Qualia, conscious awareness, and conscious experiences are mental phenomena that have been puzzling human minds for a long time. They are difficult matters, and the hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap originated from these mental phenomena. So, three chapters will be dedicated to analyzing them. The first one, this chapter, will clarify what they are phenomenally, their definitions, and their types. The next two chapters will answer the problems of what they are physically, why they occur, how they occur, and other related questions, including the hard problem of consciousness and the explanatory gap.
3.1. Quale and qualia
When one looks at a house, one experiences the vision of the house in one’s mind. When one listens to a song, one experiences the sound of the song in one’s mind. When one smells a rose, one experiences the odor of the rose in one’s mind [Figure 3.1]. Similarly, other kinds of experiences happen with other sensory perceptions: taste, touch, pain, etc. Moreover, one can also have such experiences in other mental activities that are not related to sensory perceptions, such as thinking of something, feeling happy, and reliving past events.
Figure 3.1 Visual, auditory, and olfactory qualia
Although these mental phenomena (the vision of the house, the sound of the song, the odor of the rose, the thinking of something, the feeling of happiness, the reliving of past events, etc. in one’s mind) are non-material and have difficult-to-understand nature, their existence is real and undeniable. Each phenomenon has manifestation characteristics that are unique and cannot be described by anything except itself. For example, the vision of the house has manifestation characteristics of color, shape, and brightness while the musical sound has manifestation characteristics of pitch, timbre, and loudness, and the rose odor has manifestation characteristics of odor’s quality and strength. Each of these manifestation characteristics – color, shape, pitch, timbre, odor’s quality, etc. – is unique and cannot be described by anything except itself (e.g., one cannot describe what the color red is like based on what the sound, the smell, and the touch are like to a congenitally blind person; nor can one describe what the sound of the note C is like based on what the vision, the smell, and the touch are like to a congenitally deaf person). Such unique, indescribable manifestation characteristics are called phenomenal characteristics [1,2].
In this theory, to be precise, terms that are related to characteristics of mental phenomena will be defined as follows:
Manifestation characteristics are mental phenomena’s characteristics that manifest themselves in the mind, such as color, shape, pitch, timbre, odor’s quality, happiness, and thought.
Phenomenal characteristics are manifestation characteristics that are unique and not describable by anything other than themselves.
(Related terms in the literature are phenomenal experiences [2-7], phenomenal consciousness [3,4,7,8], phenomenal character [3,4,6], phenomenal properties [4,9].)
Phenomenal characteristics have to be experienced directly by a conscious subject for the subject to know what they are like: what the color is like, what the timbre is like, what the odor’s quality is like, and so on. In this theory, a non-material, mental phenomenon that has phenomenal characteristics that can be experienced by a conscious subject will be called quale (plural form: qualia) (Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2 Manifestation and phenomenal characteristics and qualia
Definition. A quale is a non-material, mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics.
It is important to note that this definition comes from the fact that qualia (the vision of the house, the sound of the song, the odor of the rose, etc. in one’s mind) have phenomenal characteristics that can be consciously experienced by a subject – we do have conscious experiences and conscious awareness of qualia . That is why we have concepts about them, have a special term for them, and can do many things specifically about them, such as discuss, write articles/books on, and do experiments on them. Also, it should be noted that there can be mental phenomena that have phenomenal characteristics but, for some reasons such as because they are not connected to consciousness, their phenomenal characteristics cannot be experienced by the consciousness, that is, they are not consciously experienceable. Thus, by definition, these mental phenomena are not qualia in this theory even if they have phenomenal characteristics and even if their phenomenal characteristics are unconsciously experienceable (i.e., some unconscious mental processes can experience them). The eventual conclusions, implications, predictions, and other statements that are valid for qualia as defined above are unproven for these mental phenomena that have phenomenal characteristics that are not consciously experienceable.
Etymologically, quale and qualia are the terms that derive from a Latin word meaning for “what sort” or “what kind” . Although the terms quale and qualia were first used in philosophy in 1929 by Lewis CI in a discussion of sense-data theory [4,6] and later by a lot of philosophers to describe and discuss this kind of phenomenon philosophically [4,6,7,9,10,11], at present, these two terms are also used widely in cognitive neuroscience and related fields by many scientists in attempts to explain these phenomena physically . However, the meaning of these terms can vary from author to author, and there is a lot of confusion regarding the definition of these two terms [5,6,12]. Therefore, to avoid confusion and uncertainty regarding what they mean in this theory, the working definitions of these two terms in this theory will specifically be as stated.
