Chapter 2

Theorem II: The Mind is the Composite of All Information-processing Processes of the Brain

In the previous chapter, it has been shown that a mental process occurs, exists, and functions with a neural process and that the mind occurs, exists, and functions with the brain – that is, a mental process and the mind do not occur, exist, and function alone by themselves. But what is their nature, and how do they occur, exist, and function with a neural process and the brain? This chapter will investigate these problems and methodologically find the scientific answers for them.

2.1. The nature of the mind and mental processes

For the mind, there are two mutually exclusive possibilities of its nature. One possibility is that the mind is a non-material entity that occurs, exists, and functions separately from the brain, like the soul (in many beliefs) that is envisioned to be a separate entity from the physical body. The other possibility is that the mind is a non-material entity that occurs, exists, and functions inherently in the brain, with no functionally separate entity occurring, like the information that occurs and circulates inherently in the electrical current in the functioning integrated circuit (IC), with no functionally separate entity occurring. These possibilities are the same in the case of a mental process and its neural process. As the mind is composed of mental processes and as the brain is composed of neural processes, to simplify the investigation of the nature of the mind, we will investigate this problem in detail by examining the possibility of how a mental process (instead of the much more complex mind) occurs, exists, and functions in relation to its neural process (instead of the much more complex brain).

To reiterate, the two mutually exclusive possibilities for the nature of a mental process are as follows:

Possibility 1. A mental process is a functionally separate entity from its neural process – occurring, existing, and functioning separately from its neural process. Thus, its functions and effects are separate from its neural process’s functions and effects.

Possibility 2. A mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process – occurring, existing, and functioning inherently in its neural process. Thus, its functions and effects are naturally inherent in its neural process’s functions and effects.

Now, the means to identify which possibility is correct is to examine the physical properties of the entity that a mental process is asserted to be. This is because the entity that a mental process is must have all the physical properties of a mental process, which are the same as the properties of the mind and mental processes discussed in the previous chapter. They are listed here again, as follows:

Physical properties of a mental process (PM)

PM1. Defining physical properties

PM1.1. Its nature is non-material.

PM1.2. Its functions are signal processing.

PM2. Additional physical properties

PM2.1. Its location is at its neural process.

PM2.2. Its occurrence and existence are with its neural process.

PM2.3. Its information is information in its neural process.

PM2.4. Its abilities are abilities of its neural process.

PM2.5. Its capacities are capabilities of its neural process.

PM2.6. Its changes are with its neural process.

PM2.7. Its processing capabilities are fast, dynamic, and information-intensive.

PM2.8. Its activities are associated with electromagnetic activities.

Now, let’s examine the physical properties of the entity that a mental process is asserted to be in the two possibilities, one by one.

  Possibility 1: A mental process is a functionally separate entity from its neural process.

Suppose a mental process is an entity, M (Figure 2.1), that occurs, exists, and functions separately from its neural process, like the soul (in many beliefs) that is envisioned to be a separate entity from the physical body.

Figure 2.1 A functionally separate entity M

PM1.1. The nature of M must be non-material, but what is the exact nature of this non-material entity M? Up to the present time, there is no answer to this question. So, at present, M is an unknown entity that needs a new hypothesis to describe its nature.

PM1.2. The functions of M must be signal processing. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, which processes electrical/electrochemical (E/EC) signals, then the signals that M processes cannot be E/EC signals. Thus, many questions will arise, such as what is the nature of signals that M uses in processing; where does M get those signals from; if it is the neural process that sends signals to M, how can the neural process send signals that are not E/EC signals and how can the neural process send such signals to the functionally separated M; and how can the neural process receive such signals back from M so that it can function in concert with M?

