mind and mental processes. On the contrary, diseases, pharmacologic agents, electrical stimulations, or magnetic stimulations that affect only neural circuit tissue but do not affect other brain tissue have effects on the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes occur must be in the functioning neural circuits. Furthermore, advance in cognitive neuroscience at present has revealed that each specific mental process’s occurrence can be pinpointed to its specific neural circuit, such as mental processes for the visual identification of a face are found to occur at the occipital face area, the fusiform face area, and in the ventral anterior temporal lobe where various facial identification neural circuits are [7-10]. This is true in general. Therefore, mental processes’ locations are at their functioning neural circuits.

Where in the functioning neural circuits do the mind and mental processes reside? The functioning neural circuit is composed of the signal-processing part, the metabolism part, the blood circulation part, and the structural modification (of synapses, dendrites, or other neuronal parts) part. Because the mind and mental processes must perform signal-processing functions (property PM1.2.), it is unlikely that they reside in the metabolism part, the blood circulation part, and the structural modification part because these parts cannot receive, operate, and send signals (the structural modification part can just store signals or alter signal transmissions but cannot receive, operate, or send signals by themselves). The only part that can process signals and that the mind and mental processes most likely reside in is the signal-processing part. This is proved by the fact that anything that affects the signal-processing part but does not affect the other parts, such as an electrical stimulation, magnetic stimulation, or a pharmacologic agent that affects only the signal-processing part, can affect mental processes and the mind. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes exist are specifically the signal-processing parts of their functioning neural circuits: the neural processes. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the mind or mental processes, then find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy their neural processes, respectively. These actions on the neural processes are both necessary and sufficient for the respective actions on the mind and mental processes to occur. Thus, for all physical intents and purposes, the definite locations where the mind and mental processes exist are the neural processes.

Definition: The outside world and the external world.

“The outside world” and “the external world” are the terms that will be used frequently in this theory. They are “outside” and “external” from the mind’s point of view and mean the world that includes everything except the mind and the place where it resides: the neural processes of the brain. Thus, the body and even the non-neural process part of the brain, such as the cerebral blood vessels and the meninges, are also included in the outside/external world.

   PM2.2. Their occurrences are from and their existence is with their neural processes.

It has never been found that mental processes occur alone by themselves or from anything else other than their neural processes or that mental processes exist alone by themselves or with anything else other than their neural processes. For example, the visual perception mental process must occur from and exist with the visual perception neural process: when the visual perception neural process starts functioning and continues to exist (such as when visual stimuli arrive at the visual cortical areas, when the ischemic visual neural process recovers from ischemia after blood reperfusion occurs, or when the visual neural process is stimulated by a migraine aura, epileptic activity, electrical stimulation, or magnetic stimulation), the visual perception occurs and continues to exist. Conversely, when its specific neural process stops functioning, the mental process ceases to exist. For example, when the visual neural process stops functioning (such as because there are no visual stimuli, because there is an abrupt cessation of blood supply in acute ischemic stroke, or because there is a sudden injury to the neural process), the visual perception ceases to exist too. The visual perception mental process has never been found to occur or exist alone by itself or to occur from or exist with anything else other than its neural process. This is true for all other mental processes. As the mind is composed of mental processes, the mind’s occurrence is from and its existence is with the functioning brain (the composite of functioning neural processes) only. This has always been observed to be true.

   PM2.3. Their information is part of their neural processes’ information.

The mental process’s information, which manifests as the mental process’s details (such as the color, the brightness, and the movement of all the points in a mental image or the pitch, timbre, and loudness of a perceived sound), is from its neural process and is therefore part of its neural process’s information. There can be no mental process’s information that is not from its neural process because the mental process does not have other sources of information. If this is not the case, then there must be the mental process’s information that is not from its neural process manifesting (such as there must be some extra image in the visual perception even if the object of that image is not seen by the subject) or there must be some of the mental process’s information left manifesting after the neural process stops functioning (such as there must be some part of the mental image left occurring in the mind even after the eyes have been closed or even after the occipital lobes have been destroyed). But these never happen. On the contrary, it always happens that whenever the information in the neural process changes or disappears, the information in the mental process changes or disappears accordingly. For example, when there is a lesion in the ventral or caudomedial occipitotemporal or ventromedial occipital cortex, which functions to create color information of the opposite visual field, the mental visual perception in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [11-14]. Therefore, mental processes’ information is part of their neural processes’ information.

   PM2.4. Their functions are part of their neural processes’ functions.

The mind’s and mental processes’ functions in sensing something in the outside world, performing mental operations, and affecting the outside world cannot occur alone by themselves but require and occur from the functions of their neural processes. They are thus part of their neural processes’ functions, and their capabilities are limited by their neural processes’ capabilities.