A quale can be basic, such as a vision of the red color or a sound of the note C, or can be complex, such as a vision of a house or a sound of a song. A quale that is complex is composed of many basic qualia. For example, the complex quale of a vision of a moving car is composed of several basic qualia, such as color, shape, and velocity; and when one watches a movie, the complex quale that represents the movie in one’s mind is composed of both visual and sound qualia, which can be further subdivided into many basic qualia, such as color, shape, velocity, pitch, and timbre.
3.2. Conscious awareness and conscious experience
Although a quale has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics, there will be no experience of the quale occurring if the mind does not experience it. But for the mind to experience a quale, the mind must be aware of the quale; if the mind is not aware of the quale, an experience cannot happen. For example, when one is concentrating on solving a difficult problem, one may not be aware of the sound quale that occurs in his mind from a soft sound that occurs in the surroundings and thus will not experience that sound’s quale. Therefore, it requires the mind to be aware of the quale for an experience of the quale to occur.
But when the mind is aware of a quale, not only an experience of the quale will occur but the mind will also be aware of the quale’s occurrence and of what the quale’s phenomenal characteristics are like. For example, when the mind is aware of a vision of a house, not only an experience of the vision of the house will occur but also the mind’s awareness of the vision’s occurrence and of what the vision’s phenomenal characteristics are like will occur.
This kind of awareness that has the awareness of what the phenomenal characteristics of something are like occurring happens only when the mind is consciously aware of that thing. This is in contrast to when the mind is unconsciously aware of something. In this latter case, the mind will not have the awareness of what the phenomenal characteristics of that thing are like occurring, such as in the case of unconscious awareness of blood levels of various substances (e.g., sodium, oxygen, and hormones), in which the mind is unconsciously aware of these blood levels and unconsciously reacts to them but never has awareness of what their phenomenal characteristics are like occurring. Therefore, the former kind of awareness, which has the awareness of what the phenomenal characteristics are like occurring, will be called conscious awareness.
Definition. Conscious awareness is mental awareness of something, with the awareness of that thing’s occurrence and of what the phenomenal characteristics of that thing are like occurring.
And a mental experience that occurs with conscious awareness will be called conscious experience.
Definition. A conscious experience is a mental experience of something, with the awareness of that thing’s occurrence and of what the phenomenal characteristics of that thing are like occurring.
(For the use of this term “conscious experience” in the literature, please see ref 2,9,11,13-18.)
Because the awareness of what the phenomenal characteristics are like occurs only with a mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics, i.e., a quale, in reality, conscious awareness occurs with a quale only, not with anything else. Similarly, a conscious experience occurs with a quale only.
It should be noted that conscious awareness and a conscious experience always occur together because, in the process of being aware of anything, an experience of that thing always occurs simultaneously, and vice versa. Also, it should be noted that when conscious awareness and a conscious experience of something occur, there is also conscious awareness and a conscious experience of the two former mental processes occurring too – that is, both the conscious awareness and the conscious experience themselves are qualia (mental phenomena that have consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics). This kind of awareness of awareness and an experience of an experience is a type of metacognition. And this property will help identify what conscious awareness and conscious experiences physically are, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
As any conscious experience of a quale (such as an experience of a vision of a house) occurs in the mind of the subject who is having the experience, the experience is limited to only that subject, and only that subject knows what the experience is like (such as what the experience of the vision of the house is like). Although other subjects can each have a conscious experience of a similar quale (such as an experience of a vision of the same house) and know what it is like for himself/herself, he/she can never have another subject’s conscious experience and can never know exactly what another subject’s conscious experience is like (such as what another subject’s experience of the vision of the house is like). Therefore, each conscious experience is exclusively limited to the subject who has the experience and may be different among different subjects. A conscious experience is thus, in this sense, subjective. Because of this, a conscious experience may be called a subjective experience  or a subjective conscious experience . In this theory, however, the author considers that the conscious part is essential for the experience of a quale to occur but that the subjective part just occurs by the nature of the experience, so this kind of experience will be simply called a conscious experience.