(For a separate entity M to send its information to a neural process, it must be able to create appropriate E/EC signals in the neural process because E/EC signals are the only form of information that neural process can manage. In doing so, M must be able to affect millions of neurons in the neural process correctly and accurately, that is, it must be able to affect billions of neural membrane channels and synaptic channels at correct positions, at a precise time, and in a correct way so that appropriate depolarizations occur and result in appropriate E/EC signals circulating in the neural process in a precisely correct pattern. How can M know about these exact details, and how can M carry out such effects? See more discussion of this matter in Chapter 8.)

PM2.1. M’s position must be at its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, how can it follow its neural process correctly and instantaneously, no matter which way or how fast the head moves – what is the mechanism that keeps it anatomically fixed with its neural process?

PM2.2. M’s occurrence and existence must be with its neural process. The question of M’s occurrence is, if M occurs separately from its neural process, how does M occur? If M occurs from its neural process, how can its neural process produce it and what is the neural process’s apparatus that produces it? But if M does not occur from its neural process, then what creates it? And if there is something that creates M, questions will arise, such as what creates that thing, what is the nature of that thing, how can that thing create M, and why does it create M only in association with the neural process – why not independently of the neural process – and how does it create M to exist with the neural process correctly both spatially and temporally? Or if M occurs from nothing by itself, many questions will also arise, such as how can it do that, what is the mechanism that ties its occurrences to only its neural process, what is the mechanism that makes it occur and exist with its neural process correctly both spatially and temporally?

PM2.3. M’s information must be information in its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its information need not be the same as the information in its neural process. So, its information must somehow match with its neural process’s information so perfectly that its information is always the same as the information in its neural process and thus seems to be information in its neural process, as required. The questions are where does M get such information and how can M always match its information with that of its neural process?

PM2.4. M’s abilities must be abilities of its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its abilities need not be the same as the abilities of its neural process. So, its abilities must somehow match with its neural process’s abilities so perfectly that its abilities are always the same as the abilities of its neural process and thus seem to be abilities of its neural process, as required. The questions are how can it do that or what is the mechanism that keeps its abilities matching with its neural process’s abilities all the time?

PM2.5. M’s capacities must be capacities of its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, its capacities need not be the same as the capacities of its neural process. So, its capacities must somehow match with its neural process’s capacities so perfectly that its capacities are always the same as the capacities of its neural process and thus seem to be capacities of its neural process, as required. The questions are how can it do that or what is the mechanism that keeps its capacities matching with its neural process’s capacities all the time?

PM2.6. M’s changes must be with its neural process. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, it need not change with its neural process. So, its changes must somehow match with its neural process’s changes so perfectly that its changes are always the same as its neural process’s changes and thus makes M seem to change with its neural process, as required. The questions are how can it do that or what is the mechanism that keeps its changes matching with its neural process’s changes all the time?

PM2.7. M’s processing capabilities must be fast, dynamic, and information-intensive. M’s processing capabilities can be fast and dynamic by its nature, but how can it be information-intensive. To be information-intensive, it must receive information from something. But if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, how can it get information from its neural process (see the previous discussions in PM1.2 and PM2.3), or if it does not get information from its neural process, how and where can it get information that can be as intensive as that of its neural process?

PM2.8. M’s activities must be associated with electromagnetic activities. If M’s position can somehow be fixed at its neural process, then this property can be fulfilled because M will always be associated with its neural process and thus with the neural process’s electromagnetic activities as well. But the problem is, as discussed previously in PM 2.1, if M is a functionally separate entity from its neural process, how can M’s position always be at its neural process?

So, the possibility that a mental process is a functionally separate entity from its neural process but is able to have all the required properties of mental processes has several critical questions that, at present, have no answers, and several new hypotheses are needed to support this possibility.

Next, let’s examine Possibility 2.

   Possibility 2: A mental process is a functionally united entity with its neural process.

If a mental process is a functionally inherent entity in its neural process – occurring, existing, and functioning inherently in its neural process, with no functionally separate entity occurring, then this entity must be some non-material process that occurs, exists, and functions inherently in the neural process. What is this non-material process?