  1. In sensing something in the external world, the mind and mental processes cannot sense anything in the outside world directly but require sensory neural processes (and the function of sensory receptors). For example, to see or hear anything in the external world needs the visual or auditory neural process (and the function of visual and auditory receptors), respectively. If these neural processes do not function, the mind cannot see or hear anything.

Also, the mind and mental processes can sense only what all the neural processes can. In humans, the mind and mental processes can sense only visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, proprioception, vestibular, and some internal organ stimuli because the human neural processes can sense only these stimuli. What the neural processes cannot sense, the mind and mental processes cannot sense either, even if the mind wants to. For example, because the human neural processes cannot sense magnetic stimuli, which can create magnetoreception in birds, bats, bees, and sharks [15-17], and cannot sense electric stimuli in the way that electroreception is created, like that in an electric fish [18], the human’s mind and mental processes cannot sense these stimuli either.

Also, the mind and mental processes cannot sense any specific sensation unlimitedly but can sense it only in some limited ranges (such as the limited frequency ranges of the visible spectrum and the audible spectrum and the limited spatial range of the visual field) and with some limited acuity (such as the limited acuity of vision, hearing, and touch feeling) that are identical to those of the neural processes. For example, the mind can see only in the visible spectrum, within the restricted visual field, and with limited acuity – all the identical limited capabilities of the neural processes – that is why the mind cannot see things in infrared or ultraviolet, cannot see what is behind the back of its head, and cannot see things in as much fine details (such as in micromillimeter details) as it wishes.

2. Regarding mental operations, the mind and mental processes cannot function between themselves directly but require neural processes. For example, to consciously perceive the meaning of the visual word “home”, the visual mental process that perceives the meaning of this word cannot relay this perception to the consciousness mental process directly – this interaction has to occur via the visual perception neural process, its connection with the consciousness neural process, and the consciousness neural process. If there is damage to either of the neural processes or to the connection between them, the interaction between the two mental processes cannot occur, and the conscious perception of the word “home” will not occur.

Also, the mind and mental processes can operate information only as the neural processes can. What the neural processes cannot do, the mind and mental processes cannot either. For example, the mind cannot solve complex mathematical equations instantly, even if it tries to, because there are no neural circuits and neural processes capable of doing that; the mind cannot think as fast as it wishes, no matter how hard it tries, because it is limited by the rate of neural processing; and the mind cannot go to sleep instantly whenever it wishes, even if it tries to, because the neural processes that control sleep-wake cycle cannot do that. In pathological conditions, when the operations of the neural processes are altered, the operations of the mind and its mental processes are affected likewise. For example, under stimulation from stimulants or depression from sedatives, the mind cannot maintain its normal operation, not stimulated or not depressed, even if it tries to, because the neural processes’ functions are stimulated or depressed by those substances.

3. In the matter of affecting the outside world, the mind and mental processes cannot affect the outside world directly but require neural processes. For example, to affect anything in the external world with its hand needs volitional motor neural processes that control the muscles of the hand. If the volitional motor neural processes do not function, the mind cannot command the hand to do anything, even if it is its hand.

Also, the mind and mental processes can affect the world by only what the neural processes can do to affect the world, that is, by volitional motor movement (such as using hands, legs, and vocalizing organs), by non-volitional motor movement (such as smooth muscle contraction and various motor and autonomic reflexes), and by secretion of hormones or other substances (such as pheromones, sweat, and digestive enzymes). What the neural processes cannot do, the mind and mental processes cannot do either. For example, the mind cannot command the body or a physical object to levitate, teleport, or change physical form, even if it tries to, because there are no neural processes capable of doing that (and no mystical mental power capable of doing such deeds has ever been definitely proved to exist). Even its own body or itself, the mind can affect only as much as the neural processes can. What the neural processes cannot do, the mind cannot do either, even if it is its own body or itself. For example, the mind cannot, no matter how hard it tries, heal the body wound instantly, slow down or reverse aging processes in its body, or halt a dementing disease that is affecting itself because the neural processes cannot do that.

If some of the neural processes are impaired and lose some capabilities, the mental processes that depend on the impaired neural processes will be impaired, and the mind will lose those capabilities too. For example, when the brain loses the capabilities to perceive vision, perform cognitive functions, or initiate volitional motor movement because the visual perception neural processes in the occipital lobe, the cognitive neural processes in the frontal lobe, or the motor neural processes in the precentral gyrus are impaired by stroke, trauma, tumor, etc., respectively; the mental processes of visual perception, cognition, and initiation of volitional movement will unavoidably be impaired, and the mind will inevitably lose capabilities to do these functions too. Thus, the mind’s and mental processes’ functions are just part of the neural processes’ functions.

