Chapter 1

Theorem I: The Mind and the Brain are Inseparable Counterparts

1.1. Physical properties of the mind and mental processes

Although the mind is us, it has been an entity that is difficult to understand and we do not know exactly what it is, especially what exactly it is physically. The reason for this is partly because we have not comprehensively examined its physical properties. In the past, the mind was mostly investigated on its functional properties only and was found to have several functional properties such as being private, subjective, and representational, and having propositional content [1-6]. But these properties are properties that are related to the mind’s functions but not to the outer physical world and thus yield no clues about the minds’ physical nature. Therefore, in order to determine the physical nature of the mind and mental processes, it is necessary to examine their physical properties, which are properties that are directly related to the outer physical world and can be investigated physically. They are as follows:

Physical properties of the mind and mental processes (PM)

PM1. Defining physical properties

PM1.1. Their nature is non-material.

PM1.2. Their functions are signal processing.

PM2. Additional physical properties

PM2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

PM2.2. Their occurrences and existence are with their neural processes.

PM2.3. Their information is information in their neural processes.

PM2.4. Their abilities are abilities of their neural processes.

PM2.5. Their capacities are capabilities of their neural processes.

PM2.6. Their changes are with their neural processes.

PM2.7. Their processing capabilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

PM2.8. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

PM1. Defining physical properties

Defining physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are observed to have and that are used to define the mind and mental processes in their definitions (D1 and D3, the previous chapter). They are as follows:

PM1.1. Their nature is non-material.

By definition, the mind is a non-material entity, and so are its mental processes, which are the mind’s parts that function to do certain activities. This definition comes from the fact that the kind of mind and mental process that we want to investigate has never been found by any means to have mass, shape, and size and has never been found to be tangible, visible, audible, smellable, or tasteable.

PM1.2. Their functions are signal processing.

Because the definition requires that the mind functions to sense, operate, and send signals, from both the outside world and itself, resulting in various mental activities such as visual perception, thinking, and controlling motor movements, the mind’s and mental processes’ functions must be signal-processing. This definition also comes from the fact that the kind of mind and mental processes that we want to investigate are observed to function to process signals, indeed.

PM2. Additional physical properties

Additional physical properties are physical properties that the mind and mental processes are observed to possess in addtion to the defining physical properties. They are as follows:

   PM2.1. Their locations are at their neural processes.

The mind and mental processes have definite locations in space. There has long been an unfounded belief among many people and even some philosophers that the mind and mental processes do not have definite locations in space [2]. However, this belief has never been scientifically substantiated. On the contrary, at present, there is overwhelming evidence that the mind and mental processes have definite locations. They always occur in the brain (the alive, processing brain). Never have they been found elsewhere, such as in the heart, the abdomen, or the hand. This is evident from the fact that such a body part can be injured, removed, or replaced without injuring, removing, or replacing the mind and all mental processes – only some localized effects resulting from injuring, removing, or replacing that part, such as the loss of sensation or motor command of that part, will occur. On the contrary, if the brain is injured or destroyed, the mind and all mental processes will be injured or destroyed. Also, the mind and mental processes have never been found to occur or exist in a non-processing or dead brain either. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy them, then find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the brain, respectively. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the mind and mental processes have definite locations in space: in the brain.

Where in the brain do the mind and mental processes occur? They do not occur in the blood vessels, the meninges, or any other tissue of the brain other than the processing neural circuits. This is evident from the fact that diseases such as pure meningitis, atherosclerosis of the brain blood vessels, and intracerebral calcification that affect only brain tissue other than processing neural circuit tissue do not have effects on the mind and mental processes. Also, injuries or electrical stimulations to these structures without affecting processing neural circuit tissue do not have effects on the mind and mental processes. On the contrary, diseases, pharmacologic agents, electrical stimulations, or magnetic stimulations that affect only processing neural circuit tissue but do not affect other brain tissue have effects on the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes occur must be in the processing neural circuits. Furthermore, studies in clinical neurology and cognitive neuroscience at present have revealed that each specific mental process is found to occur at some specific neural circuit, such as various mental processes for the visual identification of a face are found to occur at various face perception areas, such as  the occipital face area, the fusiform face area, and the ventral anterior temporal lobe, where various facial identification neural circuits are [7-10]. This is true in general. Therefore, mental processes’ locations are at their processing neural circuits.