3.3. Consciously experienceable, conscious awareness and conscious experiences
From its definition, a quale is a non-material, mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics. But how do we know that a mental phenomenon has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics? This can be answered from the fact that, because a quale has this property, when a conscious subject attends to it, he/she can have conscious awareness and a conscious experience of it. So, we can define a quale to be a non-material, mental phenomenon that can induce the occurrences of conscious awareness and a conscious experience in a conscious subject. This is an alternative definition of a quale, and if we know that conscious awareness and conscious experiences of a quale occur, we know that the quale is consciously experienceable. But, how do we know that conscious awareness and a conscious experience occur in a subject? To answer this question, we have to consider the differences between the unconscious awareness and experiences and the conscious awareness and experiences.
The unconscious awareness and experiences occur in awareness and experiences of both internal information (such as various blood levels of electrolytes, oxygen, sugar, hormones, and other blood constituents; some internal sensation, such the pressure in atrium and carotid sinus, the tension of muscle fibers, and the tension of tendons; the autonomic functions, the brain stem functions, the cerebellar functions, and many deep cerebral nuclei functions) and external information (such as in the case of subliminal perception [19-22], binocular rivalry [23-30], attentional blink [31-34], inattentional blindness [35-38], blindsight [39-42], and various unconscious cerebral processes*). In these unconscious cases, we never know that we are aware of these multitude kinds of information, yet we unconsciously are, and we react to them all the time.
(*For example, unconscious face recognition, unconscious attention, unconscious error detection, unconscious reading, unconscious mathematical operation, and unconscious situation analysis [43-51])
The conscious awareness and experiences occur in awareness and experiences of both the perception of all external sensations (e.g., visual, auditory, and olfactory sensations) and some internal sensations (e.g. equilibrium and proprioception) and of the internal cognitive mental phenomena (thought, emotion, memory, etc.). In these conscious cases, we know that we are aware of and experiences these kinds of information and react to them both consciously and unconsciously.
The principle difference between the two kinds of awareness and experiences are that, in the unconscious case, the information of the awareness and experiences is not distributed extensively to various cognitive mental processes, especially the consciousness and the language mental processes, while the contrary happens in the conscious case. So, if a person is normal (has no disabilities), he/she can be simply asked whether he/she knows that he/she has the awareness and an experience of something (e.g. blood level of sodium or a vision). The answer will be no for unconscious awareness and an experience (such as in the case of blood level of sodium) but will be yes for conscious awareness and an experience (such as in the case of a vision).
More objectively or in the case that the person cannot answer the question (due to some disabilities, such as generalized paralysis, aphasia, or deafness and blindness), whether conscious awareness and experiences occur when a subject turn his/her attention to something can be ascertain by neurophysiological studies. It has been found from experiments that when a subject turns his/her attention to something and conscious awareness and experiences of that thing occur, these neural phenomena will occur :
- A sudden intense ignition of neural activities of bilateral prefrontal and parietal regions.
- The appearance of a slow wave, P300 wave, over the vertex of the head, about 300 milliseconds after the stimulus from that thing enters the brain.
- A massive increase in high frequency gamma-band oscillation, starting around 300 milliseconds after the stimulus from that thing enters the brain.
- Massive synchronization of electromagnetic signals across distant cortical regions, also starting around 300 milliseconds after the stimulus from that thing enters the brain.
Other neural phenomena have also been found to occur with conscious awareness and experiences. These phenomena are the neural signatures of conscious awareness and experiences. Although it is not settled at present which combination of these phenomena is necessary and sufficient to indicate that conscious awareness and experiences have occurred, it is very likely that conscious awareness and experiences are associated with some specific combination of these phenomena and that this specific combination will be found in the future. Therefore, because qualia induce the occurrences of conscious awareness and a conscious experience, ultimately, qualia can be defined objectively as a non-material, mental phenomenon that can induce some specific combination of the above phenomena. Despite this exciting prospect, it should always be remembered that, basically, a quale is a non-material, mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics, because this property will help us identify its nature.
3.4. Quale and conscious experience
It is to be noted that in the literature the terms quale (qualia) and conscious experience (or subjective experience or subjective conscious experience in some literature) may be used interchangeably to mean a mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics (such as a vision of a house) or a conscious experience of the mental phenomenon (such as a conscious experience of the vision of the house) or both. That is, in some literature, there is no differentiation between the two terms and between the two phenomena – which can be confusing. So, the reader has to be careful which phenomenon is being discussed at that point in the literature and which meaning is being used for that term.