   PM2.5. Their changes are with their neural processes.

When there are changes in neural processes, the corresponding mental processes will change with their neural processes simultaneously and accordingly (qualitatively and quantitatively). For example, in an acute case, mental processes change instantly with neural processes when a sudden head injury occurs, and the types (quality) and degree (quantity) of mental processes’ changes depend on the types and degree of neural processes’ injury. In a subacute case of a brain tumor destroying the frontal lobe, the person’s personality, intellect, and emotion change gradually and worsen proportionally to the degree and types of neural process destruction. In a chronic case of Alzheimer’s disease, the patient’s personality, intellect, memory, and language capability change little by little but relentlessly as more and more neural processes in the corresponding brain areas degenerate slowly but inexorably.

This is also true in experiments and psychoactive drugs administration: whenever neural processes (such as visual, auditory, or somatic perception neural processes) are changed by electrical or magnetic stimulations, their mental processes (such as vision, auditory, or somatic perception) will change simultaneously; and whenever psychoactive drugs, such as sedatives, anxiolytics, or psychedelics, exert effects on neural processes, mental processes will change accordingly and simultaneously.

Thus, when there are changes in neural processes, the mind and mental processes cannot resist the corresponding changes even if they try not to change. On the other hand, if neural processes do not change, the mind and mental processes cannot change even if they try to. For example, the mind cannot change its behavior, understand difficult things, or attain a spectacular sports skill all of a sudden whenever it wishes because the involved neural processes cannot change so.

   PM2.6. Their processing abilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

Because the signals that the mind and mental processes operate on are signals that have information in the order of millions of bits, such as the information that is contained in a visual image [19], the mind’s and mental processes’ processing capabilities must be information-intensive of this order. And because the signals that the mind and mental processes operate on are signals that are always changing and changing fast, in the order of milliseconds, such as the visual [19] and audio signals of a movie, the mind and mental processes must have fast, dynamic processing capabilities of this order, also.

   PM2.7. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Although the mind and mental processes are non-material entities, their activities are not physically traceless – they are associated with electromagnetic phenomena. Whenever there are the mind and mental processes, electromagnetic activities are always there. Their electrical activities can be recorded as EEG (electroencephalography) at the scalp, as ECoG (electrocorticography) at the cerebral cortex surface, or as single-unit recordings in the cortex (intracortical neural recording). Their magnetic activities can be recorded as MEG (magnetoencephalography) just outside the brain. Not only can these electromagnetic activities signify the presence of the mind and mental processes, but they can also give information about the state or event of the mind and mental processes at that moment. For example, continuous isoelectric EEG (i.e., no EEG activity) signifies that there is no mind or mental processes occurring; generalized slow-wave EEG that is unresponsive to stimulation signifies that the mind and mental processes are being severely deranged; spike discharges over the occipital area signify that visual epileptic aura is occurring; generalized 3 Hz spike-and-wave discharges signify that the mind is in the state of absence seizure; and various sleep EEG patterns signify that the mind is in certain stages of sleep. As specific patterns of electromagnetic activities are always present when and where there are the mind and mental processes in specific states and change or vanish when and where the mind and mental processes change or cease to exist, the mind’s and mental processes’ activities are definitely associated with electromagnetic activities.

1.2. Theorem I

From the observed properties listed above, it is evident that, physically, a mental process is totally dependent on a certain neural process (its neural process). Stating otherwise: physically, nothing about a mental process exists that is not dependent on this particular neural process. And because a mental process occurs from this neural process, exists with this neural process at the same location, has information as part of this neural process’s information, functions as part of this neural process’s functions, and changes and disappears with this neural process, it can be concluded that a mental process is part of this neural process, in the sense that it is created by, is at the same place as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with this neural process, which is a certain neural process. This theory asserts this as Theorem I.

Theorem I. A mental process is part of a certain neural process.

In general, therefore, mental processes are parts of certain neural processes, and the mind, which is composed of all mental processes, is part of the functioning brain, which is composed of all neural processes. Therefore, the mind – the non-material entity that exists in an animal with a nervous system and that can sense, operate, and send signals – is proved to be part of the functioning brain in the sense that it is created by, is at the same place as, has information (details) as part of, functions as part of, and changes and disappears with the functioning brain. Theorem I for the mind is thus as follows:

Theorem I. The mind is part of the functioning brain.

In other words, the mind does not exist and does not function independently of the functioning brain. The concept that the mind is a functionally independent entity – freely functioning and depending on nothing except itself – is not correct.