Where in the processing neural circuits do the mind and mental processes reside? The processing neural circuit is composed of the signal-processing part, the metabolism part, the structural maintenance (of membranes, organelles, cystoskeletons, etc.) part, and the circuit modification (of synapses, dendrites, and axons) part. Because the mind and mental processes perform signal-processing functions (property PM1.2), it is unlikely that they reside in the metabolism part, the structural maintenance part, or the circuit modification part because these parts cannot receive, operate, and send specific signals (signals that convey specific information, not non-specific information such as heat from metabolism or vibration from blood circulation, between neural circuits). It is to be noted that the circuit modification part, which is involved in the processes of storing long-term memory, skill learning, personality formation etc., can just store signals and provide the stored signals but cannot receive, operate, or send neural signals by itself. The only part that can process signals and that the mind and mental processes most likely reside in is the signal-processing part. This is supported by the fact that anything that affects the signal-processing part but does not affect the other parts, such as an electrical stimulation, a magnetic stimulation, or a pharmacologic agent that affects only the signal-processing part, can affect the mind and mental processes. Therefore, the locations where the mind and mental processes exist are specifically the signal-processing parts of their processing neural circuits: the neural processes. If one wants to find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy the mind or mental processes, then find, examine, monitor, manipulate, or destroy their neural processes, respectively. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the definite locations where the mind and mental processes exist are at the neural processes.

Definition. The outside world and the external world

“The outside world” and “the external world” are the terms that will be used frequently in this theory. They are “outside” and “external” from the mind’s point of view and mean the world that includes everything except the mind and the place where it resides (the neural processes of the brain). Thus, the body and even the non-neural-process parts of the brain, such as the cerebral blood vessels and the meninges, are also included in the outside/external world.

   PM2.2. Their occurrences and existence are with their neural processes.

It has never been found that mental processes occur and exist alone by themselves or with anything else other than certain neural processes, which will be called the neural processes of the mental processes or the mental processes’ neural processes. For example, the visual perception mental process occurs and exists with only the visual perception neural process, which is the neural process of this mental process: when the visual perception neural process starts functioning and continues to exist (such as when visual stimuli arrive at the visual perception areas, when the ischemic visual neural process recovers from ischemia after blood reperfusion occurs [such as in the case of transient ischemic attack], or when the visual neural process is stimulated by a migraine aura, epileptic activity, electrical stimulation, or magnetic stimulation)*, the visual perception mental process occurs and continues to exist with the visual perception neural process. Conversely, when its neural process stops functioning, the mental process ceases to exist. For example, when the visual neural process stops functioning (such as because there are no visual stimuli, because there is an abrupt cessation of blood supply in acute ischemic stroke, or because there is a sudden injury to the neural process), the visual perception mental process ceases to exist too. The visual perception mental process has never been found to occur and exist alone by itself or with anything else other than its neural process. This is true for all other mental processes. As the mind is composed of mental processes, the mind’s occurrence and existence are with the brain (which is composed of neural processes) only. This has always been observed to be true.

* That a neural process starts functioning, continues to function, or stops functioning can be confirmed by investigations such as fMRI, EEG, MEG, and intracortical neural recording.

  PM2.3. Their information is information in their neural processes.

The mental process’s information, which manifests itself as the mental process’s details (such as the color, the brightness, and the movement of all the points in a mental image; the pitch, timbre, and loudness of a perceived sound; or the details of a recalled past event), is information in its neural process. There can be no mental process’s information that is not information in its neural process because the mental process does not have other sources of information than its neural process. If this is not the case, then there must be some mental process’s information that is not information in its neural process manifesting. For example, there must be some extra image occurring in the perceived vision even if the object of that extra image is not seen by the subject or even if the extra image is not created in the neural process by other processes (such as hallucination, migraine/epileptic aura, or electrical/magnetic stimulation), or there must be some of the mental process’s information left manifesting after the neural process stops functioning, such as there must be some part of the perceived vision left occurring after the eyes have been closed or after the occipital lobes have been destroyed. But these never happen. On the contrary, it always happens that whenever the information in the neural process changes or disappears, the information in the mental process changes or disappears accordingly. For example, when there is a lesion in the ventral or caudomedial occipitotemporal or ventromedial occipital cortex, which functions to create color information of the opposite visual field, the perceived vision in the opposite visual field will inescapably lack color information, resulting in achromatopsia (color blindness) in that visual field [11-14]. Thus, mental processes’ information is information in their neural processes.