When a neural process, which is the signal-processing process of a neural circuit, is functioning, the material E/EC signals will be circulated and processed in the neural circuit. But, non-materially, the information that is inherent in the material E/EC signals will always be circulated and processed simultaneously with the material E/EC signals too. This is because the information is the inherent, non-material counterpart of the material E/EC signals. Therefore, in the entirety, there are two processes occurring concurrently. The first one is the obvious, material process: the neural process, which is the electrical/electrochemical signal-processing process (EPP). The other one is the inconspicuous, non-material process: the information–processing process (IPP). Both processes not only occur simultaneously but also are inseparable and cannot occur independently of each other. Each is the inherent counterpart of the other: the EPP is the inherent, material counterpart of the IPP, and the IPP is the inherent, non-material (informational) counterpart of the EPP (the neural process).

Because the IPP is a non-material process that occurs, exits, and functions inherently in its neural process, it is qualified to be the entity that a mental process is. If we verify this concept with all the mental processes, which are the entities that perform sensation and perception functions, integrative and control functions, and response or output functions, we will find that all mental processes’ functions are indeed about information processing. Therefore, it is very probable that the mental process is the IPP (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2 A functionally united IPP

Now, we have to check whether this possibility (that a mental process is the IPP – the inherent, informational counterpart of the EPP) is correct or not. If a mental process is the IPP, then the IPP must have all the physical properties of a mental process; otherwise, a mental process cannot be the IPP. Does the IPP have all the required properties? This can be verified as follows:

PM1.1. The IPP’s nature must be non-material. This property is satisfied because the IPP is non-material, as discussed above. And, because the nature of the IPP is obvious – its nature is an information-processing process – no additional hypothesis is needed to describe the exact nature of a mental process.

PM1.2. The IPP’s functions must be signal processing. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, whose function is E/EC signal processing. So, the IPP’s function must be signal processing too. However, the signals that the IPP processes are not material E/EC signals but are non-material signals, i.e., information.

PM2.1. The IPP’s location must be at its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, so its location must always be at its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, is always at the same place as its neural process, no matter which way or how fast the head moves.

PM2.2. The IPP’s occurrence and existence must be with its neural process. These properties are satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, so it must occur and exist with its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, never occurs or exists alone or with anything else.

PM2.3. The IPP’s information must be information of its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP itself is the inherent, informational counterpart of the neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, always has only the information that is of its neural process and never has information that is not of its neural process.

PM2.4. The IPP’s abilities must be abilities of its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, so its abilities must naturally be abilities of its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, can do only what its neural process can and cannot do what its neural process cannot.

PM2.5. The IPP’s capacities must be capacities of its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, so its capacities must naturally be capacities of its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, can do something with limited capacities like its neural process and cannot do anything exceeding the capacities of its neural process.

PM2.6. The IPP’s changes must be with its neural process. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, so its changes must be with its neural process. This is why a mental process, if it is the IPP, must change when its neural process changes and cannot change if its neural process does not change.

PM2.7. The IPP’s processing capabilities must be fast, dynamic, and information-intensive. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process, which has fast, dynamic, and information-intensive capabilities by its nature. This is why a mental process’s processing capabilities, if the mental process is the IPP, are bound to be fast, dynamic, and information-intensive like its neural process and cannot become slow, inert, and information-deprived by itself even if it tries to.

PM2.8. The IPP’s activities must be associated with electromagnetic activities. This property is satisfied because the IPP is the inherent, informational counterpart of its neural process and because a neural process is always associated with electromagnetic activities. This is why a mental process’s activities, if the mental process is the IPP, are always associated with electromagnetic activities and cannot occur without associated electromagnetic activities.