However, current knowledge in neurophysiology indicates that, although the two phenomena – quale and conscious experience – are closely related functionally and sometimes overlapping (in the case of conscious awareness and conscious experiences, because conscious awareness and conscious experiences themselves are also qualia), they are different phenomena. All qualia except conscious awareness and conscious experiences occur with neural processes that are different from those of conscious awareness and conscious experiences, and these two kinds of phenomena can change independently of each other. For example, a visual quale of a house occurs with the visual perception neural processes in various visual perception areas while a conscious experience of the visual quale of the house occurs with a re-entrant and synchronization between the consciousness neural process (which is likely to be the complex network of neurons with long-range axons densely distributed in prefrontal, parieto-temporal, medial temporal, and cingulate cortices) and the visual perception neural processes that the visual quale of the house occurs with.[52,53] Separate disturbances in the neural processes that a quale occurs with without disturbing the neural process that a conscious experience occurs with can occur, and vice versa. For example, when a person is consciously experiencing the visual and the auditory qualia of his/her surroundings, if there is an acute stroke affecting the right occipital lobe or the left ventromedial occipital cortex, resulting in left hemianopia or right hemi-achromatopsia, respectively, the person’s visual qualia will be correspondingly affected, but his/her overall conscious experience will still be intact, as is evident by the fact that he/she can still consciously experience the auditory and the remaining visual qualia normally. On the other hand, if the person becomes drowsy, his/her conscious experiences (and conscious awareness) of the visual and auditory qualia of the surroundings will become less and less and fade away while the qualia themselves are still undisturbed. That is, the phenomenal characteristics of the visual and the auditory qualia are undisturbed, for example, visual qualia remain visual qualia, not change to auditory qualia or other qualia; all basic qualia of the visual qualia, such as color, brightness, and shape, remain the same, not disappear or change to other basic qualia; and deficits in qualia details such as hemianopia and hemi-achromatopsia do not occur. Therefore, in this theory, the two phenomena are two different phenomena and will be referred to with separate terms:
– Only quale, not any other term, will be used for a mental phenomenon that has consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics, and quale will be used to refer to only this phenomenon, not anything else. (Qualia will be used in plural cases.)
– Only conscious experience, not any other term, will be used for a conscious experience of a quale, and conscious experience will be used to refer to only this mental experience, not anything else.
3.5. Types of qualia
All mental phenomena that have consciously experienceable phenomenal characteristics are qualia. Thus, there are many kinds of qualia. They can be classified into two types:
1.Sensory perception qualia
- External sensory perception qualia
- Internal sensory perception qualia
1. Sensory perception qualia are qualia that occur in perceptions of sensations. They can be subdivided into external sensory perception qualia and internal sensory perception qualia. External sensory perception qualia are qualia that occur in perceptions of sensations that occur from stimuli outside the body. In humans, there are several kinds of external sensory perception qualia: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and cutaneous sensory perception qualia. Internal sensory perception qualia are qualia that occur in perceptions of sensations that occur from stimuli inside the body. In humans, there also are several kinds of them: vestibular, proprioceptive, and visceral sensory perception (i.e., visceral pain, distension, cramps, nausea, etc.) qualia. It is possible that some animals that have sensory modalities that human beings do not, such as magnetoreception in birds, bats, bees, and sharks [54-56] or electroreception in electric fish , have other kinds of qualia for these sensory perceptions too. Each kind of sensory perception qualia has phenomenal characteristics, which are unique, cannot be described based on any other qualia or anything else, and must be consciously experienced to know what it is like for oneself (e.g., what the vision is like, what the sound is like, what the magnetoreception is like, or what the electroreception is like). Each kind of sensory perception qualia may consist of several components that are basic qualia, such as visual qualia consist of several components: color, brightness, shape, and other basic visual qualia, while auditory qualia consist of several other components: pitch, timbre, loudness, and other basic auditory qualia. Each component or each basic quale has its own phenomenal characteristic, which is unique, cannot be described based on any other basic qualia or anything else, and must be consciously experienced to know what it is like for oneself (e.g., for visual qualia: what the color is like, what the brightness is like, or what the shape is like). Sensory perception qualia, both external and internal, are information about something in the outside world. They are usually vivid in their manifestation characteristics.