PM2.4. Their abilities are abilities of their neural processes.

The mind’s and mental processes’ abilities in sensing something in the outside world, performing mental operations, and affecting things in the outside world are abilities of their neural processes. There can be no mind’s and mental processes’ abilities that are not abilities of their neural processes.

A. In sensing things in the external world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever sensing abilities they want to have; their sensing abilities must be only the sensing abilities of their neural processes. For example, in humans, the mind and mental processes have only the abilities to sense visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, somatosensory, proprioception, vestibular, and some internal organ stimuli because the human neural processes have only these sensing abilities. What sensing abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the human neural processes do not have the abilities to sense magnetic stimuli, which can create magnetoreception in some animals such as birds, bats, bees, and sharks [15-17], and to sense electric stimuli in the way that electroreception (which is not the tingling sensation or pain that we feel when we get an electrical shock) is created, like that in electric fish [18-23], the human’s mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to sense these stimuli either.

Also, the mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to sense things by themselves alone but require the sensing function of their neural processes. For example, to mentally see or hear anything in the external world, the mind and the visual or auditory mental process cannot see or hear anything by themselves but require the sensing function of the visual or auditory neural process (and the visual or auditory receptors and pathways), respectively. If these neural processes are impaired and cannot function to see or hear (such as in the case of stroke, tumor, or trauma), the mind and the visual or auditory mental process cannot see or hear anything, even if they want to.

B. Regarding mental operations, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever operating abilities they want to have; their operating abilities must be only the operating abilities of their neural processes. What operating abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the  normal human neural processes do not have the abilities to process signals with unlimited speed, to turn off or turn on their whole processing operations at will, and to calculate the square roots of odd digits (3, 5, 7 etc.) by themselves, the human’s mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to think with unlimited speed, to lose or become conscious at will, and to calculate the square roots of odd digits mentally either. (Some extraordinary calculating abilities have been found in some cases of people with savant syndrome [discussed more in detail later]. But these people have extraordinary neural processes to account for their extraordinary abilities; their mental operating abilities thus still are their neural processes’ operating abilities.)

Also, the mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to operate by themselves alone but require the operating function of their neural processes. For example, to consciously perceive the meaning of the visual word “home”, the visual mental process that perceives the meaning of this word cannot relay this perception to the consciousness mental process directly by itself but requires the operating function of the visual perception neural process, the consciousness neural process, and their connection. If there is damage to the neural operation at either of the neural processes or at their connection (such as in the case of stroke, tumor, or demyelinating disease), this mental operation cannot occur, and the mental conscious perception of the word “home” will not occur.

In the matter of affecting the outside world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever affecting abilities they want to have; their affecting abilities must be only the affecting abilities of their neural processes. For example, in many animals, the mind’s and mental processes’ abilities to affect the outside world are limited to only volitional motor movement (such as using hands, legs, and vocalizing organs), non-volitional motor movement (such as smooth muscle contractions and various motor and autonomic reflexes), secretion of hormones or other substances (such as pheromones, digestive enzymes, and poisons), and other means found in some animals (such as color changing in octopuses, chameleons, frogs, etc.; shape changing in some caterpillars, pufferfish, frogs, etc.; bioluminescence or production and emission of light in fireflies, comb jellies, deep sea fishes, etc.; production and discharges of electricity in electric eels, electric catfish, electric rays, etc.; and production of sonar waves in bats, dolphins, killer whales, etc.), because the animal neural processes have only these affecting abilities. What affecting abilities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the human neural processes cannot command the body to change its colors or shape, produce and emit light, produce and discharge electricity, produce sonar waves, or do extraordinary feats such as command the body to levitate, teleport, or become transparent, the mind cannot execute these deeds either even if it tries. Even its own body or itself, the mind can affect only as much as the neural processes can. What the neural processes cannot affect, the mind cannot affect either, even if it is its own body or itself. For example, the mind cannot, no matter how hard it tries, heal a body wound instantly, slow down or reverse aging processes in its body, or halt a dementing disease that is affecting the mind itself, because no neural processes have the abilities to do that.

Also, the mind and mental processes do not have the abilities to affect the outside world by themselves alone but require the affecting function their neural processes. For example, to affect anything in the external world with its hand, the mind cannot command its hand to do anything by itself but requires the affecting function of the volitional motor neural processes to command the muscles of the hand. If the volitional motor neural processes lose this ability (such as in the case of stroke, tumor, or degenerative disease), the mind cannot command the hand to do anything, even if it is its hand.