1.3. Generalizations

The evidence that is used to establish this theorem is mainly from human studies. A lot of similar evidence can be found for various higher vertebrates such as chimpanzees, dogs, dolphins, birds [20-25]; thus, it is reasonable to extend this theorem to include the minds and mental processes in these higher vertebrates. Regarding animals in protostomes, although their nervous systems are anatomically inverted from those of deuterostomes, both of them are basically and functionally similar in that their neurons and other neural tissue are similar and are highly genetically conserved [26-29], that they consist of networks of neurons connecting with each other via synapses, and that their neural processes use electrical and/or electrochemical signals to send information between them. Moreover, several kinds of higher animals in protostomes demonstrate complex behaviors like higher animals in deuterostomes [21,22, 30-35]. Therefore, it is rational to assume that the minds and mental processes also exist in these protostomes too, and the definition of the mind (D1 of the previous chapter) is valid in these animals. Finally, as many of the observed physical properties in section 1.1 can also be demonstrated in these protostomes, it is logical to infer that their minds and mental processes are physically similar to ours and that their mental processes are parts of their neural processes and their minds are parts of their functioning brains, as well. Accordingly, this theorem is generalized to include all animals with a nervous system and, with the mind defined as in the previous chapter, asserts that mental processes are parts of certain neural processes and that the mind is part of the functioning brain for all animals with nervous systems.

1.4. Predictions

  1. A mental process (such as visual perception, thinking, emotion, consciousness, and self-awareness) will never be found to occur by itself but will always be found to be created by a certain neural process (such as visual perception neural process, thinking neural process, emotion neural process, consciousness neural process, and self-awareness neural process), and a mind will never be found to occur by itself but will always be found to be created by a functioning brain. This means that whenever a mental process is identified, a neural process that creates the mental process and that the mental process is part of will be found.* A neural process can be verified to be the one that the mental process is part of by experiments that manipulate the neural process. If the neural process is the one, there will be corresponding changes in the mental process when there are changes in the neural process. Similarly, this means that whenever a mind is found, a functioning brain that creates the mind and that the mind is part of will be found. A functioning brain can be verified to be the one that the mind is part of by similar processes used in identifying the neural process.
  2. An event of a mental process (such as a visual perception of a movie, a thinking of a situation, or an emotion of happiness) will never be found to occur independently without a corresponding event of a neural process (such as events in neural processes of the occipital cortex, of the frontal lobe, and of the amygdala, which can be investigated by EEG, ECoG, MEG, fMRI, etc.), and every event of a mind will never be found to occur independently without a corresponding event of a functioning brain. The neural process and the functioning brain in these cases can be similarly identified by the verifying processes in 1.
  3. For the pair of mental process and neural process in 1., the predictions that are true for the neural process in any event or experiment, such as that the neural process will start functioning, change, or stop functioning, will be simultaneously true for the mental process. This is similarly true for the mind and the functioning brain. The predictions that are true for the functioning brain in any event or experiment, such as that the brain will start, change, or stop functioning, will be simultaneously true for the mind.

(* As in the process of proving this theorem, it does not matter whether the neural process that a mental process is part of occurs naturally or artificially [e.g., by electrical or magnetic stimulation], the neural process that the mental process is part of can be naturally or artificially occurring.)

1.5. Remarks

It is to be noted that the concept that the mind and mental processes are dependent on neural processes is not a novel one. This concept has long been present in philosophy [2,4,36-41] and in cognitive neuroscience and related fields [4] for a long time. At present, scientific evidence (from clinical, neurophysiologic, neuroimaging, and neuropharmacologic studies and studies in other related fields) indicating that mental processes are results of neural processes and that the mind is the result of these neural processes are overwhelming to the point that this concept is irrefutable. Although this is not stated in cognitive neuroscience and related fields explicitly as a theorem, it has been the basis of studies and experiments related to the mind in these fields for a long time, as can be seen when one searches the literature. However, because this concept is most basic and very crucial to the understanding of the nature of the mind and mental processes, it is proved explicitly and stated definitely as Theorem I of this theory. However, it is to be cautioned that this theory asserts that mental processes are part of their neural processes and that the mind is part of the functioning brain but does not assert that mental processes are identical with their neural processes and that the mind is identical with the brain. This theory does not support the concept that the mind and the brain are identical (The Mind-Brain Identity Theory [2,37,38]). On the contrary, according to this theory, it is basically impossible for the mind to be identical with the brain and for mental processes to be identical with neural processes because, by this theory’s definition, the mind and mental processes are non-material while the functioning brain and neural processes have both material and non-material parts. The entity that is the mind and mental processes will be discussed and identified in the next chapter.

 

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