Evidently, the IPP completely has the physical properties of a mental process. Now, this may not be enough for the IPP to be the entity that the mental process is. We have to check whether the IPP has the functional properties of the mental process, i.e., whether it can function to do or to be as the mental process can, too. This can be checked as follows: First, what a mental process can function to do or to be depends on its abilities, capacities, and information. Second, the abilities, capacities, and information of a mental process are the abilities, capacities, and information of its neural process (see the previous chapter). Third, the abilities, capacities, and information of the IPP are the same as those of its neural process (see the previous discussions). So, the abilities, capacities, and information of a mental process are the abilities, capacities, and information of its IPP. Thus, what a mental process can function to do or to be, the IPP can function to do or to be too. Therefore, for the functional properties that some philosophers believe are the properties of the mind and mental processes, such as being private, subjective, intentional, and representational, and having propositional content [1-6], the IPP has these properties too. For example, because the IPP occurs privately in an individual as its neural process does and because only that individual is the subject who experiences it, the IPP is certainly private and subjective, like the mental process. Similarly, if a mental process of a certain neural process is a representation of something, then the IPP of that neural process is certainly a representation of that thing too because the IPP has the same information as the mental process does. And, if it can be proved that a mental process of a certain neural process is intentional by some arguments, then the IPP, which has the same abilities, capacities, and information as the mental process does, can also be proved to be intentional by the same arguments. Therefore, in all aspects, both physical and functional, the IPP has the same properties as the mental process does.

2.2. Theorem II

In summary, there are two possibilities: that a mental process is a functionally separate entity from its neural process and that a mental process is a functionally intrinsic entity in its neural process, i.e., the IPP. The former possibility has to devise an unknown entity and needs several additional hypotheses to explain how this unknown entity can have the “must-have” physical properties of a mental process. If this unknown entity can explain something or has the potential to explain something about the mental process more than the other possibility, the IPP, can, it is logical and necessary to invent this entity. But, at present, there is no evidence that this unknown entity can explain anything or has the potential to explain anything about the mental process more than the IPP can. On the contrary, the IPP has all the required properties of a mental process without having to formulate additional hypotheses to support its existence. It is thus illogical and unnecessary to forge an unknown entity to be the mental process and rational to conclude that the mental process is the IPP. Therefore, this theory asserts this as Theorem II:

Theorem II: A mental process is the information-processing process of its neural process.

Generally, mental processes are the information-processing processes of their neural processes. Because the mind is the composite of all mental processes while the brain is the composite of all neural processes, the mind is the composite of all information-processing processes of the brain. Theorem II regarding the mind can thus be specifically stated as:

Theorem II: The mind is the composite of all information-processing processes of the brain.

Because the mind is a composite of information-processing processes, it is an informational entity – a non-material entity that is composed of information and information processing – and because the information processing processes that form the human mind are innumerable in number and involve information that ranges from simple to very advanced (such as the complex visual perception, the complex problem-solving thought, and the complex command of motor movement), the human mind is an informational entity in a highly advanced form. And, regarding the extended mind as discussed in the previous chapter, it can be concluded that the extended mind, or the extended version of the mind, is the composite of all information-processing processes of the whole nervous system.

Figure 2.3 The mind

In conclusion, the mind – the non-material entity that exists in an animal with a nervous system and that functions to sense, operate, and send signals – is the non-material process that exists inherently with the brain: the composite of all information-processing processes of the brain (Figure 2.3A). To explain the phenomena of the mind, therefore, a novel entity (Figure 2.3B) is not needed.