PM2.5. Their capacities are capacities of their neural processes.

The capacities of the mind and mental processes in sensing something in the outside world, performing mental operations, and affecting things in the outside world are capacities of their neural processes. There can be no mind’s and mental processes’ capacities that are not capacities of their neural processes.

A. In sensing things in the external world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever sensing capacities they want to have; their sensing capacities must be only the sensing capacities of their neural processes. For example, the mind and mental processes can sense any specific sensation only in limited ranges (such as the limited frequency ranges of the visible spectrum and the audible spectrum, the limited amplitude ranges of the visible spectrum and the audible spectrum, and the limited spatial ranges of the visual field and the audible area) and with limited acuity (such as the limited acuity of vision, hearing, and touch feeling) because the neural processes have the capacities to sense only in these limited ranges and with the limited acuity. What sensing capacities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the human sensing neural processes do not have the capacities to sense the light in infrared or ultraviolet spectrum, in very low intensity, or out of the visual field, the human mind cannot see things in infrared or ultraviolet, cannot see things when it is too dark, and cannot see what is behind the back of its head.

B. Regarding mental operations, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever operating capacities they want to have; their operating capacities must be only the operating capacities of their neural processes. What operating capacities the neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the human neural processes do not have the operating capacities to remember all the texts on a newspaper page in a second, to process all what ten people say to it at the same time, and to solves ten mathematical equations simultaneously by themselves, the mind does not have these operating capacities either.

C. In the matter of affecting the outside world, the mind and mental processes do not have whatever affecting capacities they want to have; their affecting capacities must be only the affecting capacities of their neural processes. What affecting capacities neural processes do not have, the mind and mental processes do not have either. For example, because the neural processes cannot command the fingers to type one full A4 page in 10 seconds, cannot command one foot to tap in a tango rhythm while commanding one hand to wave a wand in a waltz rhythm, and cannot command the articulation organs (tongue, lips, vocal cord, etc.) to recite one story while commanding the hand to write another story, the mind does not have these affecting capacities either.

Interestingly, extraordinary capacities that general people do not have can be found in people with savant syndrome, both autistic and acquired. For example, some savants can rapidly memorize thousands of books with subsequent encyclopedic knowledge of geography, history, literature, etc., some have accurate calendar-calculating abilities, and some can recite the Pi number to 22,514 digits and solve mathematical problems in a blink of an eye. These people have abnormalities in some areas of the brain, especially the left fronto-temporal lobe, that enable them to have these special capacities. The acquired savant syndrome can occur in people with strokes, head injury, and even some degenerative diseases that affect the left fronto-temporal lobe. Transcranial magnetic stimulations of this area can also elicit these kinds of unusual capacity too, even though only transiently. It is probable that lesions at the left fronto-temporal lobe cause disinhibition of neural processes in some other areas and enable them to function with extraordinary capacities [24-30]. Thus, when there are neural processes that can perform functions with extraordinary capacities, the mind and mental processes can perform the functions with the extended capacities too.

   PM2.6. Their changes are with their neural processes.

When there are changes in neural processes, the corresponding mental processes will change with their neural processes simultaneously and similarly (both qualitatively and quantitatively). For example, in an acute case, mental processes change instantly with neural processes when a sudden head injury occurs, and the types (quality) and severity (quantity) of mental processes’ changes depend on the types and severity of neural processes’ injury. In a subacute case of a brain tumor destroying the frontal lobe, the person’s personality, intellect, and emotion change gradually and worsen proportionally to the types and severity of neural process destruction. In a chronic case of Alzheimer’s disease, the patient’s personality, intellect, memory, and language capability deteriorate little by little but relentlessly corresponding to the types and severity of neural process degeneration.

This is also true in experiments and administration of psychoactive drugs: whenever neural processes (such as visual, auditory, or somatic perception neural processes) are changed by electrical or magnetic stimulations, the corresponding mental processes (such as vision, auditory, or somatic perception) will change accordingly and simultaneously; and whenever psychoactive drugs, such as sedatives, anxiolytics, or psychedelics, exert effects on neural processes, the corresponding mental processes will change accordingly and simultaneously.