It is important to note that not all the sensations that occur inside the body have qualia. In fact, a majority of internal sensations that convey information from various organs or tissue inside the body, such as pressure in the blood vessels (sensed by baroreceptors in carotid sinuses and the aortic arch), blood oxygen level (sensed by chemoreceptors in the carotid body and the aortic body), blood pH and carbon dioxide level (sensed by chemoreceptors in the medulla), and various hormone levels (sensed by various hormone receptors), do not have qualia, and we never know what their phenomenal characteristics are like, i.e., what various blood pressure levels are like, what various blood pH are like, what various hormone levels are like, etc. Similarly, it is important to note that sensory perception qualia do not occur in all stages but occur only in the final stages of sensory perception, such as the final stages of visual perception – which create visual qualia of color, brightness, shape, etc. All the earlier stages of sensory perception, such as the first stage of processing raw sensory signals that arrive at the primary sensory perception area, do not have qualia, and we do not know what their phenomenal characteristics are like, i.e., what these sensory signals are like at these early stages. The fact that some sensations have qualia while some do not and the fact that qualia occur only in the final stages of sensory perception can give clues to why and how qualia and conscious experience occur. This point will be discussed in more details in the next three chapters.
2. Cognition-emotion qualia are qualia that occur in mental processes that perform cognition or emotion functions. They occur in cognitive perceptions (such as perception of time, of existence, of self, and of non-self), cognitive executive functions (such as thinking of something, reliving past events, planning actions, making decisions, and controlling volitional movement), and emotions (such as happiness, sadness, and anger). Like sensory perception qualia, these qualia have phenomenal characteristics, which are unique, cannot be described based on any other qualia or anything else, and must be consciously experienced to know what each of them is like for oneself (e.g., what the perception of time is like, what the thinking is like, or what the feeling of happiness is like). Cognition-emotion qualia are information about conscious activities of cognition or emotion. They are usually not as vivid in their manifestation characteristics as sensory perception qualia.
Once more, it is important to note about the selectivity of qualia occurrences. All of the cognition-emotion qualia occur exclusively in the highest-level mental processes. All the lower-level mental processes, which comprise the vast majority of mental processes, such as the mental processes of the basal ganglia, brainstem nuclei, and cerebellum, do not have qualia, and we never know what their phenomenal characteristics are like, i.e., what the extrapyramidal motor control is like, what cerebellar motor control is like, what autonomic control of body temperature, heart rate, various blood constituents, etc. is like, and so on. Again, the fact that the highest-level cognitive mental processes have qualia while the lower-level mental processes do not gives clues to why and how qualia and conscious experience occur. This point, too, will be discussed in more details in the next three chapters.
3.6. Sensory perception qualia as representations of the outside world
A sensory perception quale of the outside world, such as a vision of a house, a sound of a song, or an odor of a rose, may seem real; however, it is not the physical thing itself. It is just the mental phenomenon of a sensory perception mental process, which occurs with a sensory perception neural process, to represent that thing in the outside world. But because the process of neural perception of the outside world depends on many factors, such as in the case of a visual perception of a house: the external physical factors (the light that illuminates the house, the medium through which the light must pass, the distance between the house and the eyes, etc.), the internal anatomical properties of the whole visual pathway (from the corneas to the visual perception areas in the brain), and the physiologic functions of the whole visual pathway (from the generation of visual signals in the retina through several steps of signal processing in visual perception neural processes to the final visual perception neural processes in the brain), the final neural perception of the outside world and the associated mental perception and quale usually do not represent the outside world identically in detail but are just approximate and modified representations of it. As the details of the neural perception and of the quale are the information about the outside world, the final information that is contained in the neural perception and the quale is not identical with that of the outside world. Sometimes, the inaccuracy produced in the perception may be so great that it results in an illusion, or there may be a perception system anomaly that causes a different perception to occur with the primary perception and results in a condition called synesthesia [58-75].
Some examples of inaccuracy in perceiving the outside world are as follows:
– The visual quale of a house when one looks at the house at a distance does not contain the complete visual details of the house, such as a nail in the house wall, a patch of dirt on the door, or a small crack in a window – this inaccuracy occurs as a result of an external physical factor (the distance) combined with an internal physiologic property (the limited spatial resolution of the retina).
– The visual quale of a fish in a stream is distorted and wavering even if the actual fish is not distorted and stays still – the distortion and wavering occur because of the unsteady refraction of the flowing water that the light from the fish must pass through.