2.3. Physicalism and dualism

Because the mind is the composite of all information-processing processes of the brain, if we consider an information-processing entity to be a physical entity, then the mind is a physical entity. Therefore, in this sense, this theory supports physicalism [7-9], i.e., that everything is physical. However, as noted in the previous section, because the mind is an information-processing entity, it is an informational entity – a non-material entity that is composed of information and information processing – not a conventional physical entity like mass, energy, and force, which will be called mechanical entities in this theory. The mind is thus basically different from the mechanical entities, and that is why it is so different from them. Evidently, there are two basically different classes of entities in this universe, and, in this aspect, the universe consists of two parts: the mechanical part, which is the part of the universe that the mass, the energy, the forces, and other mechanical entities, including the neural process and the brain, exist; and the informational part, which is the part of the universe that the mind, the mental process, and other informational entities exist. Both parts are inseparable and complementary to each other, and complementary entities in both parts, such as the mental process and the neural process or the mind and the brain, function unitedly as one. Therefore, each part is not an epiphenomenon of its counterpart: the mental process is not an epiphenomenon of the neural process, and the mind is not an epiphenomenon of the brain. Unlike an epiphenomenon, such as the sound from a working electric engine, which can be ridden off in a certain way without affecting the essential function of the engine (such as let the engine work in a vacuum to get rid of the sound),  the mental process cannot be ridden off from the neural process, and the mind cannot be ridden off from the brain at all – there cannot be the neural process without the mental process, and there cannot be the brain without the mind – and vice versa. Moreover, it is not that the neural process and the brain cause the mental process and the mind to occur and function according to them – they both occur and function together as one. The neural process and the brain are just the mechanical side while the mental process and the mind are just the informational side of the same signaling process. It is the nature of this universe that there exist, not one, but two sides in the signaling process. Thus, this theory supports dualism [10-12] in the sense that there are not one but two basically different classes of entities in this universe; however, because they function unitedly as one with their counterparts, this theory does not support dualism in the sense that there are two classes of entities that function independently of each other in this universe.

2.4. Implications

Because the E/EC-signal-processing process, or the EPP, is the mechanical counterpart of the IPP, which is the mental process, the physical characteristics of the EPP can be surrogates for the physical characteristics of the IPP and the mental process. Therefore, it must be possible to study (measure, monitor, compare, etc.) a mental process physically (qualitatively and quantitatively) by studying the physical characteristics of the EPP, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process, the details of the signaling pattern, and the electrical and magnetic parameters of the signaling process. For example:

– The EPP characteristics, such as the signaling pattern, can be used to identify definitely what the exact mental process is occurring, such as what the exact visual image, thought, or emotion is occurring in the person’s mind.

– The EPP characteristics, such as the number of neurons participating in the signaling process or the electrical or magnetic parameters of the signaling process, can be used to objectively quantify and compare mental processes, such as to quantify how intense the pain feeling, anger emotion, or alertness that the person is experiencing is and to compare who is experiencing the pain or anger more or who is more alert.

Also, because the EPPs and the IPPs are inseparable, complementary to each other, and cannot occur independently of each other, anything that affects the EPPs will similarly affect the IPPs. Thus, they will always be created, changed, and destroyed similarly in all events and experiments. This can be the basis for experiments about the IPPs and mental processes by using the EPPs as surrogates.

2.5. Predictions

1. A mental process can be identified, quantified, or monitored by identifying, quantifying, or monitoring only its EPP, respectively. These actions on the EPP are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding actions on the mental process to occur, and these actions on anything else without having the actions on the EPP will not result in the corresponding actions on the mental process.
2. A mental process can be created, modified, tested, or destroyed by creating, modifying, testing, or destroying only its EPP, respectively. These actions on the EPP are both necessary and sufficient for the corresponding actions on the mental process to occur, and these actions on anything else without having the actions on the EPP will not result in the corresponding actions on the mental process. Experimentally, isolated actions on the EPP, without having actions on anything else, can be done by electrical stimulations, magnetic stimulations, and pharmacologic agents that have effects on only the E/EC signal transmissions of the neural process (because the EPP consists of the E/EC signal transmissions among neurons of the neural process).
3. In any event or experiment, all predictions that are valid for the EPP, such as that the EPP will occur, change, or disappear, will be identically valid for the mental process of that EPP, that is, the changes that occur in the EPP and those that occur in the mental process of that EPP will be identical in all aspects (quality, quantity, temporal pattern, etc.). For example, if the EPP changes its function abruptly from processing visual signals of the static, faint, homogeneous red color to processing visual signals of the dynamic, vivid, complex movie, the changes in the mental process of that EPP will be identical in all aspects, such as identical changes from homogeneous color to complex movie (quality), from faint to vivid (quantity), and abruptly from static to dynamic (temporal pattern).