Thus, when there are changes in their neural processes, the mind and mental processes cannot resist the corresponding changes even if they try not to change. On the other hand, if their neural processes do not change, the mind and mental processes cannot change even if they try to. For example, the mind cannot fall asleep, get out of a depressive or anxious state, change its behavior, understand difficult things, or attain a spectacular sports skill whenever it wishes because the involved neural processes cannot change so whenever it wishes (but it will change so when the involved neural processes are changed, such as by hypnotics, antidepressants/anxiolytics, or trainings).

   PM2.7. Their processing capabilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

Because the signals that the mind and mental processes process are signals that are information intensive, such as in the order of billions of bits for a visual process [31,32], the mind’s and mental processes’ processing capabilities must be information-intensive of this order. And because the signals that the mind and mental processes process are signals that are always changing and changing fast, in the order of milliseconds, such as the visual [31,32] and audio signals of a movie, the mind and mental processes must have fast, dynamic processing capabilities of this order, also.

   PM2.8. Their activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Although the mind and mental processes are non-material entities, their activities are not physically traceless – they are associated with electromagnetic phenomena. Whenever there are the mind and mental processes, electromagnetic activities are always there. Their electrical activities can be recorded as EEG (electroencephalography) at the scalp, as ECoG (electrocorticography) at the cerebral cortical surface, or as single-unit recordings in the cortex (intracortical neural recording). Their magnetic activities can be recorded as MEG (magnetoencephalography) just outside the brain. Not only can these electromagnetic activities signify the presence of the mind and mental processes, but they can also give information about the state or event of the mind and mental processes at that moment. For example, a continuous isoelectric EEG (i.e., no EEG activity) signifies that there is no mind or mental processes occurring; a generalized slow-wave EEG that is unresponsive to stimulation signifies that the mind and mental processes are being severely deranged; spike discharges over the occipital area signify that a visual epileptic aura is occurring; generalized 3 Hz spike-and-wave discharges signify that the mind is in the state of absence seizure; and various sleep EEG patterns signify that the mind is in certain stages of sleep. As specific patterns of electromagnetic activities are always present when and where there are the mind and mental processes in specific states and change or vanish when and where the mind and mental processes change or cease to exist, the mind’s and mental processes’ activities are definitely associated with electromagnetic activities.

1.2. Theorem I

From the physical properties listed above, it is evident that, physically, a mental process does not and cannot occur, exist, and function by itself alone but must occur, exist, and function with a certain neural process. Similarly, mental processes must occur, exist, and function with certain neural processes. As the mind is the composite of mental processes, the mind must occur, exist, and function with a composite of neural processes. Now, the most parsimonious composite of neural processes that will enable their mental processes to do all the necessary three kinds of function of the mind (as defined in D1, the previous chapter) completely is the brain. Therefore, parsimoniously, the mind must occur, exist, and function with the brain.

Yet, if we consider this matter in reverse, we shall see that, whenever a neural process occurs, exists, and functions, a mental process always occurs, exists, and functions with the neural process too. For example, when a visual perception neural process starts processing visual stimuli and continues to do this function, a visual mental process always occurs, exists, and functions with the visual perception neural process, as discussed in PM2.2; the visual perception neural process never occurs, exists, and functions alone without the visual mental process occurring, existing, and functioning with it. Clinical evidence and evidence from studies in cognitive neuroscience indicate that this is also true for other mental processes, such as emotion neural processes, volitional motor neural processes, and consciousness neural process – whenever these neural processes occur, exist, and function, emotion, volitional motor movement, and consciousness always occur, exist, and function with their respective neural processes. Therefore, it can be concluded that a neural process must occur, exist, and function with its mental process and that neural processes must occur, exist, and function with their mental processes. And the composite of neural processes – the brain – must occur, exist, and function with the composite of mental processes – the mind; the brain never occurs, exists, and functions by itself alone without the mind.

In conclusion, the mind and the brain always occur, exist, and function together – they are inseparable. The concept that the mind or the brain is an independent entity – freely occurring, existing, and functioning by itself, without the other – is not correct. And, because their functions are the same, each is the counterpart of the other. Therefore, they are inseparable counterparts, and this theory asserts this as Theorem I:

Theorem I: The mind and the brain are inseparable counterparts.

Similarly, a mental process and a neural process always occur, exist, and function together – they are inseparable. And, because their functions are the same, each is the counterpart of the other. Therefore, they are inseparable counterparts, and Theorem I for a mental process and a neural process is thus:

Theorem I: A mental process and its neural process are inseparable counterparts.