– The quale of pain in the shin after it hit something hard is reduced in intensity if the shin is lightly stroked or massaged – this change in intensity of the pain quale occurs physiologically by the pain gate-control system or by the change of combinatorial coding of primary afferent neurons [76-81].
– An auditory illusion quale of a third tone, a binaural beat, can be heard when two different pure-tone sine waves with frequencies lower than 1,500 Hz and less than 40 Hz difference between them are presented separately through each ear  – this illusion is created physiologically in the auditory perception system [83-87].
– Various visual illusions occur physiologically in normal people, such as the scintillating grid illusion in Figure 3.3 and the rotating movement illusion in Figure 3.4
Figure 3.3 Scintillating grid illusion. The picture consists of gray bars on the black background with small white discs at the intersections. The illusion is dark dots that appear and disappear (scintillate) at the intersections randomly.
Figure 3.4 A rotating illusion (from http://opticalillusionshare.blogspot.com/). The picture is a still picture, yet rotating movements of the circles are seen. The rotating movements can be seen best when not looking at the picture directly.
– A color perception quale occurs together with an auditory perception quale when a person who has sound-color synesthesia hears a musical sound. This additional visual quale is created by a neural connection anomaly between the auditory and the visual perception systems [88-90].
In representing the outside world, the inaccuracy of a neural process’s perception and the inaccuracy of its associated quale involve all details of the outside world, not only the physical details as discussed above but also the temporal details. For example, in the case of a visual perception of a house, it takes time from the moment the house reflects off light signals to the moment the visual neural processes perceive it and the visual quale of the house occurs. So, the house that we see in the mind is not the real-time house but the house a few milliseconds ago. This can be very obvious in the case of very distant objects, for example, the sun we see in our minds is not a real-time sun but an 8-minute-ago sun at an 8-minute-ago position in the sky, and this is similarly true for all other celestial objects: the planets, the stars, the supernovas, etc. Also, a temporal inaccuracy may arise physiologically from the work of neural processes themselves, such as the prolongation of time that we feel in the stopped-clock illusion [91-94].
In summary, a sensory perception quale occurs with the function of a sensory perception neural process to represent a physical thing in the outside world but is not the physical thing itself. As there are many factors that affect the process of neural perception of the outside world, the details of the resulting neural perception and its quale are not exactly identical with the details of the outside world. Thus, a sensory perception quale is just an approximate, modified representation of something in the outside world, and illusion qualia or synesthetic qualia, which represent nothing real in the outside world, may also occur.
If qualia are just representations of things in the external world, what are those things in the external world really like by themselves?
Things in the external world do not have color, shape, size, dimension, hardness, odor, etc. as they appear in our minds by themselves; they just have properties that can create these sensory perceptions in a being’s nervous system and mind via the being’s sensory perception systems. The perceptions of a thing in the outside world may be different in different beings, but none of the perceptions are that thing or can be claimed to be the only correct representations of that thing.
Figure 3.5 Qualia among different subjects
In Figure 3.5, the man, the woman, the dog, or the bee cannot claim that his/her/its perception quale of the house is the house or that his/her/its perception quale of the house is the only one that is the correct representation of that house. Similarly, perceptions of space, time, and existence are not what space, time, and existence are either. The former entities are just mental phenomena that are created to represent the latter entities, but they are not the same ones.
What things in the outside world, space, time, and existence are like by themselves is an unanswerable question because what those things are like is not absolute but observer-dependent. If there is no observer to judge what they are like (i.e., in the question of what they are like by themselves), then the question of what they are like is meaningless. However, what those things really are by themselves is an answerable question. The answer is that they are entities with properties that can create sensory perception qualia, which manifest themselves as vision, sound, space, time, etc., in some entities that have signal-processing systems that can create qualia, such as humans or some other animals. Hence, the correct depiction of Figure 3.5 is, in fact, Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6 Qualia exist only in the minds
The man, the woman, the dog, the bee, and the house do not have shape, size, color, etc. as we perceive them by themselves. Shape, size, color, etc. of all things exist in the mind of the observers only.
The next chapter (Chapter 4 – Theorem III) will examine and establish whether qualia are physical phenomena or not, and the following chapter (Chapter 5 – Theorem IV) will examine and find the true nature of qualia and answer the interesting question of whether what you see as red in your mind can appear as blue, green, or other colors in other people’s minds.
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Keywords: qualia, quale, conscious awareness, conscious experience, consciousness, phenomenal characteristics, experiential characteristics