All of the above predictions can be verified by experiments on conscious human subjects.

2.6. Remarks

It may be against the feeling or belief of some people that the mind is not a novel entity or not a separate entity from the brain. So, even with all the demonstrated evidence, some people may still insist that the mind is not the IPPs of the brain but is something else. Let’s denote this something else with M’. If this is the case, then there must be some properties that differentiate M’ from the IPPs. These properties must be the mind’s properties, other than those listed at the beginning of this chapter, that M’ has but the IPPs do not. Thus, not only must M’ have all the already listed physical properties of the mind but also it must have these additional, differentiating properties too. The questions are, other than the IPPs, what is the entity that has all the already listed physical properties of the mind and what are these additional, differentiating properties that will abrogate the IPPs as the entity that the mind is? As long as such an entity and such additional, differentiating properties are not identified and as long as the predictions pertaining to the assertion that the mind is the IPPs are true, which is the case at present, it is reasonable to keep the concept and the theorem that the mind is the IPPs. With an evidence-based theorem that has testable predictions as the basis, experiments can be designed to verify or falsify it. No matter whether the theorem is proved to be true or false, advance in understanding of the mind will occur, and a more refined or better theorem will emerge.

Also, it is to be noted that the idea that mental processes are caused by specific brain activation pattern is not a novel one. For example, Moutoussis (2016) wrote that, “… a specific brain–activation pattern, leading to the formation of a specific percept. The Causal Theory of Perception (see Grice, 1961; Lewis, 1980; Snowdon, 1981) is a philosophical standpoint in harmony with this view …  specific, individual perceptual experiences are caused by specific, individual brain activation pattern …” [4]. The concept that the mind and mental processes are just signal-processing processes or information processing process is not novel either. For example, Roederer (2016) stated that, “when does a specific distribution of neural firings actually become a mental image? This neural activity distribution does not become anything – it is the image” [13], Smart (1959) said that, “When I say that a sensation is a brain process …, I am using is in the sense of strict identity” [14], Varvatsoulias (2014) discussed in detail various scholars’ opinion on the concept that the human mind is a computational process device [15], and Doyle asserts that “The mind is a biological information processing system” [16]. These ideas are also evident even in sci-fi novels and movies. The movie series “The Matrix”, for example, certainly based their plots on these principles. Also, Doyle proposes, before this theory does, that information, which is neither matter or energy, can provide the basis for mental substance and says that immaterial information is as close as a physical or biological scientist can get to the idea of a soul or spirit [17]. These concepts are very similar to the concept of this theorem, the concept that information, specifically information in neural processes, have the right properties – being non-material and having the required physical properties – to be mental processes and the mind. However, this theory proves these concepts methodologically, which, to the author’s knowledge, has never been done before. Also, this theory proves that the informational entity that a mental process is is, specifically, the information-processing process – the information counterpart of the material E/EC-signal-processing process – of a neural process and states it explicitly as a theorem.

Looking ahead

All the puzzles about the mind and mental processes are not yet completely solved. Theorem I and II are true for the mind and all mental processes. However, when the mind and mental processes function, sometimes there are mental phenomena called qualia and consciousness occurring. What are these additional phenomena? Are Theorem I and II applicable to these phenomena as well, or are they different entities that need additional theorems? These questions will be answered in the following chapters.

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“What happens when we see, hear, smell, and feel things around us, experience moods, think of various things, plan appropriate actions, and command our hands, lips, and body to move, if not information, information, and information are being processed.

We are just informational entities, composed of information and information processing, living on the informational side of the universe.”

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