Theorem I can also be looked at and stated in another way. Because the mind and the brain are inseparable, they are always a unity, and we can consider the mind to be the non-material aspect and the brain to be the material aspect of this unity. And because their functions are the same, each is equivalent to the other. Theorem I can thus be stated as: The mind and the brain are equivalent aspects of a unity. Similarly, because a mental process and a neural process are inseparable, they are always a unity, with the mental process the non-material aspect and the neural process the material aspect of this unity. And, because their functions are the same, each is equivalent to each other. Thus, theorem I for a mental process and a neural process can also be stated as: A mental process and a neural process are equivalent aspects of a unity.

To be noted is that all the neural processes of the whole functioning nervous system, which is composed of the brain, the spinal cord, the peripheral nervous system, and the enteric nervous system, have mental processes that can do all the necessary functions of the mind (as defined in D1, the previous chapter) too. Thus, it can also be stated that the mind occurs, exists, and functions with the whole functioning nervous system as well. However, as the brain can function to enable the mind to do what it (the mind) is defined to do and as the salient feature of the mind (the ability to process signals to the highest levels that the animal can, which can result in consciousness, perception, emotion, memory, language abilities, intelligence, decision abilities, etc.) exists in the brain even if the rest of the nervous system (the spinal cord, the peripheral nervous system, and the enteric nervous system) is cut off (such as in patients with high cervical cord injury), the brain alone is sufficient for the mind to occur. On the contrary, these are not true for the isolated processing spinal cord, peripheral nervous system, and enteric nervous system – although we can say that mental processes occur, exist, and function with the isolated processing spinal cord, peripheral nervous system, or enteric nervous system, we cannot say that the mind (as defined in D1, the previous chapter) exists in any of them because they lack the salient feature of the mind as mentioned above – mental processes in them do not have the ability to process signals to the highest levels that that animal can. The mind with additional mental processes in the processing spinal cord, peripheral nervous system, and enteric nervous system is thus just a larger entity than the mind that is composed of mental processes in the brain alone. The former entity can be considered to be an extended version of the mind. The difference between the mind and the extended version is just the number of mental processes that compose them, but they are entities of the same kind – composed of mental processes, which occur, exist, and function with neural processes. Because of this, all conclusions and predictions that are derived from the principle that mental processes occur, exist, and function with their neural processes will be identical for both the mind and the extended mind.

1.3. Generalizations

All the properties that are used to establish this theorem (PM1.1 to 1.2 and PM2.1 to 2.8) can be demonstrated in all animals that have a nervous system, both the most basal animals (such as the animals in Ctenophora [comb jellies], in Cnidaria [such as corals, jellyfish, and hydras], and in primitive bilateria [such as small flatworm-like animals in Acoelomorpha]) and the more advanced animals (such as the animals in the more advanced bilateria, e.g., worms, octopuses, insects, fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals). No such animals (with a nervous system) have ever been found to have the manifestations of mental processes without neural processes and the manifestations of the mind (as defined in D1, the previous chapter) without the brain. To be noted is that, although animals in Ctenophora and Cnidaria and some animals in primitive bilateria do not have definite brains but have only nerve nets distributed in their bodies [33-36], their whole processing integrated nerve nets are able to process signals to the highest levels that these animals can, which result in several complex activities, such as capturing preys, feeding, and fleeing. Thus, the whole processing integrated nerve nets can be considered the functioning brains for these animals. Likewise, although many animals in Protostome (such as flatworms, roundworms, and mollusks) and some animals in Deuterostome (such as tunicates, lancelets, and starfish)  do not have a definite brain but instead have a nerve ring connected with ganglia, a system of connected several ganglia, or a primitive brain vesicle as the center of their nervous system [34-38], these structures are able to process signals to the highest levels that these animals can, which result in several complex activities, such as capturing preys, feeding, and fleeing. Therefore, these structures in function can be considered the functioning brains for these animals.

Thus, this theorem is generalized to include all animals with a nervous system and, with the mind defined as in the previous chapter, asserts that the mind occurs, exists, and functions with the brain, and vice versa, and that the mind and the brain are inseparable counterparts in all animals with a nervous system.

1.4. Predictions

  1. A mental process (such as a visual perception, thinking, emotion, consciousness, and self-awareness mental process) will always be found to occur, exist, and function with a certain neural process (such as a visual perception neural process, thinking neural process, emotion neural process, consciousness neural process, and self-awareness neural process) – it will never be found to occur, exist, and function without a certain neural process. Similarly, a mind will always be found to occur, exist, and function with a brain – it will never be found to occur, exist, and function without a brain. This means that, whenever and wherever there is a mental process, there must be a neural process that the mental process occurs, exists, and functions with, then and there. A neural process can be verified to be that particular neural process by experiments that manipulate the neural process. If the neural process is that particular neural process, there will be simultaneous, corresponding changes in the mental process when there are changes in the neural process. Similarly, this means that, whenever and wherever there is a mind, there must be a brain that the mind occurs, exists, and functions with, then and there. A brain can be verified to be that particular brain by similar processes used in identifying the neural process.
  2. Every event in a mental process (such as a visual perception change from perceiving the red color to perceiving a house, a thinking change from thinking leisurely to solving a problem, or an emotion change from happiness to sadness) will always be found to be associated with an event in a certain neural process (such as an event in a neural process in the occipital cortex, in the frontal lobe, or in the amygdala, which can be investigated by EEG, ECoG, MEG, fMRI, etc.) – it will never be found to occur without a corresponding event in a certain neural process. Similarly, every event in a mind will always be found to be associated with an event in a brain – it will never be found to occur without a corresponding event in a brain. The neural process and the brain in these cases can be similarly identified by the verifying processes in 1.
  3. For a pair of a mental process and a neural process in 1., the predictions that are valid for the neural process in any event or experiment, such as that the neural process will start functioning, change, or stop functioning, will be valid for the mental process. This is similarly true for a similar pair of a mind and a brain.

N.B. Up to the present time, the predictions of this theorem have been borne out by everyday clinical events and experimental outcomes. The up-coming interesting event that will further support or will undermine or even invalidate this theorem is the outcome of the AWARE II [AWAreness during REsuscitation II] trial [39-41], the result of which is expected to come out in July 2020 or sometime after that. According to this theorem, the AWARE II trial will not be able to confirm that near-death and out-of-body experiences [42-58] are phenomena that occur from the mind that is anatomically and functionally separated from the brain.

1.5. Remarks

It is to be noted that the concept that mental processes and the mind are closely associated with neural processes and the brain in the sense that the former entities always occur, exist, and function with the latter entities, and vice versa, is not a novel one. This concept has long been present in philosophy and in cognitive neuroscience and related fields for a long time [2,4,59-64]. Also, the concept that the mind and the brain are the complementary part or counterpart of each other is not a new concept, either. Similar concepts have existed in the literature before. For example, De Sousa (2013) stated that, “The Mind is the functional correlate of the brain, while the Brain is the structural correlate of the mind. One is an entity and the other is its operational correlate.” [1], Singh and Singh (2011) stated that, “The brain-mind dyad must be understood, with brain as the structural correlate of the mind, and mind as the functional correlate of the brain.” [65], and Panksepp (2011) stated that, “it may be wiser to have a monistic term, that does not prioritize either mind or brain, but combines the concepts into a unified term (common variants are brain-mind or mind-brain)” [66]. At present, scientific evidence (from studies in clinical neurology, neuropharmacology, neuroimaging, and cognitive neuroscience and studies in other related fields) indicating that mental processes are completely associated with their neural processes and that the mind is completely associated with the brain – that mental processes and the mind never occur, exist, or function without neural processes and the brain, respectively – so that they are inseparable counterparts of each other are overwhelming to the point that this concept is practically irrefutable. Although this is not stated in cognitive neuroscience and related fields explicitly as a theorem, it has been the basis of studies and experiments related to mental processes and the mind, in these fields, for a long time, as can be seen when one studies the literature. However, because this concept is most basic and very crucial to the understanding of the nature of the mind and mental processes, it is proved explicitly and stated definitely as Theorem I of this theory. However, it is to be cautioned that, although this theory asserts that the mind and the brain are inseparable counterparts of each other and likewise for a mental process and a neural process, it does not assert that mind is identical with the brain and that a mental process is identical with a neural process. This theory does not support the concept that the mind and the brain are identical (The mind-brain identity theory [61,62]). On the contrary, according to this theory, it is basically impossible for the mind to be identical with the brain and for mental processes to be identical with neural processes because, by this theory’s definitions, the mind and mental processes are non-material while the brain and neural processes are material, so they can be just counterparts of each other. But what is the exact nature the mind and mental processes? The next chapter will investigate and answer this question.

Next: Chapter 2 – Theorem II (The true nature of the mind) >

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